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Metacognition enhances students’ efforts to effectively self-regulate their 
learning. It is a multifaceted construct that includes metacognitive knowledge, 
metacognitive regulation, and metacognitive experiences. Metacognition theory clearly 
indicates that metacognitive regulation should be impacted by the context in which the 
learning takes place, but little empirical research has attempted to show this effect of 
context on metacognitive regulation. The purpose dissertation of this was to investigate 
how context influences undergraduate students’ use of metacognitive regulation. To this 
end, an instrument (the Metacognition Inventory for Post-Secondary Students; MIPSS) 
that assesses metacognitive knowledge globally and metacognitive regulation as a 
context-dependent construct was created and evaluated through item analysis and factor 
analysis. Then, within-person differences in metacognitive regulation were examined, 
measures of metacognition and self-regulated learning (SRL) were associated with each 
other and used to predict academic achievement. Results indicated the MIPSS has a bi-
factor structure, metacognitive regulation is influenced by the course and activity 
associated with the regulation, and associations among metacognition and SRL scales and 
achievement tend to follow theoretical predictions. Limitations and future directions for 
research are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Students’ ability to monitor and regulate their own learning has a substantial 
impact on their academic success at the post-secondary level. Relative to high school, 
most post-secondary educational environments put greater responsibility on the student to 
keep track of deadlines, study and complete coursework outside of the classroom, and 
identify what has been learned sufficiently and what has not. Said differently, academic 
success in higher education requires greater self-regulated learning (SRL). Students who 
self-regulate their learning are metacognitive, motivated, and behaviorally engaged in the 
learning process (Zimmerman, 2008). Metacognition is the term given to cognition about 
cognitive products and processes and includes knowledge about cognition (metacognitive 
knowledge), regulation of cognition (metacognitive regulation), and experiences related 
to the awareness of one’s own cognition (metacognitive experiences; Tarricone, 2011). 
Metacognition, specifically, and SRL, more broadly, have been the subject of much 
educational research for more than thirty years. Metacognition and SRL research 
originated from different literatures, but the two areas have grown together and now 
overlap considerably. Although metacognition is only one part of SRL, the focus of this 
dissertation is on metacognition and not other, equally important aspects of SRL. More 
specifically, the focus of this dissertation is on within-person (intra-individual) variability 
in metacognitive regulation. 
 For the most part, existing research on SRL and metacognition has focused on 
either isolating and teasing apart the various sub-processes that unfold as one completes a 
learning task or relating individual differences in metacognition to differences in 
performance outcomes or other educationally-relevant variables (e.g., motivation). The 
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latter has involved examining differences in metacognition in a single class or activity or 
on average across all classes and activities. Though it is recognized that a person’s 
metacognitive regulation is likely to vary across contexts, little is known about such 
within-person variability. Further, a practically useful yet understudied area is how 
student characteristics (e.g., motivation, prior knowledge) and various aspects of the 
learning context (e.g., instruction, learning activities, peer interaction) contribute to 
within- and between-person differences in SRL. Identifying characteristics of students 
and learning contexts that support and encourage SRL as well as those that discourage 
and inhibit SRL will facilitate efforts to increase the likelihood that students will engage 
in SRL while in class or learning independently. 
 Studying within-person variability in metacognition might also help determine 
whether students who fail to metacognitively regulate their learning are exhibiting an 
availability deficiency or a production deficiency (Veenman, 2013b; Veenman, Van 
Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006). Students exhibiting an availability deficiency do not 
have the metacognitive knowledge that underlies the ability to apply metacognition to a 
specific task. In contrast, students exhibiting a production deficiency have the ability to 
metacognitively regulate, and likely do in other situations, but for some reason are failing 
to do so at a given time. This distinction is important because the type of intervention or 
assistance needed depends on whether the individual is experiencing an availability or 
production deficiency. If it can be determined that a student regulates in one situation but 
not in another, that student is most likely exhibiting a production deficiency when failing 
to fully make use of her metacognitive capabilities. However, if a student rarely regulates 
his cognition, regardless of the situation, he is likely exhibiting an availability deficiency.  
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 An inescapable obstacle currently inhibiting research on within-person differences 
in metacognition is the inability to measure such differences in a way that is not overly 
burdensome to either participants or researchers. Existing methods such as think-aloud 
protocols could be used to study within-person differences but would require substantial 
time from participants and resources from researchers. Existing self-report methods 
would require substantial reconfiguring in order to tease apart the possible sources of 
within-person differences in metacognition. Therefore, the first step in completing this 
dissertation was to develop a new instrument that made it possible to efficiently measure 
and study within-person differences in metacognition. This instrument was named the 
Metacognition Inventory for Post-Secondary Students (MIPSS). 
 The aim of this dissertation is to investigate how context (as distinguished by 
course and activity) influences undergraduate students’ use of metacognitive regulation. 
The overarching research question being investigated is: how is undergraduate students’ 
(self-reported) metacognitive regulation influenced by the course and academic activity 
in which one is engaged? In addressing this larger question, the factor structure of the 
MIPSS was investigated, within-person differences in metacognitive regulation were 
examined, measures of metacognition and SRL were used to predict academic 
achievement, and context-specific measures of metacognition were compared with 
course-specific and context-general measures of metacognition and SRL. 
Results of bi-factor analyses indicate a bi-factor model approximates the MIPSS 
data well. This bi-factor structure includes a general metacognition factor that was 
associated with all the items and group factors made up of subsets of items that 
correspond to declarative, procedural, and conditional metacognitive knowledge, and 
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metacognitive regulation during four different academic activities that most 
undergraduate students encounter regularly. This structure suggests that there is a broad 
level of metacognition that varies across individuals and additional sources of variation in 
metacognition among individuals that are not associated with their general level of 
metacognition.  
Results of the repeated-measures analyses of variance revealed within-person 
differences in regulation associated with participants’ favorite and least favorite courses. 
Participants reported using metacognitive regulation and SRL in their favorite courses 
more frequently than in their least favorite courses. The difference between courses 
varied across different academic activities, suggesting that the activity in which one is 
engaged might also influence metacognitive regulation.  
Self-report measures of metacognition and SRL were weak to moderate predictors 
of academic achievement. Associations among the various instruments’ scales generally 
followed expectations and suggest that (a) metacognitive knowledge is separate but 
related to metacognitive regulation, (b) multiple course-specific scales are able to capture 
differences in regulation across courses, and (c) students’ metacognitive regulation 
during a given activity can vary considerably depending on the course for which the 
activity is done. 
The next chapter presents a review of the literature relevant to this dissertation. 
Then, Chapter 3 outlines the method used to create the MIPSS and for the two studies. 
Chapter 4 contains results of the analyses that were conducted to test the three research 
questions. And, Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the results, limitations and future 
directions for research, and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This chapter reviews the literature related to metacognition and its measurement. 
First, early theories of metacognition and the intersection of metacognition and self-
regulated learning (SRL) are reviewed. Second, contemporary perspectives on 
metacognition are discussed, with special attention given to the influence of context on 
metacognition. Third, seven common methods of measuring metacognition are described. 
Fourth, seven existing self-report instruments are presented along with information about 
their structure, reliability, and validity. Finally, gaps in the literature that are addressed by 
this dissertation are presented. 
Classic Perspectives 
 This section reviews early theories of metacognition that have been influential in 
educational psychology, followed by a discussion of the intersection of metacognition 
and SRL. This discussion is limited to theories most related to metacognition in academic 
contexts, and does not cover other aspects of metacognition such as theory of mind, 
perspective taking, and epistemic cognition (see Moshman, 2015 for an excellent 
discussion of metacognition beyond academic contexts). The four theories of 
metacognition presented here are those created by Flavell (1976, 1979), Brown, 
Bransford, Ferrara, and Campione (1983), Jacobs and Paris (1987), and Nelson and 
Narens (1990). Because Flavell’s framework is widely considered to be the original 
conceptualization of metacognition, it is discussed in the greatest detail. 
Early Theories of Metacognition 
 Flavell’s work on metacognition began with his work on another similar 
construct: metamemory. The term metamemory was coined by Flavell (1971), and he 
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conceptualized it as including knowledge, monitoring, and regulation of memory 
processes. Memory monitoring and the selection and use of memory strategies were of 
particular interest in the early study of metamemory (Tarricone, 2011), and they have 
remained a prominent part of metacognition theories. A few years later Flavell introduced 
the term metacognition to describe cognitive processes and knowledge related to more 
than just memory. Flavell’s (1976) original description was brief and rather broad. He 
defined metacognition as, 
one’s knowledge concerning one’s own cognitive processes and products or 
anything related to them. … Metacognition refers, among other things, to the 
active monitoring and consequent regulation and orchestration of these processes 
in relation to the cognitive objects or data on which they bear, usually in the 
service of some concrete goal or objective. (Flavell, 1976, p. 232) 
This paints metacognition as encompassing nearly any knowledge or cognitive 
process that takes a cognitive process or product as its object. Later Flavell (1979) 
pointed out that he believed it is only the content and function of metacognitions that 
distinguish them from other cognitions: metacognitions are not “better” or “greater” than 
other cognitions in terms of form or quality. 
Metacognition’s origins in metamemory can be seen throughout Flavell’s original 
discussion, particularly in the special attention he gave to the knowledge and regulation 
of storage and retrieval processes. Flavell also proposed that metacognition is learned: 
over time children acquire the ability to execute metacognitive processes and they 
construct metacognitive knowledge. He went on to argue that children’s (lack of) 
knowledge related to storage and retrieval processes and their knowledge of strategies 
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that can be used to maximize these processes was related to their problem-solving ability. 
From the very beginning, metacognition was conceptualized as being connected to 
cognitive processes that are crucial to learning. 
 Flavell’s (1979) formal model of cognitive monitoring expanded on his earlier 
work (Flavell, 1976) by including more detail about metacognitive knowledge and 
introducing metacognitive experiences. In this model, cognitive monitoring (a 
metacognitive process) arises from the interactions of metacognitive knowledge, 
metacognitive experiences, tasks, and strategies. Flavell’s definition of metacognitive 
knowledge includes knowledge or beliefs about people as cognitive beings and of 
cognitive tasks, goals, experiences, and actions. He divides metacognitive knowledge into 
knowledge related to person, task, and strategy variables. Knowledge of person variables 
includes within-person differences (e.g., personal cognitive strengths and weakness, 
factors that influence one’s own cognition), interindividual differences (e.g., differences 
between peers, comparison of one’s ability to others), and universals of cognition (e.g., 
knowledge of human cognition in general). Knowledge of task variables involves 
knowing how the features of a task influence the difficulty of the task and the approach 
needed to successfully complete the task. Task variables are divided into the two groups, 
available information (e.g., generally having more information makes a task easier) and 
task demands and goals (e.g., verbatim recall is more difficult than gist recall). 
Knowledge of strategy variables consists of all knowledge related to strategies, including 
how and when to use particular strategies. Flavell also points out that metacognitive 
knowledge cannot, in practice, be divided cleanly into these categories. Most stored 
metacognitive knowledge combines these categories. For example, a student might know 
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that he needs to take reading notes while reading for his geography class when the 
reading assignment is more than ten pages, but he does not need to take reading notes if it 
is a short reading assignment (i.e., a within-person difference related to strategy 
knowledge and task demands). He might also know his friend can learn a great deal from 
any reading assignment without taking notes (i.e., an interindividual difference).  
Flavell (1979) defines metacognitive experiences as conscious cognitive or 
affective experiences that relate to or result from any cognitive endeavor. Metacognitive 
experiences come in a variety of forms. They make take place before, during, or after the 
focal cognitive activity, and they may be brief or enduring. To illustrate, a student 
receives an assignment and feels that she does not understand the content well enough to 
complete it successfully. Another student is reading for his psychology course when he 
senses that he did not understand the previous section correctly. A professor reflects on a 
previous conversation with a colleague and begins to think she did not fully understand 
what he meant. Each of these examples involves a metacognitive experience that takes 
place at a different time in relationship to the cognitive activity at the center of the 
experience. Metacognitive experiences play an important role in the learning process 
because a person may respond to a metacognitive experience by changing a goal or 
strategy, constructing new metacognitive knowledge, or activating additional strategies to 
achieve a goal. 
In their extensive review of metacognition research, Brown and colleagues (1983) 
define metacognition as “the knowledge and control of the domain of cognition” (p.86). 
They divide metacognition into two main components: metacognitive knowledge and 
metacognitive regulation. They state that metacognitive knowledge consists of 
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knowledge of one’s own cognitive processes and others’ cognitive processes. 
Metacognitive regulation includes planning, monitoring, and checking outcomes. Brown 
and colleagues (1983) mention that planning, monitoring, and regulation may be directed 
at strategies, but they do not discuss the classification of the strategies themselves or 
knowledge related to strategies. They also do not include metacognitive experiences or 
any similar affective dimension in their conceptualization of metacognition. They do, 
however, identify four main characteristics of metacognitive knowledge: stability, state-
ability, fallibility, and age relatedness. That is, metacognitive knowledge is relatively 
stable over time (though it can be increased and revised), can be communicated verbally, 
is subject to error, and increases with age. In contrast, metacognitive regulation is 
described as less stable, sometimes unstate-able, and related to the task and situation 
rather than age. Brown and colleagues point out that because of differences in these 
characteristics, different aspects of metacognition are expected to vary in stability, the 
extent to which they are influenced by task and context, and their ability to be verbalized. 
It is therefore necessary to specify which aspect of metacognition is being referred to 
when discussing, for example, the degree to which metacognition is stable across tasks 
and contexts. 
Jacobs and Paris (1987) provide a slightly different definition of metacognition. 
They define metacognition as, “any knowledge about cognitive states or processes that 
can be shared between individuals.... demonstrated, communicated, examined, and 
discussed” (p. 258). That is, automatic or implicit cognitions that cannot be reported are 
not considered metacognition, a perspective that opposes that of Brown and colleagues 
(1983). They also identify the primary components of metacognitive knowledge and 
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metacognitive regulation but refer to them as “self-appraisal of cognition” and “self-
management of thinking” respectively (p. 258). As such, the framework presented by 
Jacobs and Paris is more similar to that of Brown and colleagues (1983) than that of 
Flavell (1979).  
According to Jacobs and Paris (1987), metacognitive knowledge contains three 
sub-components: declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge. Declarative 
knowledge is knowing that, procedural knowledge is knowing how, and conditional 
knowledge is knowing why and when. For example, knowing that learning is easier when 
new information is related to what is already known is declarative knowledge. Knowing 
how to activate prior knowledge and make connections to it is procedural knowledge. 
And, knowing it is helpful to activate related prior knowledge when a new topic is 
introduced in lecture because it will facilitate making connections is conditional 
knowledge. They divide metacognitive regulation into three types of processes: planning, 
evaluation, and regulation. Similar to Brown and colleagues (1983), Jacobs and Paris 
(1987) do not include metacognitive experiences in their definition of metacognition.  
This conceptualization of metacognition was reiterated by Schraw and Moshman 
(1995) in their summary of “standard accounts of metacognition” (p. 352), though 
Schraw and Moshman use the labels knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition 
for the two primary components. The perspective of metacognition as consisting of 
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation (and not metacognitive 
experiences) is currently the most common conceptualization used in research. 
Finally, the metacognitive model of cognition introduced by Nelson and Narens 
(1990) has also been influential, though it is considerably different from the three 
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previously discussed models. This is a model of metacognitive regulation and does not 
include metacognitive knowledge. Though referenced with some regularity in variety of 
fields, this model has not been as popular in educational psychology as the models that 
incorporate both metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation. However, it is 
present in the educational psychology literature, and it is notable because it is a 
considerably different view of metacognition.  
Nelson and Narens’s model attempts to solve Comte’s paradox, which contends 
the mind cannot both think and observe itself thinking at the same time. Their solution to 
the paradox is to distinguish between two levels of processing that happen in parallel: 
object-level processing and meta-level processing. The meta-level contains a model of its 
goals and ideas of how the object-level can be used to accomplish those goals. The levels 
“communicate” through the processes of monitoring and control. Information moving 
from the object-level to the meta-level is a result of monitoring, and information moving 
from the meta-level to the object-level is how the meta-level controls what the object-
level does. Processing can take place at both levels simultaneously, putting this 
perspective in the same realm as dual-processing theories of cognition. Dual-processing 
theories, of which there are many, posit the existence of two separate classes of cognitive 
processes. Most dual-processing theories make a distinction between automatic, fast, and 
intuitive “System 1” processing and deliberative, slow, and analytical “System 2” 
processing (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). The two 
components of Nelson and Narens’s (1990) model are not separated in this way. 
Furthermore, the System 1/System 2 distinction used in most dual-processing theories 
does not connect cleanly with most metacognition theories, largely because processes that 
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have been labeled “metacognitive” do not all fall under the same system. For example, 
monitoring generally considered an automatic process (System 1), whereas planning 
requires the intentional application of cognitive resources (System 2). That being said, 
theories of metacognition (including Nelson and Narens’s) assume that the individual can 
be cognitively engaged in a task while simultaneously regulating cognitive engagement 
with that task, thus adopting a kind of dual-processing perspective even though dual 
processing is not explicitly incorporated into most theories of metacognition. 
The Intersection of Metacognition and SRL 
Metacognition has been part of SRL theories from the beginning, and it is difficult 
to discuss one without the other. SRL developed from the overlap of research on learning 
strategies, academic studying behaviors, and motivation, among other topics. A group of 
researchers working on these topics gathered at the 1986 American Educational Research 
Association meeting and created a broad definition of SRL that was intended to guide 
future research. SRL was defined as, “the degree to which students are metacognitively, 
motivationally, and behaviorally active participants in their own learning process” 
(Zimmerman, 2008, p. 167). Clearly, metacognition was viewed as an important 
component of SRL from the start.  
Originally, the clearest intersection between metacognition and SRL was 
strategies. Flavell (1979) presented knowledge of strategies as a type of metacognitive 
knowledge, and other early theories of metacognition (e.g., Brown et al., 1983; Jacobs & 
Paris, 1987) also identified planning, monitoring, and evaluation as strategies that belong 
to the category of metacognitive regulation. Thus, at least some strategies were place at 
the “meta” level. SRL theories, however, did not generally specify knowledge of 
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strategies as metacognitive knowledge, and processes such as planning and monitoring 
were dubbed metacognitive processes in some theories (e.g., Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; 
Zimmerman, 1989) but not others (e.g., Butler & Winne, 1995). Furthermore, some SRL 
theories (e.g., Butler & Winne, 1995) included the non-strategy aspects of metacognitive 
knowledge (e.g., knowledge of task variables; Flavell, 1979), while others did not (e.g., 
Pintrich & De Groot, 1990). Regardless, early theories of metacognition and SRL were 
generally overlapping in their inclusion of strategies, especially domain-general strategies 
like planning and monitoring. 
The clear overlap between metacognition and SRL led to attempts to draw 
boundaries between the two constructs. Some SRL researchers argued that metacognition 
plays a limited role in SRL. For example, in an issue of Educational Psychologist from 
1995, Winne (1995) discussed the importance of metacognitive knowledge in successful 
SRL, and he called for more research on how instruction can increase students’ 
metacognitive knowledge. Schunk (1995) wrote a response to the article that appeared in 
the same issue, and one of his main points was that metacognition cannot fully explain 
the dynamic interplay of SRL processes. Winne suggested that the role of metacognition 
in SRL should be more thoroughly researched, and Schunk’s response was to remind 
readers that metacognition is a small part of SRL.  
In contrast, some researchers deliberately attempted to integrate components of 
metacognition and SRL theories into a single perspective of how learners can be aware of 
and in control of their learning. Notable examples of this centrist approach include the 
work of Pressley and Borkowski and of Winne. 
  14 
Pressley and Borkowski both began studying memory and memory strategies 
before extending their work to metamemory and metacognition. During the late 1980s, 
they worked to integrate cognitive, metacognitive, and motivational aspects of learning 
into a single theory. In various publications, they employ the terms, “self-regulated 
cognition” (Borkowski, Carr, Rellinger, & Pressley, 1990), “spontaneous strategy use” 
(Borkowski, Carr, & Pressley, 1987), and “good information processor” (Pressley, 
Borkowski, & Schneider, 1989). Regardless of the term being used, they described self-
regulated learning (though not using the term) as the outcome of the interactions between 
domain knowledge, metacognition, and motivation. The role of metacognitive knowledge 
is emphasized, primarily in the forms of declarative, procedural, and conditional 
knowledge related to strategies. The role of motivation is described primarily in terms of 
attributions, but also self-esteem, locus of control, self-efficacy, and goals. Borkowski 
and colleagues (1990) group these motivation constructs with the label self-system and 
posit that the self-system underlies metacognition. Adaptive motivation patterns at the 
level of the self-system are believed to support and enrich further growth of 
metacognition. At the same time, they identify metacognitive knowledge as a potential 
source of motivation for multiple reasons (Borkowski et al., 1987). First, knowing how 
and why a strategy can be effective provides the individual a reason to apply the strategy. 
Second, understanding the role of strategies in the learning process influences the 
individual’s locus of control and the types of attributions made in instances of success 
and failure. Thus, metacognition and motivation are described as having reciprocal 
influences on each other. 
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Winne (1996) explicitly discussed the role of metacognition in SRL. He identified 
various ways individual differences can influence the role of metacognition within an 
episode of SRL. First, differences in domain knowledge influences the role of 
metacognition because (a) individuals with more expertise in a topic are likely to rely less 
on metacognition, and (b) individuals’ task-related metacognitive judgments (i.e., 
judgments of task difficulty and the extent to which information has been stored in 
memory) are influenced by prior knowledge of similar tasks and topics. Second, 
differences in knowledge of strategies lead to differences in strategy use, metacognitive 
monitoring, and metacognitive control. Third, differences in the degree to which a 
strategy is automated lead to differences in how effectively a strategy is executed. One’s 
proficiency in executing a strategy has a direct effect on the need to metacognitively 
monitor and regulate the use of that strategy. Fourth, there are individual differences in 
metacognitive decision-making processes related to strategy selection. Finally, various 
dispositional differences are related to metacognition. For example, metacognitive 
monitoring and reflection are part of deep processing (Biggs, 1987), and therefore a 
tendency toward deep processing rather than shallow processing implies a tendency to be 
metacognitive while engaged in the learning task. 
 In sum, the overlap and connections between metacognition and SRL have been 
apparent and recognized by researchers for decades. Metacognition was formally 
introduced as a construct first, and early theories encompassed a broad range of cognitive 
products and processes that took cognitive products and processes as their objects. SRL 
emerged from diverse topics of education research that all pertained to active, self-
directed learning. Aspects of metacognitive theories were incorporated into SRL theories, 
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but there was considerable variability in the extent to which metacognition was allowed 
to permeate conceptualizations of SRL. Regardless, both metacognition and SRL have 
enjoyed an ongoing presence in the research literature. 
 An important note about the ongoing debates about the distinctions between 
metacognition and SRL, is that both metacognition and SRL are umbrella-terms that 
cover numerous other constructs that overlap and interact in a variety of ways. Attempts 
to completely distinguish between the two are unlikely to be successful as long as the two 
continue to be conceptualized as such broad, overarching constructs. The debate is further 
complicated by the fact that metacognition is used at times to mean either metacognitive 
knowledge or both metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation, and what 
seems to be a perceived need to distinguish between which strategies or processes operate 
at the “meta” level and which do not (Meijer et al., 2013). 
Contemporary Perspectives 
This section reviews more recently published conceptualizations of 
metacognition. This includes a discussion of how some researchers have attempted to 
explicitly address the ways in which the learning context can influence metacognition.  
Modern Conceptualizations of Metacognition 
 Broad theoretical conceptualizations of metacognition have changed little in the 
years following the early work described above. This might be due to the development of 
measures of metacognition that are based on specific conceptualizations. Available 
instruments led researchers to conduct studies that aligned with the conceptualization 
underpinning a specific instrument. It might also be due to the movement away from 
conducting research on metacognition as a whole, multifaceted construct, and instead 
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conducting research on individual components of metacognition, such as monitoring 
accuracy (e.g., Huff & Nietfeld, 2009; Koriat & Bjork, 2005), independent strategy use 
(e.g., Karpicke, Butler, & Roediger, 2009), and confidence judgments (e.g., Krebs & 
Roebers, 2010). Three conceptualizations of metacognition that have been put forth in the 
past 25 years are described below, including that of Schraw and Dennison (1994), 
Efklides (2008, 2011), and Tarricone (2011). 
The highly influential framework proposed by Schraw and Dennison (1994) is 
similar to the previously described frameworks put forth by Brown and colleagues (1983) 
and Jacobs and Paris (1987). At least some of the popularity of Schraw and Dennison’s 
conceptualization of metacognition is due to the popularity of the Metacognitive 
Awareness Inventory (MAI), the self-report measure of metacognition that was created 
and published along with the framework.  
In contrast to earlier definitions of metacognition, Schraw and Dennison’s 
definition was clearly oriented toward learning environments. They defined 
metacognition as “the ability to reflect on, understand, and control one’s learning” 
(Schraw & Dennison, 1994, p. 460). Though the “ability” part of the definition suggests a 
conceptualization based only on processes, the elaborated framework consists of both 
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation. In this conceptualization, 
metacognitive knowledge consists of declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge. 
Metacognitive regulation involves a variety of skills, five of which were identified as 
being particularly prevalent in the literature: planning, information management 
strategies, comprehension monitoring, debugging strategies, and evaluation. Notably, 
Schraw and Dennison’s (1994) conceptualization of metacognition only deviates from 
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that of Jacobs and Paris (1987) when it comes to the way metacognitive regulation is 
divided into its component processes. A slight variation of this two-component 
framework also has served as the basis for the many studies conducted by Veenman and 
colleagues (van der Stel & Veenman, 2010; Veenman, 2011, 2013a; Veenman & Spaans, 
2005).  
Efklides (2008) presented a three-component conceptualization of metacognition. 
In her framework, metacognition is divided into metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive 
experiences, and metacognitive skills. Early theories (e.g., Brown et al., 1983; Flavell, 
1979; Jacobs & Paris, 1987) had generally incorporated two of the three components, but 
did not explicitly include all three components. Efklides was not the first to suggest a 
three-component model (e.g., Pintrich, Wolters, & Baxter, 2000), but it is her model that 
is described here because of her contributions to SRL theory (described next) as well as 
metacognition theory.  
According to Efklides (2008) metacognitive knowledge is declarative knowledge 
and includes models of cognitive processes, knowledge of persons (the self and others), 
knowledge of tasks, knowledge of strategies (including conditional knowledge), 
knowledge of goals, and epistemological beliefs. Epistemological beliefs relate to the 
nature of knowledge and the justifiability of beliefs (Moshman, 2015). Metacognitive 
experiences “are what the person is aware of and what she or he feels when coming 
across a task and processing the information related to it” (Efklides, 2008, p. 279). They 
arise from self-awareness during task engagement, and may be feelings, judgments, 
estimates, and on-line task-specific knowledge. On-line task-specific knowledge is 
metacognitive knowledge that is retrieved and applied to the present task along with 
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awareness of thoughts and specific task elements. Metacognitive skills are deliberately 
used strategies that aid in the control of cognition. Procedural knowledge of strategies is 
placed within this component of metacognition, rather than within metacognitive 
knowledge (as is the case in many conceptualizations of metacognition). Efklides 
identifies five processes that are metacognitive skills: orientation, planning, regulation, 
monitoring, and evaluation. In this model, the three components of metacognition are 
assumed to influence each other during task completion. For example, metacognitive 
skills and metacognitive knowledge are activated by metacognitive experiences, and 
metacognitive knowledge is used in strategy selection. The reciprocal influences of the 
three components in this model echoes the reciprocity that is a prominent feature of her 
broader theory of SRL. 
Efklides (2011) theory of SRL reflects a deliberate attempt to reconcile the 
differences between previous theories of SRL and metacognition and represent the ways 
metacognition, motivation, and affect interact during an SRL episode. In the 
Metacognitive and Affective model of Self-Regulated Learning (MASRL model), 
metacognition, motivation, and affect operate at two reciprocally related levels of 
functioning: the person level and the person x task level. The person level includes trait-
like, global dispositions, knowledge, and characteristics relating to cognition, 
metacognition, motivation, affect, and volition. Person-level characteristics are assumed 
to be relatively stable and influence SRL in a top-down manner. The person x task level 
consists of the individual’s task-related processing and any subjective experiences that 
relate to the task. Person x task interactions are dynamic and influence SRL in a bottom-
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up manner. The top-down/bottom-up reciprocity means that each level has the potential 
to inform and change the other.  
The inclusion of person x task interactions in the MASRL model provides a clear 
point at which the learning context might influence one’s metacognition and SRL. Much 
regulation that takes place during a task is done in response to one’s ongoing progress 
with the task. This can be clearly seen through the process of evaluation: a judgment of 
one’s work on a task is directly connected to the task and context in which it is 
completed. For example, a student might not take time to evaluate the quality of her 
response to an essay prompt if the task is a low-stakes in-class assignment for a teacher 
with relatively low grading standards. However, she might put considerable time into 
evaluating the quality of the essay if it is a final paper for a teacher with higher grading 
standards. Even though the actual task is the same, the context is different, and as a result, 
the student’s use of metacognition is different.  
Finally, Tarricone (2011) conducted a comprehensive review and analysis of the 
literature related to metacognition and proposed a taxonomy of metacognition that 
organizes and synthesizes existing theories of metacognition. Her taxonomy is extensive 
and detailed to the point that the complete figure is available only on an interactive 
website (Tarricone, 2014). In her taxonomy, Tarricone (2011) retains the primary 
distinction between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation. What 
follows is a brief overview of the taxonomy.  
Metacognitive knowledge is divided into declarative, procedural, and conditional 
knowledge. Each type of knowledge can relate to person, task, and strategy variables. 
First, declarative knowledge includes knowledge of intra-individual (i.e., within-person) 
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and interindividual differences; universals of human cognition; task information and 
demands; and strategy attributes, applicability, and effectiveness. Tarricone also states 
that declarative knowledge is “stable, familiar, constant, established long-term 
knowledge” (Tarricone, 2011, p. 156). Second, procedural knowledge is knowledge of 
how to carry out processes and actions that can be used to achieve a desired outcome. 
Third, conditional knowledge involves knowing and recognizing the conditions that 
influence learning. It includes knowing when and why specific strategies are or are not 
appropriate, and it makes strategy transfer possible. 
Metacognitive regulation is divided into (a) regulation of cognition and executive 
functioning and (b) metacognitive experiences. Regulation of cognition and executive 
functioning is further divided into (a) monitoring and control and (b) self-regulation. 
Both monitoring/control and self-regulation can relate to person, task, and strategy 
variables. However, it is not clear if monitoring/control and self-regulation should be 
considered as separate, as many related terms and processes (e.g., monitoring, planning) 
are used in the descriptions of both components. Metacognitive experiences are products 
of on-line monitoring and awareness of cognition. They serve as feedback that can inform 
self-regulation. In the taxonomy, metacognitive experiences are divided into 
metacognitive feelings and metacognitive judgments, both of which can relate to person, 
task, and strategy variables. Metacognitive feelings may relate to task or information 
familiarity, task difficulty, confidence, feelings of knowing, or satisfaction with 
performance. Metacognitive judgments include estimates of learning, memory accuracy, 
solution correctness, effort expenditure, and strategy effectiveness. 
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Clearly, Tarricone’s (2011) taxonomy integrates aspects of all the previously 
described conceptualizations of metacognition. The primary critique of the taxonomy 
offered here is that because it is a synthesis of all previous conceptualizations, it has not 
necessarily clarified nuances or resolved logical inconsistencies within and between the 
various conceptualizations. A source of considerable confusion is the overlap in 
monitoring and control with self-regulation within the category of metacognitive 
regulation. This is probably a product of the general ambiguity surrounding the 
intersection of metacognition and SRL. 
Consistent with most contemporary perspectives of metacognition and SRL 
(especially that of Efklides, 2011), metacognition is conceptualized as being an integral 
component of SRL in this dissertation. That is, metacognition encapsulates metacognitive 
knowledge, regulation, and experiences, and it is bidirectionally related to other aspects 
of SRL such as motivation and behavior, which altogether make up SRL. As such, 
metacognitive knowledge is seen as most useful to learning when being used to inform 
decisions made while self-regulating, and metacognitive regulation is conceptualized as 
metacognitive processes used during SRL. Further, in this dissertation, the knowledge 
and regulation/experiences aspects of metacognition are understood to have different 
basic characteristics. Most fundamentally, knowledge is relatively stable across 
contexts—one’s knowledge does not change just because the task at hand has changed, 
but regulatory processes and experiences, in contrast, are quite unstable and are 
influenced by the learning context because metacognitive regulation and experiences 
involve responding to one’s environment or the outcome of an action. The different 
characteristics of metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation and experiences 
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were described by Brown and colleagues (Brown et al., 1983) and are at least partially 
captured in the two levels of the MASRL model (Efklides, 2011), where the person level 
consists of more stable constructs whereas the person x task level is more dynamic, and 
actions are dependent on both the person and the task. Empirical work by other 
researchers that relates to the unstable, context-sensitive nature of metacognitive 
regulation is reviewed in the next section. 
The Influence of Context on Metacognition 
 The two main components of metacognition—knowledge and regulation—are 
theorized as being influenced by context differently. Namely, metacognitive knowledge 
is generally viewed as stable and influenced little by context whereas metacognitive 
regulation is viewed as dynamic and influenced considerably by the environment in 
which it takes place. As McCardle and Hadwin explain, “regulation is sensitive to 
context. Learners adjust what they do and how they study depending upon task, self, and 
context conditions” (McCardle & Hadwin, 2015 p. 45). The dynamic and variable nature 
of self-regulation, including metacognitive regulation, has been emphasized in theory 
(Efklides, 2008, 2011; Pintrich, 2004; Winne, 1997; Zimmerman, 1989), and is reflected 
in the recent trend toward studying SRL and metacognition as a context-bound event. For 
example, in their programs of research, Azevedo (e.g., Azevedo & Cromley, 2004; 
Azevedo, Guthrie, & Seibert, 2004; Azevedo, Johnson, Chauncey, & Burkett, 2010) and 
Veenman (Veenman, 2013a; Veenman, Bavelaar, De Wolf, & Van Haaren, 2014) collect 
digital trace data as participants complete learning tasks on computers. Actions within the 
computerized learning environment are then interpreted as indicators of various kinds of 
regulation. A primary idea underlying all research that acknowledges the role of context 
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on regulation is that SRL is not algorithmic and will not proceed in the same way during 
different tasks or in different environments. Stated differently, the ways in which SRL 
and metacognitive regulation unfold as a student completes a task are directly influenced 
by the characteristics of the task and context. 
Regulatory processes are embedded within a given context and are best 
understood as part of that context. Researchers often turn to “on-line” measures (such as 
the computer-based tasks described above) in order to study metacognitive regulation in 
connection with the context in which it is used. More rarely and recently, researchers 
have begun to study individuals’ metacognitive regulation across multiple contexts to 
determine how changes in context might contribute to shifts in metacognitive regulation. 
These within-person shifts further support the notion that SRL and metacognitive 
regulation are influenced by context. Empirical studies of within-person differences in 
metacognitive regulation are reviewed next. 
In one study, Ben-Eliyahu and Linnenbrink-Garcia (2015) investigated 
differences in high school and college students’ SRL in favorite and least favorite 
courses. Specifically, they examined the influence of self-reported cognitive, 
metacognitive, affective, and behavioral regulation on the use of learning strategies and 
academic achievement. The participants reported more metacognition, self-regulation, 
and strategy use in favorite courses than in least favorite courses. The pattern of 
relationships among components of SRL, learning strategies, and achievement also 
differed across favorite and least favorite courses and between the high school and 
college samples, further indicating an influence of the learning context on metacognition 
and more broadly, SRL. Furthermore, the zero-order correlations between the individual 
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components of SRL in favorite and least favorite courses (e.g., planning in favorite 
course vs. planning in least favorite course) ranged from .38 to .73 for the high school 
sample and from .19 to .62 for the college sample. This suggests that some components 
of SRL might be more stable while others are more variable across contexts. 
One shortcoming of Ben-Eliyahu and Linnenbrink-Garcia’s study (2015) is that 
they simply asked students to identify a favorite and least favorite course, so in essence, 
each student’s survey was asking about different courses. This makes it difficult to make 
generalizations from their study. A course might be identified as a (least) favorite because 
of the topic, the instructor, the level of difficulty, or any number of other reasons. No 
auxiliary information about the courses was reported, so it is not possible to determine 
whether characteristics of specific courses that made them more or less preferable (e.g., 
level of challenge, student-centeredness) contributed to differences in SRL or the 
relationships between SRL and achievement. Regardless, this study suggests there are 
differences in SRL, including metacognition, across contexts that can be detected 
empirically.  
Additional research on the influence of context on metacognition comes from 
outside the core metacognition and SRL literature. Research from the Student 
Approaches to Learning tradition and the Latent State-Trait theory framework provides 
evidence that students’ use of metacognition and SRL might differ across learning 
contexts. For example, Vermetten, Lodewijks, and Vermunt (1999) adopted a Student 
Approaches to Learning framework while examining the consistency and variability in 
Dutch law students’ use of learning strategies in four different courses during a single 
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semester1. Students were asked to report their strategy use in four different classes. 
Strategies were grouped by type (e.g., memorizing, critical processing, self-regulation). 
Consistency of strategy use was gauged through correlations and variability across 
classes was analyzed with repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The 
researchers concluded that students’ use of learning strategies relative to other students 
was somewhat consistent, and the frequency at which students used some, but not all, 
types of strategies varied across classes. Coertjens, Vanthournout, Lindblom-Ylänne, and 
Postereff (2016) similarly found that theology students varied in their approaches to 
learning in different theology courses, but students’ general approaches to learning were 
predictive of their course-specific approaches. 
The Latent State-Trait theory framework is also consistent with research that has 
examined differences in metacognition across contexts. Constructs that are 
conceptualized as either states or traits can be found in many branches of psychology. 
States are temporary and subject to situational influences, whereas traits are stable, 
enduring, and relatively immune to situational influences. Constructs exhibiting both 
state-like and trait-like characteristics (e.g., anxiety) have been discussed by scholars 
studying personality for decades (e.g., Gaudry, Vagg, & Spielberger, 1975; Kendall, 
Finch, Auerbach, Hooke, & Mikulka, 1976). Rarely has this type of duality been 
explicitly incorporated into the metacognition and SRL literature despite the theoretical 
support and the (admittedly limited) empirical evidence that suggests metacognition and 
SRL have both state-like and trait-like characteristics. Theoretical frameworks such as the 
MASRL model (Efklides, 2011) and some research in the Student Approaches to 
Learning tradition (e.g., Coertjens et al., 2016; Vermetten et al., 1999) suggest 
                                                 
1 Despite being in law school, these students were the age of traditional US undergraduate students. 
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simultaneous trait-like and state-like aspects of SRL and metacognition. Latent State-
Trait theory has been applied successfully to the study of SRL by a small number of 
researchers. 
Latent State-Trait theory is based on classical test theory (CTT) and originated in 
personality research. The basic model derived from CTT specifies that an observed score 
is composed of true score and measurement error. In Latent State-Trait theory, an 
observed score reflects a latent state and measurement error (Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid, 
1999). The latent state is a combination of the individual’s latent trait and the effect of the 
specific situation on the individual. For example, consider the combination of stability 
and variability in an individual’s extraversion. An individual may exhibit moderate 
extraversion in most situations (latent trait) but show little extraversion when at a 
reception full of superiors (a situation-specific effect). If that individual’s extraversion 
was measured under “normal” conditions and again in the exceptional situation, a 
stability coefficient would suggest that the measure was heavily influenced by 
measurement error. Rather than classifying the deviation from what is typical as 
measurement error, Latent State-Trait theory makes it possible to account for deviations 
due to variability in contexts. 
There are few instances of Latent State-Trait theory being applied to 
metacognition research. In one such study, Mujagić and Buško (2013) used a Latent 
State-Trait theory approach to examine students’ use of five different types of learning 
strategies, including metacognitive strategies, while preparing for two different tests. 
They compared the fit of structural equation models that either contained a latent trait 
factor or latent trait and state factors. For all five types of learning strategies, models that 
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contained both latent trait and state factors had better fit. Consistency and occasion-
specificity coefficients also indicated that some types of learning strategies were more 
stable across situations than others. Though promising, these results must be interpreted 
cautiously as they are based on a sample that is small for the structural equation models 
that were tested (N = 155).  
Other research not anchored in Latent State-Trait theory has also examined state 
and trait components of metacognitive regulation. Hong (1998) used structural equation 
modeling to compare the stability of state and trait components of college students’ 
metacognitive regulation during a single semester. Metacognitive regulation was 
measured twice in a single semester by two different self-report instruments. The trait-
metacognition instrument asked how frequently general metacognitive regulation 
strategies were used, and the state-metacognition instrument (given one week later) asked 
about students’ metacognitive regulation during a test that had just been completed. As 
predicted, trait-metacognition was more stable than state-metacognition, but the stability 
of state metacognition was different for two different classes of students. Trait-
metacognition was also a significant predictor of state metacognition at both time points 
for both classes. The studies by Hong (1998) and Mujagić and Buško (2013) both provide 
preliminary evidence for a trait component of metacognitive regulation that is related but 
separate from a state component of metacognitive regulation.  
These studies all provide evidence that at least some part of metacognition can 
vary over time or context. Variability over time (Mujagić & Buško, 2013), over time and 
at different levels of specificity (Hong, 1998), or across classes (Ben-Eliyahu & 
Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2015; Coertjens et al., 2016; Vermetten et al., 1999) have been 
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found, and suggest that within-person differences in metacognition can be detected and 
studied. An important potential source of within-person differences in SRL and 
metacognition that is not accounted for in the studies reviewed here is different types of 
activities that occur within a single course (e.g., completing a homework assignment vs. 
taking a test). SRL theory emphasizes that SRL is situated within tasks and can be 
influenced by the task (Efklides, 2011; Veenman, 2011; Zimmerman, 2000) as well as the 
broader context (e.g., the course) surrounding the learning task (Ben-Eliyahu & Bernacki, 
2015; Efklides, 2011). Therefore, when measuring and studying SRL and metacognition, 
it is important to consider how the nature of an activity might influence one’s SRL and 
metacognition. And, studying within-person differences in metacognition along with how 
different characteristics of the task or learning environment contribute to those within-
person differences will provide insight into the ways educators can design learning 
environments so as to better support students’ metacognition.  
Common Methods of Measuring Metacognition 
Researchers have attempted to measure metacognition from multiple perspectives 
and with a variety of methods. The most popular approaches are questionnaires, 
interviews, think-aloud protocols, and behavior trace methods such as electronic logfiles. 
Within this group of methods, measures are often categorized as either on-line or off-line 
measures (Schellings, van Hout-Wolters, Veenman, & Meijer, 2013; Veenman et al., 
2006). On-line measures are obtained while the participant engages in a task and 
generally measure regulatory processes, whereas off-line measures are obtained away 
from a target task or context and are used to measure both knowledge and regulatory 
processes. On-line measures are, by definition, always connected to a specific task, but 
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off-line measures may be connected to a specific task, or they may involve generalizing 
across multiple tasks.  
Another way to categorize measures of metacognition is by considering whether 
the measure is reflective of the view of metacognition as more state-like or trait-like. The 
view of metacognition as a state-like phenomenon that is influenced by the specific 
context and activity can be seen in both on-line and off-line measures that are connected 
to a specific task. Because these measures usually provide detailed information on 
various components of metacognition, they are considered fine-grained (also referred to 
as “microanalytic”) measures (Paris & Paris, 2001; Pintrich, 2004; Schraw, 2000). The 
view of metacognition as a trait-like phenomenon that is relatively stable over contexts 
and activities can be seen in off-line measures that are not connected to specific tasks. 
These measures are considered coarse-grained (also referred to as “macroanalytic”) 
measures because the information they provide is comparatively general. A prototypical 
coarse-grained measure is a questionnaire that asks respondents to report what they 
“usually” do. 
As is generally the case in social sciences, the method used to measure 
metacognition influences which aspects of metacognition are captured in the resulting 
data. For example, behavior trace methods can be used to measure some regulatory 
processes, but they are not as well suited for measuring knowledge. In contrast, interview 
methods can be used to measure knowledge and beliefs, but they are limited to processes 
the interviewee is aware of and can recall. The various components of metacognition are 
such that researchers must consider tradeoffs when deciding which method(s) to use. 
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Common methods of measuring metacognition are presented next along with their 
advantages and disadvantages.  
Think-Aloud Protocols  
The think-aloud protocol is a fine-grained measure that is used to access an 
individual’s thoughts as they complete a task (Schellings et al., 2013). The individual is 
asked to verbally report all thoughts they have while completing the target task, hence the 
name think-aloud. The think-aloud protocol can be used as an on-line measure (i.e., 
concurrent think-aloud) or an off-line measure (i.e., retrospective think-aloud), but 
concurrent think-alouds are considered more reliable than retrospective think-alouds 
(Schellings et al., 2013) and are used more frequently. Generally, the individual’s 
statements are recorded, transcribed, and then coded by means of a coding scheme that is 
intended to connect verbalizations to specific cognitive activities (Schellings et al., 2013). 
Historically, think-aloud protocols have been used frequently in reading research 
(Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995), and they are one of the most commonly used on-line 
measures (Thillmann, Gößling, Marschner, Wirth, & Leutner, 2013). 
 Of all measures used, concurrent think-aloud protocols provide the most direct 
means of assessing what participants are thinking as they complete a task, potentially 
providing detailed insight into metacognitive regulation as it unfolds. Think-alouds also 
make it possible to examine in detail the connection between metacognition and a 
specific context and task (Pintrich et al., 2000). However, there are a number of 
disadvantages associated with think-aloud protocols. First, there is a great deal of time 
involved in conducting and analyzing even a single think-aloud (Pintrich et al., 2000; 
Thillmann et al., 2013; Veenman et al., 2014, 2006). When using think-aloud protocols in 
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research, a researcher meets individually with participants, sessions are recorded and 
transcribed, and transcriptions and artifacts (if applicable) from the session are coded. 
The time-intensive nature of think-aloud protocols results in a practical limitation on the 
number of participants that can be included in a study, thereby restricting power and the 
statistical analyses that can be considered by the researcher. As a result, large-scale 
studies relying on think-alouds are rarely feasible. Second, it is likely, though 
unconfirmed, that the demand of completing a task and overtly reporting thoughts that 
are usually covert may contribute to cognitive load to a point that performance on the 
task is impaired (Baker & Cerro, 2000; Schellings et al., 2013). Third, participants may 
not be able or willing to report all thoughts they have while completing the task (Baker & 
Cerro, 2000). What participants do report will be constrained by their verbal ability, thus 
making think-alouds less valid for children and individuals with limited verbal ability 
(Whitebread et al., 2010). Finally, think-alouds confound metacognition, verbal ability, 
and the degree to which metacognition and task performance influence each other 
(Pintrich et al., 2000).  
Observations 
Observations are used as fine-grained, on-line measures of metacognition. Similar 
to think-aloud protocols, participants’ behavior is recorded and coded, and inferences 
about metacognition are made based on behaviors. Though in general observations are 
used less often than other on-line approaches, they are used most frequently in research 
on children’s metacognition. Observation instruments and coding schemes have been 
developed for children as young as 3 years old (Whitebread et al., 2010), and they have 
  33 
been utilized in quantitative (e.g., Perry, 1998) and qualitative (e.g., Perry, VandeKamp, 
Mercer, & Nordby, 2002) research.  
One advantage of using observations is that they separate metacognition from 
reading skills or general language abilities, thereby making observations a more 
appropriate method for measuring metacognition when studying children or populations 
with low verbal ability (Whitebread et al., 2010). Additionally, as an on-line measure, 
observations are not subject to the fallibility of participants’ memories. It is possible for 
researchers to access what actually happens while a task is completed, not just what is 
remembered or reported (Whitebread et al., 2010; Winne & Perry, 2000). Additionally, 
observations make it possible to examine both verbal and nonverbal indicators of 
metacognition. However, when coding observations, the researcher must make inferences 
about how metacognition is being used, and that it is being used at all. The high degree of 
inference in coding can lead to interrater reliabilities that are lower than what is 
conventionally accepted (Whitebread et al., 2010). Because observations rely only on 
overt behavior, they are limited to measuring metacognitive regulation because 
metacognitive knowledge is unlikely to be captured in the data. Another disadvantage of 
observations is that they can be costly and time consuming to conduct and code 
(Veenman et al., 2014). 
Monitoring Judgments 
Researchers have created a number of similar monitoring judgment tasks that are 
fine-grained, on-line measures of metacognition (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; 
Pintrich et al., 2000). The three most commonly used monitoring judgments are ease-of-
learning judgments (referred to as EOLs), judgments of learning (referred to as JOLs), 
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and feeling-of-knowing judgments (referred to as FOKs), all three of which are often 
labeled as metacognitive experiences in theoretical discussions (Tarricone, 2011). Ease-
of-learning judgments involve presenting a participant with information that she will 
learn and having her rate how easily she will be able to learn it. The participant then 
learns the information and is tested over it. Test performance is then compared with the 
initial ease-of-learning judgment. Judgments of learning are similar, but rather than 
predicting how easily the information will be learned, the participant rates how well she 
has learned it before taking a test. Test performance is then compared with the judgment 
of learning. When providing feeling-of-knowing judgments, the participant learns 
information and is later given a recall test. After the test, the participant is asked to 
identify any information she did not recall but believes she knows and could recognize. 
The indication that something is known but not presently recalled is a feeling of knowing, 
and it can be compared to performance on a recognition test that follows the recall test. 
 Two primary advantages to monitoring judgments are that they can be easily 
added to most types of learning tasks, and they present only a minor interruption to the 
task. The primary disadvantage is that monitoring judgments only measure limited 
aspects of monitoring and metacognitive experiences and do not measure metacognitive 
knowledge or regulation at all. An additional disadvantage is that asking participants to 
provide monitoring judgments does not necessarily reflect what they do during a task 
where monitoring is not prompted externally. That is, the method of measurement 
influences the participants’ metacognition in such a way that reported metacognition 
might not reflect naturally occurring metacognition. If a researcher’s goal is to assess 
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what students typically do while learning, monitoring judgments like the ones described 
here are not appropriate. 
Error-Detection Tasks 
Error-detection tasks are on-line, fine-grained measures that have been used 
primarily in the study of reading comprehension and monitoring, but they have been used 
with listening tasks and problem-solving tasks as well (Baker & Cerro, 2000). In reading 
comprehension error-detection tasks, the participant is given a text that contains several 
kinds of errors (e.g., syntactical errors, inconsistencies, etc.). After reading the text, the 
participant is asked to identify any errors or problems with the text. A larger number of 
reported errors is thought to be indicative of better metacognitive monitoring (Pintrich et 
al., 2000). Error-detection tasks make it possible to measure monitoring more directly 
than off-line self-report methods. However, there are multiple disadvantages associated 
with error-detection tasks. First, they have been criticized for not being ecologically 
valid: readers do not typically encounter texts that contain multiple errors that interfere 
with comprehension (Pintrich et al. 2000). Second, error-detection tasks only assess 
monitoring and not metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences, or other 
components of metacognitive regulation. Finally, when used in reading tasks, error 
detection tasks confound monitoring and other aspects of reading ability.  
Computer Logfiles 
The most recently developed method of measuring metacognition on-line has 
been made possible through advances in technology. Computers can be used to 
unobtrusively record participants’ activities in a logfile as they complete a computerized 
learning or problem-solving task. Participants’ activities are automatically coded by the 
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computer according to a coding scheme created by the researcher. Computer logfiles do 
not require researchers to spend time one-on-one with participants, making the process of 
collecting data more efficient than it is with other on-line methods (Thillmann et al., 
2013). Additionally, computer logfiles make it possible to keep track of everything a 
person does during the task, making it the finest-grained of measures, and the data 
collection method does not interfere with or interrupt the task (as is the case with think-
aloud protocols). However, as is the case with observations, the use of metacognition 
must be inferred by the researcher from observable behaviors, and it is possible for some 
activities to be coded as metacognitive without metacognition actually being used 
(Veenman et al., 2014). Another similarity between computer logfiles and observations is 
the reliance on overt behaviors that makes it unlikely metacognitive knowledge will be 
captured in the data. Another disadvantage of computer logfiles is the skillset necessary 
to create a program that will present a user-friendly learning task while recording and 
coding participants’ activities. It is likely that computer logfiles are not yet used as 
commonly as think aloud protocols and off-line self-report measures like questionnaires 
because of the skills, time, and resources needed to create such a program. 
Interviews 
Interviews of varying levels of formality have been used to assess metacognition 
off-line for many years, particularly in research on children (e.g., Cross & Paris, 1988; 
Myers & Paris, 1978; Paris & Jacobs, 1984; Swanson, 1990). Most interviews used in 
metacognition research are structured or semi-structured, and both open-ended questions 
(e.g., Paris & Jacobs, 1984) and a combination of open- and close-ended questions (e.g., 
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Cross & Paris, 1988; Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1988) have been used. Many 
different interviews have been developed and used in individual studies. 
 Two major advantages of using an open-ended, structured interview to assess 
metacognition are that (a) participants are able to use their own words to describe their 
thought processes and understanding (Pintrich et al., 2000) and (b) interviewers can probe 
participants for more elaborate responses or for clarification of responses (Groves et al., 
2009). The latter helps ensure that the participant understands questions as the researcher 
intends them and that the researcher understands the participant’s responses. An 
advantage of both open- and close-ended interviews that is particularly important when 
the participants are children is that it eliminates reading ability as a confounding variable.  
Interviews have some of the same disadvantages as on-line measures that depend 
on verbal reporting (e.g., think alouds). First, interviews must be conducted individually 
and are time consuming to administer and analyze (Pintrich et al., 2000). Second, because 
of their dependence on verbal ability, interviews may underestimate children’s 
metacognition (Whitebread et al., 2010). Third, interviews are generally conducted 
separate from any relevant context or specific event (i.e., a task that requires 
metacognition), making it more likely that participants’ reports will be incomplete. 
Interviews rely on participants’ ability to remember and report various metacognitions 
and will therefore be impacted by the extent to which metacognition can be encoded and 
retrieved (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982). Based on the assumption that knowledge of 
cognition is stored as part of stable, long-term knowledge and regulation of cognition is 
more unstable and dynamic (Brown et al., 1983), one would expect that interviews would 
yield more reliable data related to knowledge of cognition than regulation of cognition. 
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Finally, the presence of an interviewer increases the likelihood that social desirability 
bias will become a factor (Groves et al., 2009). 
Self-Report Questionnaires 
Self-report questionnaires are common in metacognition research, and they are 
the primary off-line method used to assess metacognitive knowledge and regulation 
together (Baker & Cerro, 2000; Veenman et al., 2014). Most self-report questionnaires 
use rating-scale items and have at least two subscales. Some questionnaires are designed 
to assess metacognition within a specific context (e.g., a specific course), whereas other 
questionnaires are context-general, meaning they are designed to measure one’s 
“average” or “typical” metacognition across a large range of contexts. A small group of 
questionnaires has been widely used to measure metacognition (described in the next 
section). 
 The primary advantages of self-report questionnaires are the economy and 
efficiency of the instruments (Pintrich et al., 2000; Veenman et al., 2014; Veenman et al., 
2006). Paper-based questionnaires can be administered by one or a few individuals and 
completed by an entire room full of participants simultaneously. Responses to paper-
based questionnaires are easily scored and transferred into an electronic dataset for 
analysis. Web-based survey platforms simplify the process even further. Questionnaires 
can be administered automatically to a practically unlimited number of participants. With 
most platforms, participants can access a survey anywhere on any Internet-capable 
device, and the survey platform transfers responses into a single dataset (Tourangeau, 
Conrad, & Couper, 2013) . Another advantage of self-report questionnaires is that the 
researcher can ensure the desired aspects of metacognition are assessed. The 
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disadvantages of self-report questionnaires include the following: (a) participants are 
limited in how they can respond to items, (b) participants may not understand items as the 
researcher intends them, (c) many existing questionnaires have been found to correlate 
poorly with task performance, (d) questionnaires require participants to read the items 
and response options and therefore confound metacognition and reading ability, and (e) 
as an off-line measure, responses are limited by what the participants remember about 
previous metacognitions. 
Table 2.1 presents the advantages and disadvantages of the seven major methods 
discussed above. Although fine-grained, on-line measures are usually better predictors of 
performance on specific tasks (Veenman et al., 2006), coarse-grained, off-line measures 
(primarily self-report surveys) tend to be more efficient and cost-effective. The efficiency 
and economy of off-line measures make them more feasible for studies using repeated-
measures designs and for collecting large amounts of data that are required for complex 
analyses. Coarse-grained, off-line measures have been criticized for not predicting actual 
use of metacognition on specific tasks (Veenman et al., 2006), for being based on theory 
with a complex structure when only simple structures are empirically supported (Pintrich 
et al., 2000), and for not isolating metacognition or measuring it appropriately (Pintrich et 
al., 2000). 
It is widely recognized that each method of measuring metacognition has its own 
strengths and weaknesses, and researchers ought to carefully choose a method to align 
with the questions that are being asked (e.g., Schraw, 2000; Thillmann et al., 2013; 
Veenman et al., 2006). The prevalence of questionnaires in metacognition research 
speaks to their perceived value as an efficient and economical method, especially given  
  40 
Table 2.1 
Advantages and disadvantages of common methods used to measure metacognition 
 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Think-aloud • can actually access what 
participants are thinking 
about 
• allows for connection 
between metacognition 
and a specific context 
• time-consuming to administer and analyze due to 
one-on-one administration 
• may contribute to cognitive load (but some research 
indicates it may not, Schellings et al 2013) 
• participants may not be able to report all thoughts 
• may underestimate young children’s metacognition 
• confounds metacognition and verbal ability 
Observation • see what actually happens 
during task performance 
rather than what is 
remembered 
• captures verbal and 
nonverbal behavior 
• time-consuming to train observers and conduct 
observations 
• metacognition must be inferred 
• coding is based on individuals’ inferences, and may 
lead to low interrater reliability 
Monitoring 
judgments 
• easily added to existing 
learning tasks 
• only minor interruptions 
to the task itself 
• only assesses monitoring 
• may activate monitoring in students who would not 
normally monitor with such vigilance 
Error detection 
tasks 
• more direct than off-line 
self-report methods 
• only assess monitoring 
• not ecologically valid 
• limited in the types of tasks that can be used 
• confounds monitoring and reading ability 
Computer log-
file 
• data recorded by computer 
• unobtrusive 
• on-line measure that does 
not require one-on-one 
administration 
• data can be overwhelming and hard to analyze 
• metacognition must be inferred 
• researcher must be capable of setting up the 
computer program 
Interview  • participants can use their 
own words 
• interviewer can probe for 
more information to 
ensure understanding 
• eliminates reading ability 
as a possible confound 
• time-consuming to administer and score 
• participants may not be able to verbalize everything 
• may underestimate children’s metacognition 
• limited to what participants remember 
• social desirability increased by interviewer presence 
Self-report 
questionnaire 
• efficient and economical 
• can ensure construct 
coverage 
• limits participants’ ability to communicate responses 
• participants may not understand item 
• existing measures correlate poorly with task 
performance 
• confounds metacognition and reading ability 
• limited to what participants remember 
 
the abundant criticisms of existing questionnaires. In the next section, I describe seven of 
the most widely used questionnaires, including available reliability and validity evidence. 
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Existing Self-Report Questionnaires 
Researchers have created and used numerous questionnaires to measure 
metacognition. Many have been created for use in a single study or adapted from the 
measures described below. Of those that have been made available to the research 
community, some are context-general, and some are situated within a specific domain or 
context. Seven instruments for measuring metacognition that are prominent in the 
literature are discussed next. The domain or context of the measure, construct(s) 
measured, response format, and intended population for these instruments are presented 
in Table 2.2. Because the focus of this dissertation is on metacognition across a variety of 
activities and contexts, measures that apply to specific activities or skills (e.g., reading) 
are discussed briefly. 
Reading Questionnaires 
Two widely used questionnaires that address metacognition in reading are the 
Metacognitive Awareness of Reading Strategies Inventory (MARSI) and the Index of 
Reading Awareness (IRA). The MARSI (Mokhtari & Reichard, 2002) is a self-report 
instrument that assesses adolescents’ metacognitive awareness during reading and 
perceived use of reading strategies. It consists of 30 rating-scale items and has three 
subscales: (a) global reading strategies (13 items), (b) problem-solving strategies (8 
items), and (c) support reading strategies (9 items). Students use a five-point scale 
ranging from “I never or almost never do this” to “I always or almost always do this” to 
indicate how frequently they do what is described in the item stem (e.g., “I take notes 
while reading to help me understand what I read.”). Mokhtari and Reichard (2002) 
provide some reliability and validity evidence for their scale, and it has since been used  
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Table 2.2 









MARSI Reading Metacognitive 
monitoring and 
strategy use 
5-point scale Adolescents 
















After a test Metacognitive 
regulation 
4-point scale High school and 
college students 




point on a 
100mm line or 
5-point scale 
College students 




7-point scale College students 
Note. MARSI = Metacognitive Awareness of Reading Strategies Inventory, IRA = Index of Reading 
Awareness, LASSI = Learning and Study Strategies Inventory, MSLQ = Motivated Strategies for Learning 
Questionnaire, MAI = Metacognitive Awareness Inventory, and AILI = Awareness of Independent 
Learning Inventory. 
 
extensively in research related to adolescents’ reading proficiency. The MARSI was 
intended to be used in research and by classroom teachers as a supplementary assessment 
of students’ use of reading strategies. 
The IRA (Jacobs & Paris, 1987) is an objective multiple-choice test that assesses 
third- through fifth-grade students’ knowledge of reading strategies. It was created to 
measure differences between children and changes in students’ metacognitive knowledge 
as a result of a specialized reading curriculum that involved metacognitive instruction. It 
contains 20 items that target knowledge of planning, evaluation, and regulation as well as 
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conditional knowledge related to strategy use. Each item has three response options, and 
children are awarded 2, 1, or 0 points for selecting the option that is strategic, partially 
appropriate, or inappropriate, respectively. Item response scores are summed to produce a 
total score that can range from 0 to 40. Jacobs and Paris (1987) did not provide and 
validity evidence or information internal consistency, and a later study found the IRA to 
have “questionable reliability and validity” (McLain, Gridley, & McIntosh, 1991, p. 84). 
Despite the lack of validity and reliability evidence, the IRA continues to be widely used 
in research on children’s reading abilities. 
Learning and Study Strategies Inventory 
The Learning and Study Strategies Inventory (LASSI; Weinstein, Schulte, & 
Palmer, 1987) is a copyrighted instrument that was created as a diagnostic and evaluative 
instrument that measures college students’ use of a variety of covert and overt behaviors 
that facilitate learning—referred to as “strategic learning” (Weinstein, Zimmerman, & 
Palmer, 1988). The creators claim that that LASSI can be used in a variety of ways, 
ranging from screening, counseling, and advising to program evaluation. As it pertains to 
the framework behind the LASSI, strategic learning includes skill, will, and self-
regulation, but the description of this conceptualization in the manual is not explicitly 
tied to any published research. Three versions of the LASSI have been published: the first 
in 1987, the second in 2002, and the third in 2016. 
The LASSI is a context-general, paper-and-pencil measure and is not intended to 
be connected to any specific activity or context. In the original version, college students 
use a 5-point scale ranging from “not at all typical of me” to “very much typical of me” 
to respond to 77 items that are grouped into 10 subscales. The Information Processing, 
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Selecting Main Ideas, and Test Strategies subscales make up the Skill component of 
strategic learning. The Attitude, Anxiety, and Motivation subscales make up the Will 
component of strategic learning. And, the Concentration, Self-Testing, Study Aids, and 
Time Management subscales make up the Self-Regulation component of strategic 
learning. The scales were created by a group of experts who identified items that centered 
on different themes. However, subsequent research using confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) to validate the use of these subscales has not reflected the intended 10-factor 
structure (Obiekwe, 2000). Weinstein (1988) reported coefficient alphas for the subscales 
that ranged from .60 to .89. Test-retest reliability was also reported: Ninety-six first year 
college students took the LASSI twice with a delay of between three and four weeks. 
Test-retest correlation coefficients for the subscales ranged from .64 to .81.  
The second edition of the LASSI (LASSI 2; Weinstein & Palmer, 2002) contains 
80 items that are distributed evenly across the same 10 subscales. College students use 
the same 5-point scale for the LASSI 2, and it is available both on paper and on-line. 
Coefficient alphas for the subscales increased, and the lowest reported alpha for the 
second edition is .73. No test-retest reliability was reported for the LASSI 2. The LASSI 
2 was field tested with 1,092 students across 12 different higher-education institutions 
(Weinstein & Palmer, 2002). This sample was used to generate normative information for 
the LASSI 2. The manual for the LASSI 2 (Weinstein & Palmer, 2002) does not provide 
empirical validity evidence related to any of its purported uses, a criticism that has been 
made by others (Carty, 2007; Wright, 2007). 
The third edition of the LASSI (LASSI 3; Weinstein, Palmer, & Acee, 2016) is 
shorter than the previous version and contains 60 items. The Study Aids scale was 
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replaced by a Using Academic Resources scale, and minor wording changes were made 
to a small number of items. The reported internal consistency coefficients for the scales 
are slightly higher than they were for the LASSI 2. Additionally, the manual provides 
norms that are based on a sample of 1,386 undergraduate students enrolled at universities, 
4-year and 2-year colleges, and adult education programs around the United States in 
2014. The LASSI 3 manual also does not included any validity evidence related to its 
purported uses. 
Although some of the items (across multiple subscales) in the various versions of 
the LASSI overlap with other measures of metacognition, it is not intended to measure 
metacognition and does not have a metacognition subscale. Regardless, the LASSI has 
been used as a measure of metacognition in many studies. And even though the LASSI is 
used as a proxy for metacognition in several studies, it is inappropriate to use the LASSI 
as a measure of metacognition unless it can be empirically established that the LASSI 
does, in fact, measure metacognition. 
Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire 
The Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ; Pintrich, Smith, 
Garcia, & McKeachie, 1991) is similar to the LASSI in that it is frequently used to 
measure metacognition even though that is not its intended purpose. The MSLQ is a 
course-specific, paper-and-pencil questionnaire, though some researchers have modified 
the MSLQ to make it course-general (Kitsantas, Winsler, & Huie, 2008). The instrument 
has two main sections: motivation and learning strategies. In total, the instrument has 81 
items that are grouped into 15 scales. Students respond using a 7-point scale that ranges 
from “not at all true of me” to “very true of me”. The six motivation scales are: (a) 
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Intrinsic Goal Orientation, (b) Extrinsic Goal Orientation, (c) Task Value, (d) Control of 
Learning Beliefs, (e) Self-Efficacy for Learning and Performance, and (f) Test Anxiety. 
The nine learning strategies scales are: (a) Rehearsal, (b) Elaboration, (c) Organization, 
(d) Critical Thinking, (e) Metacognitive Self-regulation, (f) Time and Study Environment 
Management, (g) Effort Regulation, (h) Peer Learning, and (i) Help Seeking. Coefficient 
alpha estimates for the scales ranged from .52 to .93, and the Metacognitive Self-
regulation scale (12 items) had an estimated alpha of .79. The MSLQ was created to be 
used by both researchers and educators, and the user can administer all or a subset of the 
15 scales as desired (Duncan & McKeachie, 2005). When used by researchers to measure 
metacognition, the Metacognitive Self-regulation scale is often used on its own. 
The initial reliability and validity evidence in the test manual (Pintrich et al., 
1991) is based on a sample of 380 students that attended two Midwestern colleges during 
the Spring semester of 1990. Correlations between each scale and students’ final grades 
are provided, as well as all scale correlations and results of a CFA. As the authors 
acknowledge, the results of the CFA are not exemplary, but they consider them 
acceptable. The factor loading estimates for the items on the Metacognitive Self-
regulation scale range from .35 to .61; the authors point out that values of .8 or higher 
indicate “well-defined latent constructs” (Pintrich et al., 1991, p. 79). In the test manual, 
it is pointed out that the Metacognitive Self-regulation scale of the MSLQ focuses on 
control and regulation aspects of metacognition and does not include metacognitive 
knowledge. If a researcher’s goal is to comprehensively assess metacognition (i.e., 
including metacognitive knowledge, regulation, and experiences), the MSLQ cannot be 
used to achieve that goal.  
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State Metacognitive Inventory 
The State Metacognitive Inventory (O’Neil & Abedi, 1996) has not been used 
nearly as widely as the other measures described in this section. It is a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire that measures metacognitive regulation as an unstable, state-like construct, 
rather than a stable, trait-like construct. It is based on the assumptions that metacognition 
is domain-independent and context-dependent. The creators define metacognition as, 
“consisting of planning, monitoring, cognitive strategies, and awareness” (O’Neil & 
Abedi, 1996, p. 234), and consequently the State Metacognitive Inventory does not 
measure metacognitive knowledge. The inventory’s four subscales reflect the four 
components of metacognition in the given definition. The State Metacognitive Inventory 
is designed to be administered immediately following a test, and respondents indicate the 
degree to which a variety of statements describe what they did during the test. In total, the 
inventory has 20 items (five per scale), and responses are given on a 4-point scale ranging 
from “not at all” to “very much so”. Responses are summed to produce a total score for 
each subscale and an overall total. 
O’Neil and Abedi (1996) report coefficient alphas for the scales between .73 and 
.78. No other reliability information was provided, and the authors argue that other forms 
of reliability evidence, such as stability coefficients, are not appropriate for a state 
construct that is expected to be unstable. During the instrument development process, 
samples of middle school, high school, and community college students were given the 
State Metacognitive Inventory, and some studies included incentives for participants to 
provide correct answers on the test that was paired with the inventory. Available validity 
evidence for the State Metacognition Inventory almost entirely comes from correlations 
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between inventory scores and scores from the tests that immediately preceded the 
inventory. O’Neil and Abedi (1996) reported correlation coefficients with test scores 
ranging from .03 to .36 across all subscales and from .18 to .46 for total metacognition 
scores. Similarly, O’Neil and colleagues (1995) reported correlation coefficients of about 
.15 for a sample of eighth grade students and about .20 for a sample of twelfth grade 
students. In a separate study that used a modified form of the State Metacognition 
Inventory, O’Neil and Brown (1998) reported that a CFA yielded an acceptable fit of the 
proposed factor structure. However, the factor analysis included items from only two of 
the State Metacognitive Inventory subscales and items from additional Effort and Worry 
scales, so it is unclear whether the intended four-factor structure of the State 
Metacognitive Inventory is reflected by responses. O’Neil and Abedi (1996) also 
reference other unpublished studies that are said to provide validity evidence, but as they 
are unpublished, the quality of the validity evidence cannot be judged. 
The State Metacognitive Inventory is unique in that it was designed to be used in 
conjunction with a specific task (i.e., a test), but this feature limits its usefulness for 
researchers who are interested in metacognition outside of testing situations. 
Furthermore, it does not measure metacognitive knowledge, making it less desirable for 
researchers who want to measure the knowledge and regulation aspects of metacognition. 
Finally, the lack of published validity evidence for the State Metacognitive Inventory 
makes it difficult to evaluate instrument. 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 
The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI; Schraw & Dennison, 1994) is the 
most widely used measure of metacognition that was created to comprehensively 
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measure metacognition and only metacognition. It is a context-general, paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire that contains 52 items. It was designed to assess both knowledge of 
cognition and regulation of cognition in college students. The theoretical framework from 
which it was created (Schraw & Dennison, 1994; described above) identified declarative, 
procedural, and conditional knowledge as subcomponents of knowledge of cognition, and 
it identified planning, information management strategies, comprehension monitoring, 
debugging strategies, and evaluation as subcomponents of regulation of cognition. Each 
subcomponent has between 4 and 10 items relating to it. When taking the MAI, 
respondents mark a 100mm line that has end points labeled “true” and “false” to indicate 
the extent to which each statement is true for them. An individual’s score for an item is 
equal to the distance in millimeters between the “false” endpoint (i.e., zero) and the mark 
created by the respondent. Subscale scores are the mean of all item scores for that 
subscale. Many researchers (e.g., Hammann, 2005; Hargrove & Nietfeld, 2015; Sperling, 
Howard, Staley, & Du Bois, 2004; Young & Fry, 2008) have simplified the scoring 
process by using a 5-point scale in place of the original 100mm line for item scores and 
sums in place of means for subscale scores.  
Schraw and Dennison (1994) reported the results of two studies conducted during 
the development of the MAI. In the first study, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
returned a six-factor structure rather than the hypothesized eight-factor structure. The six 
factors did not reflect the theoretical foundation and did not have acceptable internal 
consistency. However, a restricted two-factor solution with oblique rotation did reflect 
the distinction between knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition. The two-
factor solution accounted for 65% of the sample variance and both factors had high 
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internal consistency. As predicted, the two factors were moderately correlated, with r = 
.54. The two-factor solution was replicated in the second study: coefficient alphas were 
.88 for each of the two factors and .93 for the entire instrument. The two factors 
accounted for 58% of the sample variance, and they were again moderately correlated, 
with r = .45. The two factors were then treated as two subscales that measured knowledge 
of cognition and regulation of cognition. Mean scores from items on the two subscales 
were calculated and used in additional analyses to provide validity evidence. In general, 
students who reported higher pre-test judgments of monitoring skills and had higher test 
scores also scored higher on the knowledge of cognition subscale. Monitoring accuracy 
was not associated with knowledge or regulation of cognition, and neither pre-test 
judgments of monitoring skills nor test scores were associated with regulation of 
cognition.  
Subsequent research on the psychometric properties of the MAI has provided 
additional reliability and validity evidence. Hargrove and Nietfield (2015) reported test-
retest reliability correlation coefficients for total MAI scores ranging from .66 to .81, with 
delays of either 17 or 20 weeks between test administrations. Young and Fry (2008) 
reported modest correlations between the two subscales of the MAI, course grades, and 
overall GPA. They also reported that graduate students scored significantly higher on 
regulation of cognition than undergraduate students, but there was no difference between 
the groups on knowledge of cognition. Sperling and colleagues (2004) reported a 
negative relationship between MAI subscale scores and the number of credits college 
students dropped during a semester. They suggest that this might indicate college 
students that are more metacognitively aware are better able to manage the workload of 
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college courses. However, Sperling and colleagues (2004) did not find evidence of the 
expected relationship between the MAI subscales and measures of monitoring accuracy.  
Somewhat inconsistent with Schraw and Dennison’s (1994) findings, Hammann 
and Stevens (1998) attempted to replicate the two-factor solution through CFA and 
derived a two-factor solution that included only 26 of the 52 items and accounted for less 
than 25% of the sample variance. Additionally, Hammann (2005) and Sperling and 
colleagues (2004) reported correlations between the MAI’s two subscales of at least .68, 
which is much higher than the correlations originally reported by Schraw & Dennison 
(1994). These discrepancies between studies may be due to their use of a 5-point scale 
rather than the original 100mm scale. It is unknown how the use of the 5-point scale 
influences the factor structure of the MAI. Regardless, the MAI assesses metacognition in 
a way that is more consistent with prominent conceptions of metacognition than does any 
other self-report questionnaire reviewed thus far.  
Awareness of Independent Learning Inventory 
The Awareness of Independent Learning Inventory (AILI; Meijer et al., 2013) is 
designed to measure college students’ metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive 
regulation, and responsiveness to metacognitive experiences. All three components were 
measured as trait-like constructs, and the instrument was not connected to a specific 
course or context. The AILI has been used mostly with European samples. The original 
version was constructed in Dutch, but it has been translated to English, French, German, 
Spanish, and Italian. There are two parallel forms that both consist of 45 items. Each item 
is phrased positively in one form and negatively in the other so that in each form half of 
the items are worded positively and half are worded negatively. All responses are given 
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on a 7-point scale ranging from “not true at all” to “completely true,” with a midpoint of 
“neutral, don’t know.” 
The three scales of the AILI are metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive 
regulation, and metacognitive responsiveness. Reported coefficient alphas for the scales 
were .79, .84, and .77, respectively (Meijer et al., 2013). Test-retest correlation 
coefficients based on a subsample of 34 participants were .46, .39, and .25, respectively, 
with a delay of two years between test administrations. The test-retest correlation for 
metacognitive responsiveness was non-significant. Reported correlations between scales 
were above .60. Correlations between the AILI and the MSLQ were provided for validity 
evidence. The AILI scales were highly correlated (rs > .50) with several of MSLQ’s 
motivation scales as well as some of the cognitive and metacognitive scales. The 
correlations between the AILI scales and the MSLQ motivation scales were comparable 
in size to the correlations between the AILI scales and the MSLQ cognitive and 
metacognitive scales, but the authors did not address this part of their results. Non-
significant correlations between the AILI scales and the MSLQ Test Anxiety scale were 
offered as evidence of discriminant validity. Meijer and colleagues (2013) did not 
provide any evidence for equivalence of the two forms. They also did not provide the 
results of the CFA that is mentioned in their report or any other evidence of construct 
validity. The AILI has been used in only a small number of published studies, and though 
it is the only instrument that has scales for metacognitive knowledge, regulation, and 
experiences, little reliability and validity evidence has been published. 
Gaps in the Literature Addressed by this Dissertation 
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The gap in the empirical literature on metacognition that is primarily addressed by 
this dissertation is that of within-person differences in metacognitive regulation. As 
pointed out above, little research has examined within-person differences in 
metacognitive regulation that are predicted by theory. Of the research that has focused on 
within-person differences, I am unaware of any research that has simultaneously 
considered differences that might be due to the academic activity being completed and 
the course for which the activity is being done. Advancing our understanding of how 
differences in activity and course contribute to within-person differences in 
metacognitive regulation will make it possible to offer educators more nuanced 
recommendations for supporting students’ metacognitive regulation. 
A second gap in the literature that is addressed by this dissertation pertains to the 
factor structure of metacognition, as measured by self-report questionnaires given to post-
secondary students. Previously reported factor analyses of multiple instruments have 
failed to extract the factor structures expected from both theory and the instrument 
creation process. In most cases, theory suggests more factors than what are found 
empirically. In addition to the factor analysis findings reported above (Hammann & 
Stevens, 1998; Obiekwe, 2000; O’Neil & Brown, 1998; Pintrich et al., 1991; Schraw & 
Dennison, 1994), other researchers have reported factor analyses of some of the previous 
described metacognition scales and failed to find the expected factor structures that 
reflect the distinction between subcomponents such as declarative and conditional 
knowledge or monitoring and planning. The findings from a collection of studies that 
have involved factor analysis of data from some of the previously reviewed 
metacognition scales are summarized next. 
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Cano (2006) examined the factor structure of the LASSI through an oblique 
exploratory principal components analysis followed by a CFA. Both analyses were 
performed on the ten LASSI subscale scores, and therefore the derived factors represent 
higher-order factors. The analysis returned a three-factor solution, with factors labeled as 
affective strategies, goal strategies, and comprehension monitoring. Others (e.g., Everson, 
Weinstein, & Laitsus, 2000) have used this approach and factor analyzed LASSI 
subscales and found that subscales can be grouped onto higher-order factors. In contrast, 
Melancon (2002) reported the results of an orthogonal EFA conducted on the LASSI 
items. Because the LASSI has ten subscales, ten factors were extracted. Factor loadings 
were reported for the ten factors and overall did not reflect the LASSI subscales. 
Tock and Moxley (2017) examined the factor structure of the Metacognitive Self-
regulation subscale of the MSLQ and found that it was not unidimensional. They used a 
cross-validation approach by splitting their sample in half and performing an EFA 
followed by a CFA. One-, two-, and three-factor solutions were tested, though none of 
the solutions fit the data well (i.e., largest CFI = .83, smallest SRMR = .08). For the one-
factor solution, standardized loadings ranged from -.02 to .69; for the two-factor solution, 
they ranged from .37 to .81; and for the three-factor solution, they ranged from .31 to .75. 
The second and third factors did not correspond to any theory of metacognition, though 
the two reverse worded items loaded on the second factor. McClendon (1996) and Hilpert 
and colleagues (Hilpert, Stempien, van der Hoeven Kraft, & Husman, 2013) examined 
the structure of the entire MSLQ, and in both studies, results did not correspond to the 15 
subscales that are derived from the intended scoring procedure.  
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Several researchers have reported factor analyses of the MAI. Schraw and 
colleagues (Schraw, Horn, Thorndike-Christ, & Bruning, 1995) conducted an oblique 
EFA that was restricted to a two-factor solution, and found that only 46 of the 52 items 
loaded on one of the two factors. The knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition 
factors were correlated at r = .56. Sperling, Howard, Miller, and Murphy (2002) 
developed and analyzed a children’s version of the MAI (Jr. MAI) that was derived from 
items from the MAI . Their orthogonal principal components analysis returned a five-
factor solution that did not directly correspond to any theoretical framework, and a forced 
two-factor solution only somewhat corresponded to the distinction between knowledge 
and regulation of cognition.  
More recently, Harrison and Vallin (2017) used CFA and multidimensional 
random coefficients multinomial logit (MRCML) item-response modeling to evaluate the 
MAI. A unidimensional model, two 2-factor models, and an eight-factor model were 
compared. The eight-factor model, which did not converge, corresponded to the eight 
subcomponents of metacognition that were proposed by Schraw and Dennison (1994). 
Harrison and Vallin concluded that their results support the use of two factor scores, but 
they pointed out that the full 52-item scale had poor model-data fit. A theoretically 
representative subset of 19 items was found to have acceptable fit with a two-factor 
solution and also showed invariance between men and women, across questionnaire 
formats (i.e., electronic or paper-based), and over a three-week delay. The knowledge of 
cognition and regulation of cognition factors were strongly correlated, r = .84. 
In contrast to many studies of the factor structure of metacognition, Hong (1995) 
successfully modeled the expected factor structure using the State Metacognition 
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Inventory, an instrument that measures metacognitive regulation. She used CFA and 
invariance testing to determine whether the original version of the State Metacognition 
Inventory and a modified, trait-oriented version had the same factor structure. In the 
modified version, items were reworded to ask respondents about typical behavior, rather 
than their behavior during the preceding test. Results indicated the expected four 
factors—awareness, cognitive strategies, self-checking, and planning—were part of a 
higher-order metacognition factor, and this hierarchical structure held for both versions of 
the instrument. State and trait scores for the four factors were moderately to highly 
correlated (rs ranging from .53 to .69), and coefficient alpha estimates for the subscales 
ranged from .64 to .85. 
In two cases, researchers have attempted to fit bi-factor models to metacognition 
inventory data. Bi-factor models provide an alternative to hierarchical factor analysis 
models when modeling multidimensionality. As Reise (2012) explained, the bi-factor 
model “…appears best suited for the psychometric analysis of those assessment 
instruments where the researcher expects a response to primarily reflect a strong common 
trait, but there is multidimensionality caused by well-defined clusters of items from 
diverse subdomains” (p. 692). Whereas hierarchical models reflect constructs whose 
dimensions are correlated because they are subcomponents of the construct, the specific 
dimensions in bi-factor models (called group or specific factors) are not correlated with 
the general construct. That is, with bi-factor models, a portion of the variability in the 
observed variables is attributed to the general factor, and groups of items share some of 
the variability remaining after accounting for the general factor. An example of a bi-
factor model is shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1. Example confirmatory bi-factor model. Estimated residuals/disturbances for 
observed and latent variables are not shown. 
 
Using an item response theory (IRT) approach, Immekus and Imbrie (2008) 
compared unidimensional and bi-factor (confirmatory) models in testing the structure of 
the State Metacognition Inventory. Though the bi-factor model fit the data better, 
Immekus and Imbrie concluded the scale should be treated as unidimensional. They 
recommended against the use of subscales because in the bi-factor model, all items 
loaded strongly on the general factor and no more than two of five items loaded strongly 
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structure of the Jr. MAI. Participants in this study were elementary-aged children in 
Singapore. The bi-factor model was compared with three other models: a model with one 
factor, a model with two correlated factors, and a hierarchical model. The bi-factor model 
fit the data best, but the factor loadings did not fully correspond to the two expected 
group factors. Four of six items loaded on the knowledge of cognition group factor with 
only one item loading above 0.4, and none of the six items loaded on the regulation of 
cognition group factor. 
In these two studies, the bi-factor model exhibited better model-data fit even 
though the group factors did not clearly support the use of subscales. That is, in these 
studies, the differences among the subcomponents of metacognition were not distinct 
enough to create clear group factors after accounting for a general metacognition factor. 
However, a bi-factor model might be useful in separating unique variance that is due to 
context differences in items (e.g., items related to studying vs. taking a test). In addition 
to guiding decisions about the use of subscales, a well-fitting bi-factor model that yields a 
general metacognition factor and group factors that reflect different contexts would 
support the hypothesis that there is a relatively stable, trait-like component of 
metacognition as well as a more variable, state-like component that is influenced by 
context. 
A third and final gap in the literature that is addressed by this dissertation relates 
to the prevalent critiques of off-line measures of metacognition, especially self-report 
questionnaires (Berger & Karabenick, 2016; Veenman, 2013a; Veenman et al., 2014). In 
addition to the critiques that can be made of all questionnaires (e.g., social desirability 
bias), self-report questionnaires designed to measure metacognition have been criticized 
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for only weakly correlating with achievement, if at all, and for not correlating with on-
line measures of metacognition. For example, Veenman and colleagues (2014) provided 
the following interpretation of studies comparing on-line and off-line methods: 
There is accumulating evidence that students’ off-line self-reports do not 
converge with their actual metacognitive strategy use during task performance…. 
Apparently, learners do not do what they previously said they would do, nor do 
they accurately recollect what they have recently done. Moreover, correlations 
among off-line measures are often low to moderate, whereas correlations among 
on-line measures are moderate to high. (p. 124) 
However, most of the studies (Cromley & Azevedo, 2006; Hadwin, Nesbit, Jamieson-
Noel, Code, & Winne, 2007; Veenman, Prins, & Verheij, 2003) Veenman and colleagues 
(2014) point to as evidence for this argument were comparing responses on context- or 
domain-general questionnaires and performance on specific tasks2. As was pointed out by 
Schellings & Van Hout-Wolters (2011), low correspondence between these questionnaire 
responses and records of behavior might be due to differences in the specificity of the 
measures. For example, the ability of the “average” context-general measure to correlate 
with specific measures will be influenced by how consistently one behaves across 
contexts (i.e., within-person variability). The correlation will also be influenced by how 
                                                 
2 The study that Veenman and colleagues (2014) referred to that compared on-line and off-line task-specific 
measures (Winne & Jamieson-Noel, 2002) provides some evidence that these types of measures do not 
provide convergent information. The authors compared retrospective reports of behaviors during a task to 
trace data collected electronically as participants completed a learning task. However, the alignment 
between inferences made from some traces and specific self-report items was questionable. For example, 
the highest discrepancy between self-report item responses and behavior was on an item that asked whether 
participants “set objectives for yourself.” In the computer-based learning environment, objectives were 
provided by the program and participants who viewed the objectives were counted as setting objectives for 
themselves. It is likely that at least some of the discrepancy between the self-reports and recorded traces 
was due to participants interpreting the item “set objectives for yourself” as a reference to self-generated 
objectives, not the use of objectives that were provided. 
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closely the research task mirrors the “typical” tasks that one is mentally referring to when 
responding to context-general questionnaires. In fact, Schellings and colleagues (2013) 
compared responses on a task-specific questionnaire to think-aloud protocols and found 
much higher correspondence (r = .63) between the measures. The instrument created as 
part of this dissertation (the MIPSS, described in the next chapter) is a context-specific 
questionnaire that could serve as a more appropriate comparison for on-line measures, 
making it possible to examine whether previously found discrepancies between various 
off-line measures and between on-line and off-line measures are due to differences in the 
instruments’ specificity. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
 This chapter reviews the instrument development work and pilot study that was 
done in preparation for this dissertation and presents the methodology used in Studies 1 
and 2. The primary purpose of the studies was to investigate how context (course and 
activity) influences undergraduate students’ use of metacognitive regulation. The 
secondary purpose of the studies was to investigate the relationship between context-
specific measures of metacognitive regulation and achievement, as well as general and 
course-specific measures of metacognition and SRL.  
The overarching research question guiding this study is: how is undergraduate 
students’ (self-reported) metacognitive regulation influenced by the course and learning 
activity in which one is engaged? Specific research questions include the following: 
1. What is the factor structure of an instrument that assesses metacognitive 
knowledge globally and metacognitive regulation as a context-dependent 
construct?  
2. Does students’ report of metacognitive regulation vary across activities and 
courses? 
3. How do context-specific metacognitive regulation scale scores relate to 
achievement and to scores from context-general and course-specific measures of 
metacognition and SRL? 
Regarding Question 1 (the Factor Structure Question), it was expected that the instrument 
developed for this study (the MIPSS) would have a bi-factor structure and would 
demonstrate satisfactory psychometric properties. Specifically, it was expected that all 
MIPSS items would load on a general metacognition factor, and that groups of items 
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would load on secondary factors that are specific to the activity or the knowledge type 
represented in the item. Regarding Question 2 (the Variability Question), it was expected 
that students would report different levels of metacognitive regulation across activities 
and courses, and that more metacognitive regulation would be reported in favorite 
courses than least favorite courses. 
Regarding Question 3 (the Association Question), it was hypothesized that 
course- and activity-specific scale scores would be unrelated or weakly related to general 
measures of academic achievement (e.g., GPA) and weakly or moderately related to 
individual course grades. Course-specific measures of metacognitive regulation and SRL 
were expected to have stronger associations with course specific achievement outcomes 
than context-general measures of metacognitive regulation and SRL. It was also 
hypothesized that course- and activity-specific scale scores would be strongly related to 
other course-specific measures of metacognition and SRL, weakly or moderately related 
to context-general measures of metacognition and SRL, and weakly related or unrelated 
to measures of other constructs (e.g., implicit theories of intelligence).  
Figure 3.1 shows a theoretical framework of the constructs and measures that 
were used to address Question 3. The component structure of SRL reflects the generic 
framework of SRL as involving metacognitive, motivational, and behavioral engagement 
with the learning process (Zimmerman, 2008) and is therefore compatible with most 
conceptualizations of SRL. The theoretical framework provides an outline of the 
expected relationships between the measures used in this dissertation. In the figure, 
constructs are represented by ovals and observed measures are represented by rectangles 
(for readability, MIPSS subscales are not shown individually). Solid lines between ovals  
  63 
Figure 3.1. Theoretical framework of constructs (ovals) and measures (rectangles).  
Solid lines between constructs indicate a component – sub-component relationship. Dashed lines between 
constructs indicate one construct influences another. Dashed lines with arrows connect constructs and the 
instruments used to measure them. The arrowless dotted line between “Behavior” and “Metacognitive 
regulation” shows overlap between instruments used to measure them. The small dotted lines connecting 
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indicate the construct more to the right is a component of the connected construct to the 
left. The dashed lines between constructs indicate that one construct influences the other, 
with the arrow pointing to the construct that is being affected. For example, one’s 
motivation influences behavior, and motivation is influenced by the context in which a 
person is situated. Dashed lines between constructs and observed measures indicate the 
construct the instrument is intended to measure. The arrowless dotted line between 
“Behavior” and “Metacognitive regulation” represents the overlap between instruments 
used to measure metacognitive regulation and instruments used to measure other, often 
behavioral, regulatory aspects of SRL (e.g., strategy use). And, the small dotted lines 
connecting “Activity” to “Behavior” and “Metacognition” represent an expected unique 
influence of the academic activity on behavior and metacognition, that is separate from 
the indirect relationship of context via motivation. Metacognitive regulation might occur 
more readily during some activities because of their unique features. For example, 
unstructured, student-directed activities such as studying might require and therefore 
elicit more regulation than a structured, teacher-directed activity such as traditional 
lecture-based instruction. In general, it was expected that relationships would be stronger 
for observed measures that are “closer” to each other (i.e., have fewer paths and 
constructs connecting them) and are connected to the same context.  
Initial Instrument Development and Pilot Study 
 Instrument development efforts started during the summer of 2015 and a pilot 
study was conducted during the fall 2015. The instrument development and revision 
process is reviewed in this section. University IRB approval was obtained prior to any 
data collection. 
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 First, several existing measures of metacognition that are used with college 
students were reviewed, with particular attention given to (a) item content, (b) construct 
representation relative to prominent theories of metacognition, (c) level of context-
specificity (e.g., specific to a single course, context-general, etc.), and (d) psychometric 
properties, as available. Then, a test blueprint was created based on Tarricone’s (2011) 
taxonomy. The blueprint had two major sections: metacognitive knowledge and 
metacognitive regulation and experiences (here referred to only as metacognitive 
regulation for readability). The metacognitive knowledge section crossed the three types 
of metacognitive knowledge (e.g., declarative knowledge) and the three knowledge 
categories (i.e., persons, tasks, and strategies) to create a nine-celled matrix. The 
metacognitive regulation section crossed four aspects of regulation (i.e., planning, 
monitoring, controlling, evaluating) and two types of experiences (i.e., judgments and 
feelings) with six academic contexts to create a 36-celled matrix. The six academic 
contexts were chosen to represent a variety of tasks and contexts that undergraduate 
students in the United States encounter regularly. The six contexts were (a) studying, (b) 
completing an assignment, (c) preparing for a test, (d), taking a test, (e) a favorite course, 
and (f) a least favorite course.  
In total, 133 items were written to align with the cells of the blueprint’s two 
matrices. Metacognitive knowledge items had a four-point agree/disagree response scale 
(“strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” “strongly agree”), and metacognitive regulation 
items had a four-point frequency response scale (“almost never,” “sometimes,” “often,” 
“almost always”) with an additional “I’m not sure if I do this” option that was scored as 
zero. Most items were written so that stronger agreement or a higher reported frequency 
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was indicative of more metacognition. Thirty-five items were written with the opposite 
interpretation and were reverse coded for scoring. The “I’m not sure if I do this option” is 
unique to the MIPSS and is intended to differentiate between those who are aware of 
their regulatory practices but do not use a given strategy and those who are unaware of 
how or whether they regulate their learning. In the former case, the student is 
demonstrating some metacognitive awareness despite reporting low regulation, but in the 
latter case, the student is indicating there is not sufficient metacognitive awareness to 
generate an accurate response. 
 Two experts on metacognition were contacted directly and asked to review the 
test blueprint and item pool for content coverage and alignment. These two educational 
psychologists both have studied metacognition and other related constructs for more than 
10 years and have contributed to the metacognition literature by publishing articles and 
books on metacognition. After reviewing the test blueprint and the item pool, both 
experts indicated that items were in line with the intended dimensions and provided 
sufficient coverage of metacognition in post-secondary academic settings. Then, all items 
were administered to two individuals who thought aloud while reading and responding 
two items. Evidence of confusion or misinterpretation of items led to minor revisions to 
some items.  
Fall 2015 Pilot Study 
Following the minor revisions, a sample of undergraduate educational psychology 
students (N = 307) at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL) participated in the pilot 
study. Data collection took place during the second half of the fall 2015 semester. 
Students were recruited from three different courses that were taught by seven different 
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instructors. Participants earned research participation credit that was either mandatory or 
worth extra credit points, depending on the course.  
Participants accessed the survey on-line via the Qualtrics® survey platform 
outside of class time and were asked to complete the survey in a single sitting and within 
one week. Five participants who did not complete the entire survey and four participants 
who took more than 12 hours to complete it were excluded from analyses, leaving 298 
participants. See Table 3.1, column 2 for demographic information on the pilot sample. 
The survey consisted of four major sections: metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive 
regulation, metacognitive experiences, and demographic items. The metacognition 
sections contained subsections for each of the types of metacognitive knowledge (e.g., 
declarative knowledge) or for each context (e.g., studying). Within each of the 
subsections, item order was randomized.  
In addition to the MIPSS items, participants also responded to three constructed-
response items that asked participants to justify their response to the previous item. The  
Table 3.1 
Demographic information for all samples 
Sample Pilot Study 1 Study 2 
Total 298 426 293 
Gender    
    Male 76 122 91 
    Female 222 300 202 
    No report 0 4 0 
Academic standing    
    First year 95 119 70 
    Second year 110 114 99 
    Third year 63 124 81 
    Fourth year 21 58 41 
    Other/No report 9 11 2 
Ethnicity    
    White 252 362 247 
    Asian 12 26 21 
    Black 13 8 11 
    Latino/Latina 15 23 7 
    Other 10 12 11 
Note. Participants could select multiple responses for ethnicity, so totals do not equal the total sample size. 
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three items a given participant provided responses about were determined by the item 
randomization within the survey, so that each participant’s constructed responses were 
about a different combination of items. All items except one received a constructed 
response. The constructed responses were used as an initial measure of validity because it 
provided evidence that participants were able to interpret items as intended and provide 
reasonable responses. These responses were then given a score of 1, indicating the 
justification aligned with the response, or a score of 0, indicating the justification did not 
align with the response. (Non-responses and incomplete or incomprehensible responses 
were not given a score.) Most scored responses (89.6%) were judged as showing 
alignment between the response and the justification, suggesting that participants were 
generally able to provide valid responses to items. 
Item analysis was used to identify poorly functioning items that were 
subsequently dropped or revised. Additional items were dropped due to constructed 
response results or targets for scale length. When metacognitive regulation and 
experiences items were dropped from one of the course scales, they were dropped from 
both the favorite and least favorite sections so that the sections remained completely 
parallel. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarize the results of the item analyses that were 
conducted. Because Tarricone’s (2011) taxonomy categorizes metacognitive experiences 
as a subcomponent of metacognitive regulation, item analysis was conducted on the 
regulation and experiences items separately and together. The three major scales, 
reflecting metacognitive knowledge, regulation, and experiences, and the combined 
regulation and experiences scale all had alphas well above the conventional threshold of  
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Table 3.2 







Final α M SD 
Metacognitive knowledge 46 28 .88 3.1 0.33 
    Declarative knowledge 15 9 .69 3.4 0.34 
    Procedural knowledge 14 12 .81 2.9 0.43 
    Conditional knowledge 17 7 .78 3.1 0.42 
Metacognitive regulation 64 53 .93 2.7 0.43 
    Studying 13 12 .75 2.7 0.49 
    Favorite course 11 9 .78 2.8 0.56 
    Least favorite course 11 9 .85 2.4 0.64 
    Completing assignment 9 9 .71 2.7 0.48 
    Preparing for test 10 7 .79 2.6 0.62 
    Taking a test 10 7 .74 2.9 0.54 
Metacognitive experiences 23 18 .88 3.0 0.45 
    Studying 4 4 .72 3.1 0.56 
    Favorite course 4 3 .63 2.9 0.64 
    Least favorite course 4 3 .66 2.8 0.65 
    Completing assignment 3 2 .69 3.0 0.65 
    Preparing for test 5 4 .73 3.0 0.58 
    Taking a test 3 2 .41 3.0 0.57 
Metacognitive regulation & 
experiences 
87 71 .95 2.8 .41 
    Studying 17 16 .80 2.8 0.45 
    Favorite course 15 12 .81 2.8 0.52 
    Least favorite course 15 12 .85 2.5 0.56 
    Completing assignment 12 11 .75 2.7 0.45 
    Preparing for test 15 11 .84 2.8 0.54 
    Taking a test 13 9 .76 2.9 0.49 
Note. Response scale is 1 to 4 for metacognitive knowledge and 0 to 4 for metacognitive regulation and 
experiences. 
 
.70. All but one of the edited subscales with more than 3 items (declarative knowledge) 
had alphas above .70. 
Revisions to the MIPSS 
Following the pilot study, the MIPSS was revised and restructured. First, a small 
number of items were revised because constructed responses indicated participants were 
not interpreting items as intended. Second, 11 new items were written to replace some 
that were dropped because item removal resulted in some portions of the test blueprint  
  70 
Table 3.3 
Items dropped following analysis of pilot data 
Scale/Item M SD Initial r r at decision 
Declarative knowledge     
     11 3.1 0.76 0.02 0.02 
     13 2.5 0.82 0.05 0.07 
     7 2.4 0.75 0.13 0.11 
     14 2.7 0.77 0.12 0.15 
     12 3.4 0.67 0.23 0.20 
     8 3.2 0.65 0.32 0.33 
Procedural knowledge     
     3 3.1 0.79 0.18 0.18 
Conditional knowledge     
     2 2.5 0.77 0.05 0.05 
     3 2.5 0.79 0.10 0.05 
     9 2.8 0.81 0.15 0.11 
     15 3.0 0.84 0.15 0.10 
     16 2.3 0.79 0.16 0.08 
     17 2.6 0.85 0.24 0.09 
     14 3.2 0.74 0.15 0.15 
     1 3.1 0.72 0.24 0.24 
Favorite class     
     15 2.9 0.97 0.12 0.12 
     6 2.7 0.98 0.20 0.16 
     11 3.0 0.93 0.30 0.22 
Least favorite class     
     15 2.4 0.88 0.06 0.06 
     11 2.5 1.00 0.38 0.36 
     6 2.4 0.87 0.38 0.32 
Taking a test     
     1 2.2 1.09 0.09 0.09 
     2 2.9 0.99 0.14 0.19 
Note. Correlations (r) shown are corrected item-total correlations. 
 
being underrepresented or unrepresented. Third, the response scale for metacognitive 
knowledge items was changed from a 4-point scale to a 5-point scale with the goal of 
improving response variability. Fourth, it was decided that metacognitive regulation and 
metacognitive experiences items for each context would be represented by a single 
metacognitive regulation scale. Corrected item-total correlations and EFA indicated there 
was sufficient unidimensionality in each context to justify combining the subscales. 
Finally, the metacognitive regulation scales were reorganized. Instead of including 
separate scales for a favorite and least favorite course, subscales for specific activities—
  71 
studying, completing an assignment, being in class, and taking a test—were presented in 
the context of a favorite and least favorite course. So, items were introduced with a stem 
that included the context and the activity (e.g., “while studying for the class I consider 
one of my favorites…”). Figure 3.2 presents the conceptual structure of the revised 
MIPSS. Most of the items from the former Favorite Course and Least Favorite Course 
scales became part of the In Class scale. Other items from those scales were added to the 
Studying and Assignment scales. And, the Test Preparation scale was combined with the 
Studying scale because of the logical overlap between general studying and studying 
specifically to prepare for a test. 
After revisions were completed, two studies were planned and conducted. The 
two-study design was employed primarily so that the factor structure of the MIPSS could 
be cross-validated by conducting EFA and CFA on two different samples. And, the 
survey in Study 2 included instruments other than the MIPSS so that scores form the  
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Figure 3.2. The structure of the MIPSS. MK = metacognitive knowledge, MRE = 
metacognitive regulation and experiences. 
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context-specific scales of the MIPSS could be compared to other measures of 
metacognitive regulation and to achievement outcomes. 
Study 1 
 The participants, materials, and procedure for Study 1 are presented in this 
section. Study 1 took place during the spring 2016 semester.  
Participants 
The Study 1 sample consisted of undergraduate students (N = 426) from the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Students were recruited from five different educational 
psychology courses that were taught by ten different instructors. Participants earned 
research participation credit that was either mandatory or worth extra credit points, 
depending on the course. Demographic information for the sample is presented in Table 
3.1, column 3. One participant did not complete any MIPSS items and was dropped from 
all analyses. Two additional participants did not complete the entire survey. For these two 
participants, responses to sections that were completed were used in analyses. 
Materials 
The survey in Study 1 consisted of a section that asked about students’ 
perceptions of favorite and least favorite courses, the revised version of the MIPSS 
(described next), and a demographic section. Participants rated their favorite and least 
favorite courses on seven different dimensions that might plausibly contribute to these 
courses being labeled favorite and least favorite (“course rating items”). The dimensions 
were (a) level of challenge, (b) engagement during class, (c) motivation to learn, (d) 
teacher support of learning, (e) perceived effectiveness of learning activities, (f)  
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Table 3.4 
Descriptive statistics for course rating items 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 Favorite course Least favorite 
course 
Favorite course Least favorite 
course 




























































Note. Response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree); the midpoint, 3, was neither 
agree nor disagree. 
 
perceived instrumentality of learned content, and (g) interest in course topics. Each of the 
seven dimensions were represented by a single item. Descriptive statistics for these items 
are shown in the first two columns of Table 3.4. The complete survey is given in 
Appendix A.  
Metacognition Inventory for Post-Secondary Students. As previously 
indicated, the MIPSS measures metacognitive knowledge as a context-general construct 
and metacognitive regulation as a context-specific construct. The version used in Study 1 
contained a total of 141 items across three sections. The metacognitive knowledge 
section contained 33 items and was paired with a 5-point agree/disagree scale (“strongly 
disagree,” “disagree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “agree,” “strongly agree”). The two 
metacognitive regulation sections each contained the same 54 items referencing either a 
favorite or least favorite course. The metacognitive regulation items were presented with 
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a 4-point frequency response scale (“almost never,” “sometimes,” “often,” “almost 
always”) and a fifth option that read, “I don’t know if I do this.” Due to a computer error 
one metacognitive knowledge item was not presented to any participants. As a result, this 
item could not be included in Study 1 analyses and was not used in Study 2. 
Procedure  
Participants were recruited into the study from the educational psychology 
courses in which they were enrolled. All recruitment visits took place during a single 
week. All potential participants were given a URL address for the survey at the time of 
recruitment and were asked to complete the survey in a single sitting and within one 
week. Participants accessed the survey on-line via the Qualtrics® survey platform outside 
of class time. The survey was closed two weeks after the final recruitment visit.  
Item Analysis 
Item analysis was again used to identify poorly functioning items that were 
subsequently dropped. Additional items were dropped due to targets for scale length. 
Once again, when metacognitive regulation and experiences items were dropped, they 
were dropped from both the favorite and least favorite sections so that the sections 
remained completely parallel. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 summarize the results of the item 
analyses that were conducted.  
Study 2 
 The participants, materials, and procedure for Study 2 are presented in this 
subsection. Study 2 took place during the spring 2017 semester, starting during Week 1 
and ending during Week 4.  
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Table 3.5 
Summary of item analyses results from Study 1 
Scale Initial Items 
Retained 
Items 
Final α M SD 
Metacognitive knowledge 33 26 .87 3.8 0.40 
    Declarative 11 9 .76 4.0 0.40 
    Procedural 11 8 .79 3.6 0.60 
    Conditional 11 9 .77 3.7 0.47 
Metacognitive regulation     
Favorite class 54 45 .93 2.7 0.42 
    Studying 19 15 .83 2.6 0.48 
    In class 10 10 .80 2.6 0.52 
    Assignment 14 11 .81 2.7 0.48 
    Taking a test 11 9 .78 2.9 0.53 
Least favorite class 54 45 .94 2.4 0.45 
    Studying 19 15 .87 2.4 0.51 
    In class 10 10 .82 2.2 0.54 
    Assignment 14 11 .81 2.3 0.48 
    Taking a test 11 9 .84 2.6 0.61 
 
Participants 
Participants were again recruited from undergraduate educational psychology 
courses at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (N = 303). Demographic information is 
shown in Table 3.1, column 4. Participants earned research participation credit that was 
either mandatory or worth extra credit points, depending on the course. 
Materials 
The survey used in Study 2 contained the course rating items described as part of 
the Study 1 materials, the MIPSS, multiple other self-report instruments that have been 
used in education research, and a small number of demographic and other items that were 
created for this study. Descriptive statistics for the course rating items are shown in the 
last two columns of Table 3.4. The MIPSS was the first scale presented, and after the 
MIPSS, there was a branch within the survey that randomly directed participants to one 
of two sections within survey (see Figure 3.3). Therefore, participants did not complete 
all the instruments. The instruments within the sections of the survey were divided so that  
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Table 3.6 
Items dropped following analysis of Study 1 data 
Scale/Item M SD Initial r r at decision 
Declarative knowledge     
     4 3.8 0.83 0.23 0.23 
     3 3.5 0.96 0.30 0.33 
Procedural knowledge     
     3 3.8 0.77 0.18 0.18 
     8 3.4 0.89 0.25 0.23 
Conditional knowledge     
     5 3.6 0.90 0.18 0.18 
     8 2.7 1.02 0.25 0.25 
Studying     
Favorite     
     6 2.7 0.87 0.19 0.19 
     2 2.6 0.99 0.37 0.35 
     7 3.1 0.83 0.35 0.36 
     19 2.8 0.80 0.46 0.47 
Least favorite     
     6 2.3 0.79 0.10 0.10 
     2 2.6 0.93 0.32 0.31 
     7 2.6 0.92 0.45 0.46 
     19 2.4 0.87 0.47 0.50 
Doing an assignment     
Favorite     
     3 2.9 0.95 0.26 0.26 
     14 3.1 0.86 0.29 0.27 
     2 2.9 0.98 0.36 0.30 
Least favorite     
     14 2.8 0.79 0.21 0.21 
     2 2.6 0.93 0.28 0.26 
     3 2.5 1.02 0.30 0.25 
Taking a test     
Favorite     
     11 3.1 0.77 0.29 0.29 
     5 3.0 0.85 0.32 0.26 
Least favorite     
     5 2.6 0.86 0.13 0.13 
     11 2.8 0.83 0.20 0.14 
Note. Correlations (r) shown are corrected item-total correlations. 
 
(1) all participants responded to both a context-general and a context-specific instrument 
and (2) the total number of items were similar for the two groups. The full battery of 
instruments is presented in the Appendix B. Headings identifying each instrument were 
not shown to participants.  
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Course identification and ratings 
MIPSS 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 
Student Perceptions of Classroom 
Knowledge building (x2) 
MSLQ Metacognitive 
Self-regulation scale (x2) 





Figure 3.3. Flowchart of the survey sections. Participants were randomly directed to 
either the right or left branch. 
 
Because data collection took place that the beginning of the semester, participants 
were asked to refer to courses from the previous semester when responding to course-
specific instruments. Prior to seeing any of the instruments described below, participants 
were asked to name a course from the previous semester (fall 2016) that they considered 
a favorite and a course that they considered a least favorite. Participants again rated the 
two courses on the seven different dimensions used in Study 1 that might plausibly 
contribute to these courses being labeled favorite and least favorite.  
Metacognition Inventory for Post-Secondary Students. The MIPSS was 
changed slightly between the Study 1 administration and the Study 2 administration. 
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First, the final version used in Study 2 contained a total of 116 items across the three 
sections. The total number of items was reduced in order to reduce administration time. 
Items were cut based on item analyses conducted on the Study 1 data. The metacognitive 
knowledge section contained 26 items and was paired with the same 5-point scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The two metacognitive regulation 
sections each contained 45 of the 54 items from Study 1. These items were again repeated 
so that participants responded with respect to both a favorite and least favorite course. 
The metacognitive regulation items were presented with the same 4-point response scale 
ranging from “almost never” to “almost always.”  Because participants in Study 2 were 
reporting on courses from the previous semester, item wording was changed to the past 
tense, and the fifth option in the metacognitive regulation sections was changed to “I 
don’t know if I did this.” 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory. The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 
(MAI; Schraw & Dennison, 1994)  is a context-general measure of metacognitive 
knowledge and regulation. It contains 52 items that are divided into two sections (i.e., 
knowledge and regulation), and though many researchers have modified the scoring by 
using a 5-point response scale, the original 100-point, true/false scale (appearing as a 
slider scale) was used. The original scale was used because after an extensive search, no 
published justification for altering the scale could be located and Schraw and Dennison’s 
(1994) internal consistency and factor analysis results are based on the 100-point scale. 
They reported a coefficient alpha of .88 for each of the two scales, and the scales were 
correlated at r = .45. Some studies using a 5-point response scale have reported higher 
correlations between scales. For example, Hammann (2005) and (Sperling et al., 2004) 
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reported correlations between the knowledge and regulation scales of r = .79 and r = .75, 
respectively. 
 Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire. The Metacognitive Self-
regulation scale from the MSLQ (Pintrich et al., 1991) is frequently used by researchers 
as a brief, course-specific measure of metacognition and has been used both 
independently and as part of the full MSLQ. The Metacognitive Self-regulation scale is 
made up of 12 items that have a 7-point response scale that ranges from “not at all true of 
me” to “very true of me.” The authors of the MSLQ reported an alpha of .79 for the scale 
in their original report. Because it is a course-specific measure, this scale was presented 
twice so that participants provided responses with reference to each of the two courses 
they identified. 
 Student Perceptions of Classroom Knowledge Building scale. The Student 
Perceptions of Classroom Knowledge-Building scale (SPOCK; Shell et al., 2005) is a 
course-specific instrument that measures students’ general self-regulation, use of 
knowledge-building strategies, lack of self-regulation, question-asking behaviors (high- 
and low-level), and perceptions of the classroom environment (cooperative learning and 
teacher directedness). A shortened version of the SPOCK that has been used in other 
studies (Flanigan, Peteranetz, Shell, & Soh, 2017; Shell, Patterson-Hazley, Soh, 
Ingraham, & Ramsay, 2013) was used for this study. The shortened version contains 27 
items that make up the same seven subscales as the full version. The Question Asking 
scales were not used in this study, reducing the number of items administered to 21. 
Items are paired with a 5-point response scale that ranges from “almost never” to “almost 
always”. Each response category has a brief description (e.g., Often, occurred frequently: 
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occurred about ¾ of the time) to assist respondents in interpreting the labels. In a study 
that used the full version with a sample of college students (Shell & Soh, 2013), 
coefficient alpha estimates were above .85 for all scales. Another study (Flanigan et al., 
2017) that used the shortened version reported coefficient alpha estimates above .70 for 
the General Self-Regulation, Knowledge Building, and Lack of Regulation scales 
(perception of the classroom environment scales were not reported). Because it is a 
course-specific measure, the SPOCK was presented twice so that participants provided 
responses with reference to each of the two courses they identified. 
 Implicit Theories of Intelligence scale. The Implicit Theories of Intelligence 
scale (Dweck, 2000; Yeager & Dweck, 2012) is a measure of adults’ implicit beliefs 
about the nature of intelligence. It consists of eight items that have a 6-point response 
scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The eight items are 
divided into two scales, one for entity beliefs (i.e., intelligence is a fixed trait) and one for 
incremental beliefs (i.e., intelligence is changeable). Recent research on college students’ 
intelligence beliefs (Flanigan et al., 2017) indicates the scales have high internal 
consistency, with alphas above .90. 
 Digital distraction items. Five items assessing students’ perceptions of the 
impact of digital devices on their in-class behavior and learning were written by an expert 
on digital distractions in post-secondary education environments. The items were course-
specific and assessed the extent to which digital devices were used for non-class purposes 
(2 items), the extent to which the use of digital devices interfered with learning (1 item), 
the types of devices used (1 item), and the nature of course policies that might have 
impacted the use of digital devices (1 item). Because these items were course-specific, 
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they were presented twice so that participants provided responses with reference to each 
of the two courses they identified. These items were not used in the analyses reported in 
this dissertation. 
 Engagement check items. A small number of items were used to detect 
participant inattentiveness. Two of these items were presented within the survey and two 
items were presented after the survey in a face-to-face debriefing. The items embedded in 
the survey were intended to identify participants who provide responses without reading 
the items or response options. The first embedded item was intended to “blend in” with 
the surrounding items but was expected to yield the same response from all participants. 
The second embedded item was an instructed response item that told participants which 
response option to select for that item. In addition to the items, page-level response times 
were collected and used as an indicator of inattentiveness. The two face-to-face items 
provided an additional method of identifying participants who did not complete some or 
all of the survey attentively or honestly.  
Procedure 
Participants were recruited and participated in January of 2017. Participants 
signed up to attend data collection sessions in a computer lab on the University of 
Nebraska–Lincoln campus. After checking in, participants completed the survey on a 
computer in the computer lab. The survey took most participants less than 30 minutes to 
complete (M = 24.9 min, SD = 7.8 min, median = 23.4 min), though a small number of 
participants (n = 7) took between 45 and 65 minutes. Once the survey was completed, 
participants reported back to the researcher and answered the two face-to-face items, after 
which participants were dismissed from the lab. 
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Analysis  
Analyses for this dissertation included item analysis, exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis, correlation, regression, and repeated-measures analysis of 
variance. The rationale for the use of each analysis is described briefly. Prior to all 
analyses, data were screened for normality, outliers, and aberrant response patterns (e.g., 
“straight-lining,” exceptionally fast responses).  
Item Analysis 
The scores from the MIPSS and all other instruments used in this study are based 
on classical test theory (CTT), and classical item analysis was conducted to evaluate the 
instruments’ psychometric properties. Even though factor analysis was performed on the 
MIPSS data, factor scores were not used in any analyses. The decision to not use factor 
scores was based on the likelihood that future research would be done using CTT-based 
scores rather than factor scores, so it would be more beneficial to provide initial results 
based on CTT scores.  
Classical item analysis is a technique based on CTT, the traditional theory of 
testing and measurement. According to CTT, there are three components of test scores: 
the observed score, true score, and error (Hambleton & Jones, 1993; Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 
2009). The most commonly used model representing the relationship between the three 
components can be expressed as  
𝑋 = 𝑇 + 𝐸 
where X represents an individual’s observed score, T represents the individual’s true 
score, and E represents measurement error. The observed score is just that—the score 
observed through the measurement process. The true score is defined as the mean of an 
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infinite number of repeated, independent measurements. And, error is the difference 
between the true score and the observed score. Within CTT, errors are assumed to be 
random. This means (a) across the entire population, errors are unrelated to the true score, 
(b) errors are independent of other errors, and (c) the average error across the population 
is zero (Thorndike, 1982).  
When evaluating the MIPSS through item analysis, the main statistics of interest 
were coefficient alpha, corrected item-total correlations, and item means and standard 
deviations. Coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) provides an index of internal consistency. 
Corrected item-total correlations are an index of discrimination and indicate how well an 
item differentiates between individuals whose total scores are high and those whose total 
scores are low. And, item means and standard deviations are used to identify items that 
are poorly distributed and have low variability or may have a restricted range due to 
responses at the endpoints of the response scale (i.e., floor or ceiling effects). Item 
analysis was conducted in SPSS® Versions 23 and 24. 
Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis was used to address the Factor Structure Question. Factor analysis 
is a technique that is commonly used in instrument development because it uses the 
covariances between individual variables to reduce a large group of variables to a smaller 
number of factors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007a). Exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses were conducted in Mplus® Versions 6 and 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010, 2012), 
and bi-factor models were tested in both analyses. EFA can be used to guide model 
specification when later testing confirmatory models (Gerbing & Hamilton, 1996). Cross-
validation using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis is common practice in 
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psychological and educational research. It should be noted, however, that less is known 
about the suitability of exploratory bi-factor analysis in guiding specification of 
confirmatory bi-factor models.  
A bi-factor model is an appropriate factor-analytic model for the MIPSS because, 
though metacognition is defined as having many components, it is viewed overall as a 
singular construct, and therefore should yield a general factor through factor analysis. 
And, because the MIPSS items refer to specific academic activities, the current 
instrument is expected to have item clusters that share variability that is independent of 
the variability that is attributable to the general metacognition factor. In this dissertation, 
the primary purpose of the exploratory bi-factor analysis was to determine whether it was 
more appropriate to cluster items for the group factors in the confirmatory bi-factor 
analysis according to the components of metacognition (e.g., monitoring), as has been 
done in previous studies, or according to the different activities (e.g., studying) built into 
the instrument, as was hypothesized to better correspond to a bi-factor structure. 
Bi-factor models have a general factor on which all items load as well as multiple 
group factors on which sets of items load. Confirmatory bi-factor models were first 
introduced in the 1930s (Holzinger & Harman, 1938; Holzinger & Swineford, 1937), and 
have seen a resurgence in the literature in recent years. The renewed interest is due 
largely to advances in statistical software packages that have made it more feasible for 
researchers to fit bi-factor models to data. The exploratory bi-factor model was 
introduced by Jennrich and Bentler (2011, 2012), making it possible to test a bi-factor 
structure without specifying the exact bi-factor structure. 
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Both confirmatory and exploratory bi-factor models specify a general latent 
variable (general factor) on which all observed variables load and one or more specific 
latent variables (group factors) on which subsets of observed variables load (Holzinger & 
Swineford, 1937; Jennrich & Bentler, 2011, 2012; Reise, 2012; Reise, Moore, & 
Haviland, 2010). Exploratory models do not specify which observed variables load on 
which group factors, whereas confirmatory models do explicitly map observed variables 
onto group factors. The general factor is not allowed to correlate with group factors. 
Models that do not allow correlations among the group factors are orthogonal, and 
models that allow correlations among the group factors are oblique.  
Exploratory bi-factor analysis (EBFA) was performed on the Study 1 data, and 
confirmatory bi-factor analysis (CBFA) was performed on the Study 2 data. Group 
factors were expected to correlate, therefore oblique models were tested. Because 
confirmatory bi-factor analysis was developed before the exploratory model and serves as 
the conceptual foundation for its exploratory counterpart, CBFA is described in the next 
subsection, followed by EBFA. 
Confirmatory bi-factor analysis. CBFA (Holzinger & Harman, 1938; Holzinger 
& Swineford, 1937) was introduced more than 70 years before EBFA. In a confirmatory 
bi-factor model, it is assumed that all included variables share a common “general” 
factor, and subgroups of variables share “group” factors (Reise et al., 2010). These 
assumptions can be represented by the following loading matrix, where the first column 
is the general factor and subsequent columns are group factors: 











 ∗ ∗ 0 0 
 ∗ ∗ 0 0 
 ∗ ∗ 0 0 
 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 
 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 
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 ∗ 0 0 ∗ 
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Unless otherwise specified, CBFA models also assume that no factors are correlated. It is 
possible to specify correlations among group factors, but the general factor cannot 
correlate with any group factors. If group factors are allowed to correlate, the model is 
oblique, and if group factors are not allowed to correlate, the model is orthogonal. In 
either case, group factors can only account for variability that is not accounted for by the 
general factor. Any variability that is not accounted for by the general and group factors 
is part of the observed variables’ residual terms. Figure 2.1 shows an example CBFA 
model that corresponds to the matrix above (residual terms are not shown in Figure 2.1). 
 Bi-factor models can be evaluated with many different model fit statistics. Model 
fit statistics index the discrepancy between the observed and estimated covariance (or 
correlation) matrices. The model fit statistics used in this dissertation include chi-square 
(χ2), Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Steiger-Lind Root Mean Squared Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). 
Because all fit statistics have strengths and weaknesses, it is recommended that multiple 
fit statistics are reported so that judgments of model-data fit can be made from multiple 
fit statistics and careful inspection of model coefficients and residual terms (Kline, 2016). 
 Model chi-square is a commonly reported model fit statistic that is derived from 
sample size and the overall fit between observed and estimated parameters. The chi-
square statistic is compared to a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom 
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corresponding to that of the model. Model degrees of freedom are determined by 
subtracting the number of estimated parameters from the number of unique elements in 
the observed covariance matrix. Chi-square values closer to zero indicate better model-
data fit, and the type I error rate is typically set at .05. Model-chi square can be affected 
by non-normality, correlation size, large amounts of unique variance in observed 
variables, and sample size (Kline, 2016). 
 The Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) is a comparative 
goodness-of-fit statistic that can range from 0 to 1, with 1 reflecting the best model-data 
fit. The CFI compares the tested model to a baseline model—typically a null model of 
uncorrelated variables (Bentler, 1990)—and can be interpreted as the relative 
improvement of the tested model over the baseline model (Kline, 2016). The CFI value of 
.95 has been recommended as a cutoff for determining acceptable model fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). Though it is debated (Lance, Butts, & Michels, 2006), the more liberal 
cutoff value of .90 is also sometimes used. 
 The Steiger-Lind Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 
1990) is an absolute fit statistic that is typically presented along with a 90% confidence 
interval for the statistic. Lower RMSEA values indicate better model-data fit, with a 
value of zero indicating close, but not perfect, fit (Kline, 2016). Conventionally, an 
RMSEA that is below .05 is interpreted as indicating close fit, and an RMSEA that is 
above .10 is interpreted as indicating poor fit. Hu and Bentler (1999) recommended “a 
cutoff value close to .06” (p. 27) and reported that cutoffs of either .05 or .06 could 
effectively reject misspecified models when used in conjunction with other fit statistics, 
namely SRMR. However, Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby, and Paxton (2008) have 
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questioned the use of a universal cutoff, whether used alone or alongside the 90% 
confidence interval. 
 The Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)is an absolute fit statistic 
that gauges the mean difference between observed and estimated covariances. Similar to 
the RMSEA, lower SRMR values indicate better model-data fit, with values less than .08 
suggesting acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999) and values greater than or equal to .10 
suggesting poor fit (Kline, 2016). SRMR is one of the few commonly used fit statistics 
that does not include chi-square in its formula, and as characteristics of the data change 
(e.g., sample size, nonnormality, etc.), SRMR behaves more uniquely than most common 
fit statistics (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
 Additional statistics used in this dissertation are coefficients omega (ω; 
McDonald, 1985), omega hierarchical (ωH; Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 2005), and 
omega hierarchical subscale (ωHS; Reise, Bonifay, & Haviland, 2013). These coefficients 
index internal consistency and provides an alternative to coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 
1951). This group of coefficients is based on a specified factor model. Rather than 
assuming all items have an essentially identical relationship with the true score (i.e., tau 
equivalence), as is the case with coefficient alpha, omega coefficients use estimated 
factor loadings to account for possible differences in the relationships between items and 
the true score (Rodriguez, Reise, & Haviland, 2016).  
Coefficient omega estimates the proportion of variance in observed total scores 
accounted for by all sources of variance included in the model (Rodriguez et al., 2016). 
Like coefficient alpha, coefficient omega assumes data are unidimensional, but it has 
been argued (Zinbarg et al., 2005) that a modified version of coefficient omega can be 
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(Σ𝜆𝑔𝑒𝑛)2 + (Σ𝜆𝑠1)2 + (Σ𝜆𝑠2)2 …+(Σ𝜆𝑠𝑛)2 + 𝛴(1 − ℎ2)
 
where (Σλgen)
2 is the squared sum of the unstandardized factor loadings for the general 
factor, (Σλsn)
2 is the squared sum of the unstandardized factor loadings for a given group 
factor, and Σ(1 - h2) is the sum of the error variances. 
 Coefficient omega hierarchical (ωH) is computationally identical, except that the 
numerator does not contain the variance terms for the group factors (Gignac & Watkins, 
2013). As a result, it estimates the proportion of variance in observed total scores 
accounted for by the general factor. The square root of ωH is the correlation of raw total 
scores with the general factor (Rodriguez et al., 2016). Similarly, ωHS estimates the 
proportion of variance in observed total scores accounted for by a group factor, after 






+ (Σ𝜆𝑠1)2 + Σ(1 − ℎ2)
 
with all components defined as above. Omega hierarchical subscale is calculated 
separately for each group factor (Gignac & Watkins, 2013). The square root of ωHS is the 
correlation between raw unit-weighted subscale scores with their corresponding group 
factors (Rodriguez et al., 2016). In cases where items load strongly on the general factor, 
ωHS is expected to be considerably lower than ωH because removing the variance due to 
the general factor leaves little common variance that can be explained by the group 
factors. Discrepancies between omega coefficients and coefficient alpha estimates for full 
scales and subscales indicate the extent to which total score reliability is influenced by 
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variance due to group factors and subscale score reliability is influenced by variance due 
to the general factor (Reise et al., 2010). 
 Exploratory bi-factor analysis. EBFA was introduced by Jennrich and Bentler 
(2011, 2012) and can be performed with both orthogonal and oblique rotations. 
According to Jennrich and Bentler (2011), EBFA “is simply exploratory factor analysis 
using a bi-factor rotation criterion” (p. 537). The bi-factor rotation criterion loads all 
variables on the first factor and then attempts to create a perfect cluster structure (no 
cross-loadings) with the remaining factors. Jennrich and Bentler (2012) presented two 
different rotation criteria that can be adapted to bi-factor rotation, quartimin and geomin, 
and note that the geomin criterion might be better for returning a perfect cluster structure. 
As is the case with classic exploratory factor analysis, EBFA with orthogonal rotation 
produces a factor pattern matrix, and EBFA with oblique rotation produces a factor 
pattern matrix, a factor correlation matrix, and a factor structure matrix. 
 When calculated in Mplus® (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), EBFA model results 
include the fit statistics described in the previous subsections. Additionally, residual 
variances for each observed variable are calculated and can be used to evaluate the tested 
factor structure. 
Analysis of Variance 
Addressing the Variability Question, multiple repeated-measures analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) were used to test for differences in metacognitive regulation due to 
activity and course. Two-factor repeated measures ANOVA is an extension of repeated-
measures ANOVA that makes it possible to test for differences associated with two 
categorical factors as well as the interaction between those factors. The two-factor 
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repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on MIPSS regulation subscales, and the two 
within-subjects variables were activity (four levels) and course (two levels). If a factor in 
a repeated measures ANOVA has more than two levels, the assumption of sphericity—
that all pairs of repeated-measures variable levels have equivalent correlations—has the 
potential to be violated. If the assumption of sphericity is not met, an alternate 
significance test, such as the Greenhouse-Geisser, is necessary to correct for the bias due 
to a lack of sphericity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007b). The ANOVA was evaluated at the α 
= .05 level. Other course-specific scales were compared with one-factor repeated-
measures ANOVA. All repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted in SPSS® Version 
24. 
The F test statistic indicates whether observed differences between means are 
significantly different from zero. The degree to which any mean differences are 
practically meaningful was judged by effect sizes. The effect sizes calculated in 
conjunction with the ANOVAs were partial eta squared (𝜂𝑝
2)  and Cohen’s d. Cohen’s d 
indexes the difference between means in (pooled) standard deviation units. That is, if d = 
1.0 the difference between means is equal to one full standard deviation. Cohen’s (1988) 
conventions for interpreting d are that d = 0.2 indicates a small effect, d = 0.5 indicates a 
medium effect, and d = 0.8 indicates a large effect. In contrast, 𝜂𝑝
2 indicates the 
proportion of variability in the dependent variable that is accounted for by the 
independent variable. Following Cohen’s (1988; Richardson, 2011) guidelines for 
interpreting eta2 (𝜂2), 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01 was interpreted as a small effect, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06 was interpreted 
as a medium effect, and 𝜂𝑝
2 = .14 was interpreted as a large effect. Practically 
meaningfully differences, as judged by effect sizes, across activities and courses would 
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indicate that individuals’ (self-reported) metacognitive regulation is influenced by the 
course and activity with which one is engaging.  
Correlation and Regression 
Correlation and multiple regression were used to address the Association 
Question. Correlations were calculated between the MIPSS subscales and the other scales 
in order to reveal the patterns of association with both general and course-specific 
measures of metacognition and other constructs. Multiple regression was used to predict 
indicators of academic achievement (e.g., GPA, course grades) from the various 
metacognition and self-regulation scale scores. Correlation and multiple regression are 
related ways to index the covariance between continuous variables, and as such, were the 
appropriate techniques to address the Association Question. For both correlation and 
multiple regression analyses, r2 (or R2) provided an index of the amount of shared 
variance among variables. Cohen’s (1988) conventions are commonly used in the social 
sciences to interpret correlation coefficients (r). Cohen suggested a correlation coefficient 
of .10 be considered weak, .30 be considered moderate, and .50 be considered strong. 
These guidelines were used to interpret and describe correlations from this study. The 
corresponding R2 values were used to interpret the proportion of variance accounted for 
by multiple regression models as small (R2 = 0.01), medium (R2 = 0.09), and large (R2 = 
0.25). For regression analyses, models were evaluated with the F statistic, and 
standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients and the associated t statistics 
were used to evaluate the usefulness of individual predictors for predicting outcomes. 
The conventional alpha level of .05 was used to judge the significance of F and t 
statistics. Because of the large number of correlations that were calculated and the sample 
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size, the alpha level .01 was used to judge the significance level of correlations and 
reduce the probability of making a Type I error. Also, the sample size used for these 
analyses was large enough that an alpha of .05 would result in significant correlations 
that were not practically meaningful. All correlation and regression analyses were 
conducted in SPSS® Versions 24 and 25. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 This chapter presents the results of the analyses that tested the three research 
questions. First, the data screening and preparation process is explained. Second, results 
of exploratory and confirmatory bi-factor analyses that address the Factor Structure 
Question are presented. The third section shows the results of repeated-measures analyses 
of variance that tested the Variability Question. And finally, results of correlation and 
regression analyses that address the Association Question are given. 
Data Screening and Preparation 
Prior to any analyses, data were inspected for errors, missingness, normality, 
outliers, and aberrant response patterns (e.g., “straight-lining,” exceptionally fast 
responses). Inspection of response patterns in the Study 1 dataset led to the removal of 
the following participants: 12 participants who exhibited excessive straight-lining, 16 
participants who completed the survey in less than nine minutes, and seven participants 
who took more than 12 hours to complete the survey. Excessive straight-lining was 
determined by examining standard deviations for each survey subsection for each 
participant. Participants who had a subsection standard deviation of zero (i.e., chose the 
same response for every item) for more than three subsections were eliminated from 
further analysis. A completion time of nine minutes corresponds to an average of about 
3.5 seconds per item, without taking webpage-loading time into account. After removing 
these participants, there were 390 cases eligible for Study 1 analysis. Inspection of 
response patterns in the Study 2 dataset led to the removal of five participants who 
completed the survey in less than 15 minutes and three participants who were outliers in 
terms of age (> 40 years). A completion time of 15 minutes corresponds to an average of 
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about 5 seconds or less per item (depending on the version of the survey), without taking 
webpage-loading time into account. An additional two participants were excluded from 
analysis because at the time of the survey, they informed the researcher that they had not 
taken any courses during the previous semester and instead provided responses about the 
semester before that (i.e., one year prior). After removing these participants, there were 
293 cases eligible for Study 2 analysis. 
After data screening was completed, all items with reverse-wording were reverse-
scored. For the established scales used in Study 2, scale scores were calculated as the 
average of responses to items on the scale. 
Question 1: The Factor Structure Question 
 EBFA was conducted using the Study 1 dataset and CBFA was conducted using 
the Study 2 dataset. Prior to conducting either factor analysis, a subset of the MIPSS 
items were selected to be used in the factor analyses. Only items that were used in both 
Studies 1 and 2 were considered. Items were selected so as to maintain construct 
representation, according to the MIPSS blueprint, and interitem correlations calculated 
from the Study 1 dataset. Items from each section of the blueprint with the highest 
interitem correlations were selected so that construct representation was maintained, and 
items were positively correlated. 
Exploratory Bi-Factor Analysis 
The primary purpose of the EBFA was to determine whether it was more 
appropriate to cluster items for the group factors in the CBFA according to the 
components of metacognition (e.g., monitoring), as has been hypothesized in previous 
factor analyses of other instruments, or according to the different activities (e.g., 
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studying) built into the instrument. The latter was expected to better correspond to a bi-
factor structure. EBFA was conducted in Mplus® Version 7, and oblique quartimax 
rotation was used. In using oblique rotation, the group factors were allowed to correlate 
with each other, but the correlations between the general factor and all group factors was 
constrained to be 0 (see Figure 4.1). Oblique rotation was used because of the anticipated 
correlations between the subcomponents of metacognitive knowledge and the possibility 
of correlations between activities that shared salient characteristics (e.g., taking a test and 
completing an assignment both having a direct impact on one’s grade). Because the same 
metacognitive regulation items were presented for the favorite course context and the 
least favorite course context, two sets of EBFAs were conducted: one with the 
metacognitive knowledge and favorite course metacognitive regulation items and the 
other with the metacognitive knowledge and least favorite course metacognitive 
regulation items. 
 In order to fully consider possible factor structures that are theoretically plausible, 
results of extracting three, six, eight, and nine factors were considered for both the 
Knowledge + Favorite Course analysis and the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course 
analysis (see Tables 4.1 – 4.12). Model fit statistics for all EBFAs are provided in Table 
4.13. The numbers of factors extracted correspond to the following factor structures that 
were seen as plausible, theory-based alternatives: (a) three factors would reflect a general 
factor, a metacognitive knowledge factor, and a metacognitive regulation factor; (b) six 
factors would reflect a general factor, a metacognitive knowledge factor, and one factor 
for each of the four activities; (c) eight factors would reflect a general factor, one factor  
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Figure 4.1. Hypothesized oblique bi-factor model of the MIPSS. 
 
for each of the three metacognitive knowledge components, and one factor for each of the 
four activities; and (d) nine factors would reflect a general factor, one factor for each of 
the three metacognitive knowledge components, and one factor for each of the five 
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that are represented in the MIPSS metacognitive regulation section. It was expected that 
the eight-factor solution would most closely match the expected item groupings. 
 In Tables 4.1 through 4.12, factor coefficients below the absolute value 0.2 are 
not shown, to aid in visually detecting item groupings. The critical value for significance 
when N = 400 and α = .01 is 0.13, so all shown coefficients are statistically significant. 
The cutoff of 0.3 has been recommended for determining practical significance in classic  
Table 4.1 
Factor pattern matrix for the three-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 
DK1 0.612  0.201  
DK2 0.596  0.220  
DK3 0.650    
DK4 0.617  0.244  
DK5 0.454    
PK1 0.426  0.413  
PK2 0.520  0.245  
PK3 0.568  0.309  
PK4 0.414  0.444  
PK5 0.524  0.541  
CK1 0.317   0.464 
CK2 0.369   0.475 
CK3 0.472   0.328 
CK4 0.493   0.34 
CK5 0.332   0.542 
S1 0.538   0.331 
S2 0.361   0.526 
S3 0.459   0.246 
S4 0.406   0.436 
S5 0.631    
C1 0.610  -0.288  
C2 0.534  -0.263  
C3 0.606  -0.321  
C4 0.632  -0.249  
C5 0.571  -0.214  
A1 0.593  -0.214  
A2 0.524    
A3 0.425   0.279 
A4 0.594    
A5 0.611    
T1 0.643    
T2 0.453    
T3 0.679    
T4 0.491    
T5 0.686   -0.217 
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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Table 4.2 
Factor pattern matrix for the three-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 
DK1 0.518 0.431  
DK2 0.476 0.541  
DK3 0.509 0.471  
DK4 0.605 0.394  
DK5 0.464 0.252  
PK1 0.513  -0.205 
PK2 0.565   
PK3 0.575 0.202  
PK4 0.461  -0.201 
PK5 0.582  -0.238 
CK1 0.446   
CK2 0.482  -0.207 
CK3 0.512   
CK4 0.593   
CK5 0.499 -0.282  
S1 0.562  0.230 
S2 0.517 -0.476  
S3 0.514 -0.327  
S4 0.500 -0.498  
S5 0.526  0.298 
C1 0.564  0.307 
C2 0.426  0.238 
C3 0.496  0.393 
C4 0.473  0.202 
C5 0.534  0.254 
A1 0.474  0.279 
A2 0.374  0.364 
A3 0.522 -0.287  
A4 0.588 -0.253  
A5 0.479  0.311 
T1 0.580  0.526 
T2 0.334  0.352 
T3 0.490  0.496 
T4 0.379  0.511 
T5 0.478  0.528 
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
 
factor analysis (Stevens, 2012; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007a), but the appropriateness of 
this cutoff for bi-factor analysis has not been established. As can be seen from Tables 4.1 
and 4.2, group factors in the three-factor solutions did not reflect the distinction between 
metacognitive knowledge and regulation. And, as can be seen from Tables 4.3 and 4.4, 
group factors in the six-factor solutions generally corresponded to the three components 
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of metacognitive knowledge, with some of the metacognitive regulation items grouping 
as expected. The eight-factor solutions (Tables 4.5 through 4.10) most closely match 
what was expected, but for neither the Knowledge + Favorite Course nor the Knowledge 
+ Least Favorite Course EBFA did the Assignment group factor emerge clearly. The 
nine-factor solutions (Tables 4.11 and 4.12) yielded group factors that correspond to 
Table 4.3 
Factor pattern matrix for the six-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK1 0.535 0.442     
DK2 0.503 0.582     
DK3 0.566 0.474     
DK4 0.575 0.491     
DK5 0.442 0.300     
PK1 0.391  0.589    
PK2 0.500  0.324    
PK3 0.525  0.341   0.241 
PK4 0.354  0.535    
PK5 0.448  0.655    
CK1 0.399   0.513   
CK2 0.452   0.549   
CK3 0.537   0.273   
CK4 0.542  0.211    
CK5 0.451 -0.207  0.354   
S1 0.610      
S2 0.499 -0.203  0.213 -0.228  
S3 0.514      
S4 0.498    -0.309  
S5 0.663      
C1 0.634   -0.289   
C2 0.518   -0.396   
C3 0.597   -0.252   
C4 0.614   -0.374   
C5 0.597   -0.218  -0.314 
A1 0.589     0.219 
A2 0.514     0.281 
A3 0.481     0.367 
A4 0.596     0.282 
A5 0.560     0.334 
T1 0.602    0.410  
T2 0.435    0.247  
T3 0.595    0.523  
T4 0.429    0.393  
T5 0.599    0.449  
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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some of the same group factors as the eight-factor model, and therefore the factors did 
not reflect the subcomponents of metacognitive regulation (i.e., monitoring, evaluating) 
that were hypothesized to correspond to a nine-factor solution.  
Based on the results of the EBFAs, it was decided that the eight-factor solution 
would be the model tested in the CBFAs. In addition to most closely matching the 
Table 4.4 
Factor pattern matrix for the six-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DK1 0.527 0.408     
DK2 0.703 0.329     
DK3 0.607 0.425     
DK4 0.525 0.514     
DK5 0.370 0.373     
PK1  0.381 0.585    
PK2  0.418 0.379    
PK3  0.405 0.447    
PK4  0.296 0.614    
PK5  0.397 0.644    
CK1  0.349  0.535   
CK2  0.343  0.621   
CK3  0.468  0.434   
CK4  0.468 0.254 0.261   
CK5  0.412  0.380 0.276  
S1  0.585    0.233 
S2  0.524   0.522  
S3  0.482   0.444  
S4  0.508   0.512  
S5  0.569    0.315 
C1  0.606    0.426 
C2  0.479    0.221 
C3  0.559    0.448 
C4  0.515    0.538 
C5  0.512     
A1  0.563     
A2 -0.230 0.508   -0.214  
A3  0.589   0.226  
A4  0.615   0.269  
A5  0.556     
T1  0.772   -0.247  
T2  0.476  -0.264   
T3  0.666   -0.240  
T4  0.582 -0.249 -0.266   
T5  0.647   -0.328  
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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hypothesized factor structure and being the most interpretable, the eight-factor solutions 
fit the data well, with little improvements in fit statistics between the eight- and nine-
factor solutions (see Table 4.13). The eight-factor solution indicates there is common 
variance among all MIPSS items that correspond to a general metacognition factor, and 
after accounting for the general factor, there remains common variance among groups of 
items. These item groups mostly correspond to the three components of metacognitive 
Table 4.5 
Factor pattern matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DK1 0.607    -0.234    
DK2 0.605 0.238   -0.331    
DK3 0.635 0.271   -0.214    
DK4 0.607 0.615       
DK5 0.491      -0.349  
PK1 0.374  0.623      
PK2 0.532  0.311     -0.232 
PK3 0.596  0.293      
PK4 0.388  0.510      
PK5 0.490  0.606      
CK1 0.353   0.652     
CK2 0.414   0.592     
CK3 0.528   0.303     
CK4 0.530        
CK5 0.400   0.212 0.389    
S1 0.555    0.281    
S2 0.410    0.555    
S3 0.451    0.339    
S4 0.449    0.417    
S5 0.618        
C1 0.580     0.383   
C2 0.493     0.360   
C3 0.555     0.410   
C4 0.595 -0.205    0.339   
C5 0.522     0.532   
A1 0.589      0.319  
A2 0.547 -0.296       
A3 0.490  -0.207      
A4 0.627        
A5 0.613      0.318  
T1 0.585       0.407 
T2 0.444 -0.226      0.239 
T3 0.614       0.447 
T4 0.469       0.424 
T5 0.620       0.459 
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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Table 4.6 
Factor correlation matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 1        
2 0 1       
3 0 .063 1      
4 0 .061 .020 1     
5 0 -.089 .003 .239* 1    
6 0 .013 -.130* -.116 -.038 1   
7 0 -.145 .024 -.043 -.029 .103 1  
8 0 -.110 .018 -.137* -.159* .090 .062 1 
Note. * p < .05 
 
Table 4.7 
Factor structure matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DK1 0.607 0.249   -0.247    
DK2 0.605 0.301   -0.327  -0.207  
DK3 0.635 0.284   -0.248    
DK4 0.607 0.618       
DK5 0.491 0.207     -0.382  
PK1 0.374  0.611      
PK2 0.532  0.300     -0.203 
PK3 0.596  0.302      
PK4 0.388  0.511      
PK5 0.490  0.623      
CK1 0.353   0.652     
CK2 0.414   0.604     
CK3 0.528   0.313     
CK4 0.530    0.229    
CK5 0.400   0.318 0.463    
S1 0.555    0.296    
S2 0.410    0.567    
S3 0.451    0.308    
S4 0.449    0.427   -0.223 
S5 0.618        
C1 0.580     0.397   
C2 0.493   -0.246  0.380   
C3 0.555     0.434   
C4 0.595 -0.209  -0.225  0.354   
C5 0.522     0.522   
A1 0.589      0.333  
A2 0.547 -0.300       
A3 0.490 -0.222       
A4 0.627        
A5 0.613      0.317  
T1 0.585       0.407 
T2 0.444 -0.247      0.255 
T3 0.614       0.469 
T4 0.469       0.428 
T5 0.620       0.461 
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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knowledge and the different activities referred to in the metacognitive regulation items. 
Factor correlation matrices for the eight-factor solutions are shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.9, 
and factor structure coefficients for the eight-factor solutions are shown in Tables 4.7 and 
4.10. The factor structure matrix is the product of the factor pattern matrix and the factor 
Table 4.8 
Factor pattern matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DK1 0.555 0.386       
DK2 0.709 0.297       
DK3 0.630 0.392       
DK4 0.579 0.502       
DK5 0.394 0.364       
PK1  0.425 0.508      
PK2  0.450 0.321      
PK3  0.409 0.459      
PK4  0.310 0.606      
PK5  0.406 0.656      
CK1  0.353  0.621     
CK2  0.365  0.629     
CK3  0.471  0.353     
CK4  0.477 0.285 0.244     
CK5  0.456  0.308 0.293    
S1  0.618     0.296  
S2  0.563   0.461    
S3  0.527   0.374    
S4  0.550   0.464    
S5  0.559    0.342   
C1  0.624    0.385   
C2  0.476    0.228 -0.363  
C3  0.554    0.454   
C4  0.544       
C5  0.519    0.543   
A1  0.587   -0.277    
A2  0.512   -0.321    
A3  0.614       
A4  0.608   0.245   0.272 
A5  0.573     0.215  
T1  0.724   -0.252   0.270 
T2  0.399      0.484 
T3  0.629   -0.235   0.205 
T4  0.490      0.563 
T5  0.617   -0.316    
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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Table 4.9 
Factor correlation matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 1        
2 0 1       
3 .273 0 1      
4 .194 0 .088 1     
5 -.095 0 .019 .061 1    
6 .084* 0 -.069 .055 -.106 1   
7 .066 0 -.026 .080 -.046 .005 1  
8 .054* 0 -.115 -.169 -.088 .037 -.054 1 
Note. * p < .05 
 
Table 4.10 
Factor structure matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DK1 0.582 0.386 0.252      
DK2 0.721 0.297 0.214      
DK3 0.620 0.392       
DK4 0.574 0.502       
DK5 0.413 0.364     0.212  
PK1  0.425 0.523     -0.218 
PK2 0.216 0.450 0.375      
PK3 0.286 0.409 0.501 0.207     
PK4  0.310 0.599      
PK5 0.230 0.406 0.664      
CK1  0.353  0.607     
CK2  0.365  0.646     
CK3  0.471  0.385   0.240  
CK4  0.477 0.304 0.289     
CK5  0.456  0.328 0.324    
S1  0.618     0.296  
S2  0.563   0.468    
S3  0.527   0.375    
S4 -0.211 0.550   0.487 -0.207   
S5  0.559    0.334   
C1  0.624    0.375   
C2  0.476    0.222 -0.370  
C3  0.554    0.456   
C4  0.544       
C5  0.519    0.553   
A1  0.587   -0.244    
A2  0.512   -0.292    
A3  0.614       
A4  0.608   0.247   0.222 
A5  0.573     0.222  
T1  0.724   -0.266   0.291 
T2  0.399      0.489 
T3  0.629   -0.252   0.235 
T4  0.490      0.589 
T5  0.618   -0.341    
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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correlation matrix, so factor structure coefficients describe the relationship between items 
and factors in light of the correlations between factors. 
Confirmatory Bi-Factor Analysis 
CBFA was conducted in Mplus® Version 6. The tested models (see Figure 4.1) 
were specified so as to mirror the hypothesized eight-factor models that were tested in the 
EBFAs. Specifically, the group factors were allowed to correlate with each other, but the 
Table 4.11 
Factor pattern matrix for the nine-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
DK1 0.593 0.213     -0.230   
DK2 0.580 0.262     -0.330   
DK3 0.621 0.298     -0.237   
DK4 0.604 0.606        
DK5 0.489   -0.391      
PK1 0.430  0.751       
PK2 0.552        -0.231 
PK3 0.612     0.213    
PK4 0.420  0.269   0.299    
PK5 0.527  0.240   0.500    
CK1 0.362    0.656     
CK2 0.424    0.579     
CK3 0.525    0.288     
CK4 0.546     0.323    
CK5 0.412    0.219  0.381   
S1 0.565      0.252   
S2 0.421      0.533   
S3 0.477 0.236 0.258   -0.225 0.344   
S4 0.469      0.375   
S5 0.616       0.217  
C1 0.575       0.371  
C2 0.484       0.367  
C3 0.539       0.422  
C4 0.591       0.320  
C5 0.512       0.566  
A1 0.582   0.305      
A2 0.546 -0.265    -0.254    
A3 0.490     -0.272    
A4 0.630         
A5 0.606   0.308      
T1 0.583        0.407 
T2 0.440        0.252 
T3 0.622        0.464 
T4 0.456        0.432 
T5 0.616        0.461 
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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correlations between the general factor and all group factors were fixed to 0. And, once 
again, two separate models were tested: a Knowledge + Favorite Course model and a 
Knowledge + Least Favorite Course model. 
 The Knowledge + Favorite Course model fit the data well (χ2 [503] = 656.24, p < 
.001, CFI = .968, RMSEA = .032, CI90% .025 to .039). Standardized loadings for the 
Table 4.12 
Factor pattern matrix for the nine-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
DK1 0.543 0.432        
DK2 0.693 0.337        
DK3 0.603 0.418        
DK4 0.578 0.497    0.229    
DK5 0.391 0.372        
PK1  0.441 0.494       
PK2  0.496    -0.269    
PK3  0.475 0.336   -0.302    
PK4  0.343 0.573       
PK5  0.430 0.684       
CK1  0.368  0.641      
CK2  0.379  0.646      
CK3  0.502  0.239    0.301  
CK4  0.499 0.238     0.216  
CK5  0.439  0.226 0.293   0.298  
S1  0.606     0.215 0.333  
S2  0.501   0.533     
S3  0.471   0.490     
S4  0.490   0.543     
S5  0.548     0.352   
C1  0.606     0.393   
C2  0.470     0.212 -0.384  
C3  0.573     0.431   
C4  0.545        
C5  0.542     0.520   
A1  0.588    0.214    
A2  0.565 -0.214  -0.288     
A3  0.589   0.236     
A4  0.599   0.258    0.252 
A5  0.561    0.255    
T1  0.716    0.322   0.287 
T2  0.416       0.490 
T3  0.619    0.251   0.214 
T4  0.478       0.559 
T5  0.623   -0.218 0.217    
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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Table 4.13 
EBFA model fit statistics 
Model χ2  df p CFI SRMR RMSEA [CI] 
Knowledge + Favorite Course       
    3 1086.06 493 <.001 .927 .055 .056 [.051, .060] 
    6 618.22 400 <.001 .973 .036 .037 [.032, .043] 
    8 481.04 343 <.001 .983 .029 .032 [.025, .039] 
    9 429.28 316 <.001 .986 .027 .030 [.023, .037] 
Knowledge + Least Favorite 
Course 
      
    3 1282.33 493 <.001 .894 .061 .064 [.060, .068] 
    6 715.35 400 <.001 .957 .038 .045 [.040, .050] 
    8 568.34 343 <.001 .970 .031 .041 [.035, .047] 
    9 494.41 316 <.001 .976 .028 .038 [.031, .044] 
 
model are shown in Table 4.14 and correlations between group factors are shown in  
Table 4.15. Most items had moderate to strong loadings on both of their factors, and all 
items had moderate or strong loadings on at least one factor. All loadings on the group 
factors were moderate or strong, except for the Studying factor, which had two weak item 
loadings. The correlations between group factors were generally higher than they were in 
the EBFA, especially among the components of metacognitive knowledge.  
  The Knowledge + Least Favorite Course model also fit the data well (χ2 [503] = 
747.54, p < .001, CFI = .947, RMSEA = .041, CI90% .034 to .047). Standardized 
loadings for the model are shown in Table 4.16 and correlations between group factors 
are shown in Table 4.17. The general factor was much less well defined in this model: of 
the 35 items, 19 had loadings on the general factor below 0.30. The group factors, 
however, were more clearly defined: only 4 items had group-factor loadings below. 0.30. 
Consistent with the Knowledge + Favorite Course model, correlations between group 
factors were generally higher than they were in the EBFA.  
 All omega (ω) coefficients are shown in Table 4.18. As is indicated by the two ω 
estimates, both models account for a large portion of the variability in the data. 
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Table 4.14 
Standardized results for the Knowledge + Favorite Course CBFA 
 Factor 
 General DK PK CK S C A T 
DK1 .319 .600       
DK2 .254 .633       
DK3 .405 .588       
DK4 .288 .606       
DK5 .307 .422       
PK1 .148  .539      
PK2 .168  .489      
PK3 .212  .556      
PK4 .233  .438      
PK5 .275  .734      
CK1 .320   .431     
CK2 .278   .475     
CK3 .328   .515     
CK4 .288   .707     
CK5 .313   .515     
S1 .523    .181    
S2 .343    .838    
S3 .368    .303    
S4 .345    .401    
S5 .702    .041    
C1 .451     .408   
C2 .384     .452   
C3 .578     .587   
C4 .525     .270   
C5 .702     .205   
A1 .430      .582  
A2 .441      .427  
A3 .396      .447  
A4 .447      .368  
A5 .389      .735  
T1 .577       .571 
T2 .474       .622 
T3 .349       .754 
T4 .565       .550 
T5 .200       .419 
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
 
Table 4.15 
Factor correlation matrix for the Knowledge + Favorite Course CBFA 
 DK PK CK S C A T 
DK 1       
PK .661* 1      
CK .665* .779* 1     
S .260* .330* .474* 1    
C .259* .110 .134 -.023 1   
A .280* .403* .155 .081 .265* 1  
T -.019 .147 -.080 .153 -.151 -.045 1 
Note. * p < .05. All correlations with the general factor were fixed at 0. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK 
= Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = 
Taking a Test. 
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Table 4.16 
Standardized results for the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course CBFA 
 Factor 
 General DK PK CK S C A T 
DK1 .193 .654       
DK2 .042 .686       
DK3 .142 .706       
DK4 .315 .605       
DK5 .159 .495       
PK1 .339  .439      
PK2 .246  .453      
PK3 .279  .517      
PK4 .169  .472      
PK5 .408  .671      
CK1 .071   .559     
CK2 .067   .582     
CK3 .202   .577     
CK4 .106   .753     
CK5 .374   .493     
S1 .286    .590    
S2 .474    .351    
S3 .555    .197    
S4 .572    .275    
S5 .214    .589    
C1 .273     .621   
C2 .607     .189   
C3 .236     .747   
C4 .322     .413   
C5 .328     .658   
A1 .683      .274  
A2 .239      .613  
A3 -.097      .837  
A4 .482      .393  
A5 -.001      .711  
T1 .300       .730 
T2 .408       .629 
T3 .339       .557 
T4 .542       .529 
T5 .206       .491 
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
 
Table 4.17 
Factor correlation matrix for the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course CBFA 
 DK PK CK S C A T 
DK 1       
PK .713* 1      
CK .722* .806* 1     
S .226* -.019 .113 1    
C .321* .173 .212* .801* 1   
A .266* .317* .202* .442* .539* 1  
T .248* .055 .130 .401* .441* .502* 1 
Note. * p < .05. Note. * p < .05. All correlations with the general factor were fixed at 0. 
 DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = Studying, 
C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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Table 4.18 
Omega coefficients for CBFA Models 
 Knowledge + favorite model Knowledge + least favorite model 
Factor ω ωH ωHS ω ωH ωHS 
 .919   .886   
General  .734   .584  
DK   .040   .075 
PK   .037   .051 
CK   .034   .067 
S   .016   .032 
C   .018   .054 
A   .032   .062 
T   .041   .066 
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = 
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
 
Consistent with the interpretations of the factor loadings, the general factor of the 
Knowledge + Favorite Course model had a much higher ωH than the Knowledge + Least 
Favorite Course model. The ωHS estimates for both models indicate all the subscales have 
low reliability separate from the general factor. However, ωHS is a function of the relative 
sizes of the general factor and the subscale: Subscales that are a small portion of the full 
scale will have small ωHS estimates unless all loadings on the general factor are very weak 
(in which case a bi-factor model is unlikely to be used). To illustrate, if item loadings are 
held constant, a 10-item subscale from a 20-item scale will have a higher ωHS than a 5-
item subscale from a 20-item scale because the 10-item subscale is a larger proportion of 
the 20-item scale than the 5-item scale. Therefore, the relative size of the subscale should 
be considered when interpreting ωHS. 
 Because of the high correlations among the knowledge group factors (all rs > .65 
for the Knowledge + Favorite Course model, all rs > .70 for the Knowledge + Least 
Favorite Course model), a pair of alternative CBFA models was tested. The alternative 
models specified the four activity group factors and one knowledge group factor instead 
of three separate knowledge group factors.  
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The Knowledge + Favorite Course alternative model fit the data well (χ2 [514] = 
738.757, p < .001, CFI = .953, RMSEA = .039, CI90% .032 to .045). Standardized 
loadings for the model are shown in Table 4.19 and correlations between group factors 
are shown in Table 4.20. Loadings on the general factor were comparable to the general-
factor loadings for the hypothesized Knowledge + Favorite Course model. As can be seen 
in Table 4.19, most of the group factors were comparable to their group-factor  
Table 4.19 
Standardized results for the Knowledge + Favorite Course Alternative CBFA 
 Factor 
 General K S C A T 
DK1 .346 .514     
DK2 .297 .521     
DK3 .414 .505     
DK4 .297 .515     
DK5 .309 .372     
PK1 .164 .478     
PK2 .155 .470     
PK3 .215 .512     
PK4 .239 .402     
PK5 .273 .673     
CK1 .284 .417     
CK2 .253 .435     
CK3 .301 .478     
CK4 .260 .639     
CK5 .257 .507     
S1 .461  .286    
S2 .273  .763    
S3 .315  .367    
S4 .262  .486    
S5 .628  .192    
C1 .568   .231   
C2 .518   .241   
C3 .739   .191   
C4 .607   .003   
C5 .775   -.171   
A1 .403    .629  
A2 .433    .432  
A3 .382    .461  
A4 .414    .417  
A5 .394    .690  
T1 .494     .548 
T2 .390     .678 
T3 .258     .779 
T4 .485     .624 
T5 .149     .440 
Note. K = Knowledge, S = Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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Table 4.20 
Factor correlation matrix for the Knowledge + Favorite Course Alternative CBFA 
 K S C A T 
K 1     
S .454* 1    
C .086 -.232 1   
A .331* .204* .329 1  
T .100 .298* -.469* .071 1 
Note. * p < .05. K = Knowledge, S = Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
 
counterparts in the hypothesized Knowledge + Favorite Course model, with the exception 
of the In Class group factor. 
The Knowledge + Least Favorite Course alternative model fit the data well (χ2 
[514] = 810.006, p < .001, CFI = .936, RMSEA = .044, CI90% .038 to .050). 
Standardized loadings for the model are shown in Table 4.21 and correlations between 
group factors are shown in Table 4.22. Again, the general factor was less well defined, 
and the group factors were more clearly defined than they were for the Knowledge + 
Favorite Course alternative model. Overall, fit indices suggest the alternative models fit 
slightly worse than the hypothesized model, but they are plausible alternatives. Because 
fit was comparable between the hypothesized and alternate models and the patterns of 
factor loadings were similar, the hypothesized models were retained as the basis for scale 
scores used in subsequent analyses. 
Question 2: The Variability Question 
 The Variability Question was tested by comparing participants’ self-reported 
metacognitive regulation and self-regulation across different courses and activities. The 
results of three sets of analyses are reported next. First, MIPSS subscale scores were used 
to test for within-person differences related to course and the interaction between course 
and activity. Second, scores from the MSLQ Metacognitive Self-regulation scale were 
used to test for within-person differences related to course. And third, SPOCK scale  
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Table 4.21 
Standardized results for the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course Alternative CBFA 
 Factor 
 General K S C A T 
DK1 0.235 .595     
DK2 0.091 .625     
DK3 0.172 .641     
DK4 0.360 .528     
DK5 0.189 .447     
PK1 0.331 .389     
PK2 0.236 .415     
PK3 0.261 .473     
PK4 0.149 .441     
PK5 0.377 .610     
CK1 0.054 .516     
CK2 0.050 .536     
CK3 0.188 .532     
CK4 0.085 .692     
CK5 0.356 .457     
S1 0.269  .603    
S2 0.471  .350    
S3 0.546  .211    
S4 0.563  .287    
S5 0.197  .601    
C1 0.272   .619   
C2 0.609   .190   
C3 0.224   .755   
C4 0.311   .425   
C5 0.327   .656   
A1 0.703    .261  
A2 0.245    .615  
A3 0.080    .829  
A4 0.492    .391  
A5 0.009    .714  
T1 0.286     .741 
T2 0.401     .633 
T3 0.336     .554 
T4 0.540     .528 
T5 0.192     .502 




Factor correlation matrix for the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course Alternative CBFA 
 K S C A T 
K 1     
S .133 1    
C .265* .799* 1   
A .275* .427* .531* 1  
T .166* .416* .448* .493* 1 
Note. * p < .05. K = Knowledge, S = Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test. 
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scores were used to test for within-person differences across courses in self-regulation, 
use of knowledge building strategies, and lack of regulation. Descriptive statistics for all 
scales are shown in Table 4.23. 
Table 4.23 
Descriptive statistics for all scales 
Scale N Scale 
length 
M SD Skewness Kurtosis α 
MIPSS        
   DK 293 5 4.29 0.43 -0.04 -0.38 .70 
   PK 293 5 3.75 0.58 -0.32 0.33 .64 
   CK 293 5 3.68 0.56 0.09 -0.11 .67 
   FS 293 5 2.77 0.59 -0.19 0.50 .64 
   FC 293 5 3.10 0.59 -1.08 3.88 .74 
   FA 293 5 3.05 0.64 -1.44 4.39 .76 
   FT 291 5 3.08 0.87 -2.17 5.11 .85 
   LS 293 5 2.55 0.66 -0.17 -0.21 .68 
   LC 293 5 2.68 0.67 -0.43 0.23 .72 
   LA 293 5 2.48 0.64 0.02 -0.21 .70 
   LT 292 5 2.90 0.75 -1.60 3.87 .79 
MAI Knowledge 149 17 77.25 11.55 -0.79 1.12 .88 
MAI Regulation 149 35 67.97 13.67 -0.30 0.08 .94 
MSLQ – favorite 
course 
149 12 4.69 0.85 -0.50 0.43 .79 
MSLQ – least favorite 
course 
149 12 3.86 1.10 -0.03 0.06 .87 
Incremental Theory of 
Intelligence 
144 4 4.28 0.93 -0.39 -0.16 .91 
Entity Theory of 
Intelligence 
144 4 2.65 0.95 0.47 -0.10 .89 
SPOCK – favorite 
course 
       
   Knowledge Building 144 5 3.89 0.80 -0.63 -0.26 .84 
   Self-regulation 144 5 3.74 0.73 -0.29 -0.26 .79 
   Lack of Regulation 144 4 2.08 0.78 0.50 -0.46 .73 
   Cooperative Learning 144 4 3.46 1.17 -0.51 -0.82 .89 
   Teacher Directedness 144 3 4.05 0.72 -0.82 0.85 .56 
SPOCK – least favorite 
course 
       
   Knowledge Building 144 5 3.00 0.94 -0.30 -0.50 .86 
   Self-regulation 144 5 3.35 0.84 -0.41 0.15 .85 
   Lack of Regulation 144 4 3.13 0.90 0.04 -0.51 .72 
   Cooperative Learning 144 4 2.92 1.16 -0.04 -1.11 .88 
   Teacher Directedness 144 3 2.91 1.00 -0.28 -0.81 .79 
Note. The kurtosis statistic is adjusted so that 0 indicates normality. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = 
Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, FS = Favorite Studying, FC = Favorite In Class, FA 
= Favorite Assignment, FT = Favorite Taking a Test, LS = Least Favorite Studying, LC = Least Favorite In 
Class, LA = Least Favorite Assignment, LT = Least Favorite Taking a Test. 
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MIPSS Subscales 
In order to test whether participants’ metacognitive regulation varied across 
courses and academic activities, a two-factor repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted on MIPSS metacognitive regulation subscale scores. Subscale 
scores were calculated as the mean of the subscale items that were used in the CBFAs. 
Partial eta2 (𝜂𝑝
2) was used to interpret the magnitude of effects. The two factors were 
course (two levels) and activity (four levels). The course factor functioned as a true 
repeated measure because the same items were used across the favorite and least favorite 
course factors. The activity factor did not function as a true repeated measure because 
although the same components of metacognitive regulation and experiences were 
represented in each scale, the exact item content varied across activities. As a result, a 
significant main effect of activity could be due to differences in item content, an actual 
difference in metacognitive regulation, or a combination of the two. The interaction 
between course and activity was used to gain indirect insight into the influence of activity 
on metacognitive regulation by determining whether any differences between courses 
were consistent across the different activities. 
Because the activity factor had more than two levels, the assumption of sphericity 
was tested. Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated the assumption of sphericity was 
violated both for activity (Mauchly’s W [5] = .830, p < .001) and the interaction between 
course and activity (Mauchly’s W [5] = .767, p < .001). As a result, the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used to adjust the degrees of freedom used in judging the 
significance of the effect of activity and the interaction between course and activity. 
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Sample means for all levels of course and activity are shown in Table 4.24. The 
main effect of course was significant (F(1, 289) = 116.86, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .288), as was 
the main effect of activity (F(2.662, 769.287) = 37.03, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .114), and the 
interaction between course and activity (F(2.547, 736.197) = 17.40, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .057). 
According to Cohen’s (1988) conventions, the effect of course was large, and the effect 
of activity was medium to large, and the effect of the interaction was small. As is noted 
above, because the activity factor was not a true repeated measure, the main effect of 
activity should not be interpreted as indicating an actual difference in metacognitive 
regulation. 
Because the interaction between course and activity was significant, simple main 
effects were analyzed. The assumption of sphericity was violated for both the test of 
activity within favorite course (Mauchly’s W [5] = .749, p < .001) and within least 
favorite course (Mauchly’s W [5] = .894, p < .001), so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was again used to adjust degrees of freedom for the tests. Within the “favorite” level of 
course, activity had a significant, medium-sized effect (F(2.479, 718.770) = 19.93, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .064), indicating metacognitive regulation varied across activities completed 
for participants’ favorite courses. Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that scores 
for studying were lower (ps < .001) than scores for the other three activities. Within the 
“least favorite” level of course, the effect of activity was significant and close to the 
Table 4.24 
Means and standard deviations for courses and activities 
 Favorite course Least favorite course Cohen’s d 
Studying 2.77 (0.59) 2.55 (0.66) 0.35 
In class 3.10 (0.59) 2.68 (0.67) 0.67 
Assignment 3.05 (0.64) 2.48 (0.64) 0.90 
Test 3.08 (0.87) 2.90 (0.75) 0.22 
Note. Cohen’s d effect size is for the difference between courses for the activity. 
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conventional cutoff for being categorized as large (F(2.806, 816.584) = 39.95, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .121), indicating metacognitive regulation also varied across activities completed for 
participants’ least favorite courses. The larger effect size within the least favorite course 
level indicates there were more differences in the means of least favorite course scales 
than favorite course scales. This difference was also detected in the follow-up pairwise 
comparisons. All differences were significant (ps < .001) except for that between 
studying and completing an assignment.  
Within the “studying” level of activity, the effect of course was significant (F(1, 
292) = 27.84, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .087), indicating participants reported significantly more 
metacognitive regulation while studying for their favorite courses than their least favorite 
courses. Within the “in class” level of activity, the effect of course was significant (F(1, 
292) = 83.47, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .222), indicating participants reported significantly more 
metacognitive regulation while in their favorite courses than their least favorite courses. 
Within the “assignment” level of activity, the effect of course was significant (F(1, 292) 
= 148.30, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .337), indicating participants reported significantly more 
metacognitive regulation while completing assignments for their favorite courses than 
their least favorite courses. And, within the “test” level of activity, the effect of course 
was significant (F(1, 289) = 9.00, p = .003, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .030), indicating participants reported 
significantly more metacognitive regulation while taking tests in their favorite courses 
than their least favorite courses. The range of effect sizes across these four 
comparisons—two being small-to-medium and two being well above the conventional 
cutoff for large—suggest that although students regulate more during activities completed 
  119 
for favorite courses, the magnitude of the difference varies depending on the activity 
being completed. 
MSLQ Metacognitive Self-Regulation Scale 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether participants 
also reported differences in metacognitive self-regulation as measured by the MSLQ. The 
effect of course was significant and large (F(1, 148) = 99.46, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .402), further 
indicating participants engage in more metacognitive regulation in their favorite courses 
(M = 4.69, SD = 0.85) than their least favorite courses (M = 3.86, SD = 1.10). According 
to Cohen’s (1988) conventions, the difference between means also indicates the effect of 
course was large (d = 0.85). 
SPOCK Scales 
 Repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether participants 
also reported course-related differences in self-regulation, knowledge building, and lack 
of regulation, as measured by the SPOCK. There was a significant difference in self-
regulation (F(1, 143) = 32.89, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .187), with participants reporting more self-
regulation in favorite courses (M = 3.74, SD = 0.73) than least favorite courses (M = 3.35, 
SD = 0.84). According to Cohen’s conventions, the difference between means indicates 
the effect of course was moderate (d = 0.50). There was also a large and significant 
difference in knowledge building (F(1, 143) = 106.22, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .426), with 
participants reporting more knowledge building in favorite courses (M = 3.89, SD = 0.80) 
than least favorite courses (M = 3.00, SD = 0.94). The mean difference of the Knowledge 
Building scales also indicates the effect of course was large (d = 1.02). And, there was a 
large and significant difference in lack of regulation (F(1, 143) = 121.82, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
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.460), with participants reporting fewer problems self-regulating in favorite courses (M = 
2.08, SD = 0.78) than least favorite courses (M = 3.13, SD = 0.90). The mean difference 
of the Lack of Regulation scales also indicates the effect of course was large (d = -1.25). 
Question 3: The Association Question 
 The Association Question was tested by regressing achievement measures on 
metacognition and self-regulated learning scales and by correlating scores of the various 
metacognition and self-regulated learning scales. By design, not all participants 
completed all scales, and therefore not all possible pairs of scales could be correlated. 
Results of regression analyses related to achievement measures are reported first, 
followed by results of correlation analyses for the various scales.  
Metacognition, Self-Regulated Learning, and Achievement 
 Measures of metacognition and self-regulated learning were associated with 
measures of achievement via regression analysis. Each metacognition and self-regulated 
learning measure—the MIPSS, MSLQ, and SPOCK scales for favorite and least favorite 
courses and the MAI—were used in regressions for two general measures of achievement 
(i.e., cumulative GPA and composite ACT score) and one specific measure of 
achievement (i.e., course grade). Participants self-reported all achievement measures, 
including SAT scores for those participants who took the SAT but not the ACT. Seven 
SAT scores were converted to ACT equivalents using the concordance tables provided by 
The College Board (“SAT Concordance Tables for Higher Education,” 2016). Twenty-
six other students did not provide ACT or SAT scores and were excluded from the ACT 
scores analyses. One SAT score was not converted because the number provided was not 
a valid score. Self-reported letter grades (e.g., A-) were converted to a 12-point scale, 
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with “A+” = 1 and “F” = 12, and as a result all analyses of grades are such that lower 
values reflect higher letter grades. Participants who reported a grade of “pass” or “no 
pass” were excluded from course grade analyses. No participants reported “pass” or “no 
pass” for favorite courses, and 15 participants reported “pass” or “no pass” for least 
favorite courses. 
 Collinearity diagnostics and residual plots for each analysis were inspected, and 
no issues were detected. For each measure, results for the prediction of GPA are 
presented first, followed by results for ACT scores, and then results for course grades. 
And for each course-specific measure, results are grouped by achievement variable with 
favorite course block presented first, followed by results for the least favorite course 
block. For course-specific measures, course grades were only predicted from measures 
related to that course (e.g., favorite course metacognition scales were used with favorite 
course grades and not least favorite course grades). 
 MIPSS. Statistics for all scales and all analyses are shown in Table 4.25. The set 
of knowledge and favorite course scales accounted for a significant proportion of 
variance in cumulative GPA (R2 = .079, F(7, 283) = 3.48, p = .001). The Procedural 
Knowledge scale was the only individually significant variable (b = 0.195, t = 3.178, p = 
.002). The set of knowledge and least favorite course scales also accounted for a 
significant proportion of variance in cumulative GPA (R2 = .091, F(7, 284) = 4.05, p < 
.001). Again, the Procedural Knowledge scale was the only individually significant 
variable (b = 0.192, t = 3.172, p = .002). Both sets of variables accounted for a medium 
amount of variance in GPA, and greater knowledge of how to regulate cognition was 
associated with higher cumulative GPAs in both models. 
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Table 4.25 
Coefficients for all MIPSS regression analyses 
 b bSE β t p 
GPA      
Favorite course      
   Declarative knowledge 0.013 .080 .012 0.167 .868 
   Procedural knowledge 0.195 .061 .226 3.178 .002 
   Conditional knowledge 0.001 .067 .002 0.021 .983 
   Study 0.009 .060 .010 0.143 .887 
   In class 0.001 .056 .001 0.013 .990 
   Assignment 0.047 .051 .060 0.917 .360 
   Taking a test 0.035 .035 .061 0.994 .321 
Least favorite course      
   Declarative knowledge 0.023 .079 .019 0.288 .773 
   Procedural knowledge 0.192 .061 .222 3.172 .002 
   Conditional knowledge 0.013 .064 .015 0.208 .836 
   Study -0.049 .056 -.064 -0.889 .375 
   In class -0.015 .058 .020 -0.258 .797 
   Assignment 0.072 .055 .091 1.317 .189 
   Taking a test 0.071 .044 .107 1.618 .107 
ACT scores      
Favorite course      
   Declarative knowledge 0.798 .672 .087 1.186 .237 
   Procedural knowledge 0.763 .535 .109 1.426 .155 
   Conditional knowledge -0.005 .587 -.001 -.009 .993 
   Study -0.899 .511 -.132 -1.760 .080 
   In class 0.452 .474 .066 0.955 .340 
   Assignment -0.525 .429 -.085 -1.223 .223 
   Taking a test 0.583 .294 .129 1.988 .048 
Least favorite course      
   Declarative knowledge 0.577 .661 .063 0.872 .384 
   Procedural knowledge 0.598 .528 .085 1.133 .258 
   Conditional knowledge -0.225 .559 -.031 -0.402 .688 
   Study -0.766 .467 -.127 -1.638 .103 
   In class 1.227 .497 .203 2.466 .014 
   Assignment -0.049 .460 -.008 -0.106 .916 
   Taking a test -0.199 .368 -.038 -0.542 .588 
Course grade      
Favorite course      
   Declarative knowledge -0.104 .245 -.030 -0.423 .672 
   Procedural knowledge -0.333 .187 -.128 -1.780 .076 
   Conditional knowledge 0.027 .205 .010 0.133 .894 
   Study 0.266 .183 .102 1.451 .148 
   In class -0.060 .172 -.023 -0.347 .729 
   Assignment -0.403 .156 -.171 -2.582 .010 
   Taking a test -0.107 .108 -.061 -0.984 .326 
Least favorite course      
   Declarative knowledge 0.071 .455 .011 0.156 .876 
   Procedural knowledge -1.123 .343 -.227 -3.271 .001 
   Conditional knowledge 0.186 .365 .036 0.510 .610 
   Study 0.953 .312 .219 3.055 .002 
   In class -0.103 .335 -.024 -0.307 .759 
   Assignment -0.981 .313 -.216 -3.131 .002 
   Taking a test -0.553 .248 -.146 -2.231 .026 
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In the prediction of ACT scores, the set of knowledge and favorite course scales 
did not account for a significant proportion of variance (R2 = .044, F(7, 256) = 1.70, p = 
.109). The knowledge and least favorite course scales also did not account for a 
significant proportion of variance in ACT scores (R2 = .042, F(7, 257) = 1.63, p = .127). 
 In the prediction of course grades, the set of knowledge and favorite course scales 
accounted for a significant proportion of variance (R2 = .064, F(7, 283) = 2.77, p = .008) 
that fell between the small and medium conventions for interpretation. The Assignment 
scale was the only individually significant variable (b = -0.403, t = -2.582, p = .010). 
(Grades were coded with “A+” = 1, so lower values reflect higher letter grades.) More 
frequent metacognitive regulation while completing assignments was associated with 
higher course grades. The set of knowledge and least favorite course scales also scales 
accounted for a significant proportion of variance in course grades (R2 = .145, F(7, 269) 
= 6.53, p < .001) that fell between the medium and large conventions for interpretation. 
The Procedural Knowledge scale (b = -1.123, t = -3.271, p = .001), Study scale (b = 
0.953, t = 3.055, p = .002), the Assignment scale (b = -0.981, t = -3.131, p = .002), and 
the Taking a Test scale (b = -0.553, t = -2.231, p = .026) all made significant 
contributions to the prediction of course grades. Greater knowledge of how to regulate 
cognition and more frequent metacognitive regulation while completing assignments and 
taking tests was associated with higher course grades, as was less frequent metacognitive 
regulation while studying. Though unexpected, the negative relationship between 
regulation while studying and grades appears to be the result of a suppression effect. The 
zero-order correlation between the Studying scale and grades was .02 (non-significant, p 
= .352), but the partial correlation was .183. 
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 MSLQ Metacognitive Self-regulation scale. Statistics for all scales and all 
analyses are shown in Table 4.26. The favorite course scale did not account for a 
significant proportion of variance in cumulative GPA (R2 = .016, F(1, 147) = 2.41, p = 
.123). The least favorite course scale accounted for a significant and small-to-medium 
proportion of variance in cumulative GPA (R2 = .060, F(1, 147) = 9.34, p = .003). Greater 
metacognitive self-regulation was associated with higher cumulative GPAs. 
 In the prediction of ACT scores, the favorite course scale accounted for a 
significant and small-to-medium proportion of variance (R2 = .047, F(1, 132) = 6.55, p = 
.012). The least favorite course scale also accounted for a significant and small-to-
medium proportion of variance in ACT scores (R2 = .061, F(1, 132) = 8.51, p = .004). In 
both cases, greater metacognitive self-regulation was associated with higher ACT scores. 
 In the prediction of course grades, the favorite course scale did not account for a 
significant proportion of variance (R2 = .000, F(1, 147) = 0.004, p = .947). The least 
favorite course scale accounted for a significant and small proportion of variance in 
course grades (R2 = .033, F(1, 142) = 4.86, p = .029). Greater metacognitive self-
regulation was associated with higher grades in least favorite courses. 
Table 4.26 
Coefficients for all MSLQ Metacognitive Self-regulation scale regression analyses 
 b bSE β t p 
GPA      
   Favorite course 0.079 .051 .127 1.551 .123 
   Least favorite course 0.118 .039 0244 3.056 .003 
ACT scores      
   Favorite course 1.084 .423 .217 2.559 .012 
   Least favorite course 0.957 .328 .246 2.918 .004 
Course grade      
   Favorite course -0.010 .150 -.005 -0.067 .947 
   Least favorite course -0.480 .218 -.182 -2.21 .029 
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 SPOCK scales. Statistics for all scales and all analyses are shown in Table 4.27. 
The set of favorite course scales did not account for a significant proportion of variance 
in cumulative GPA (R2 = .046, F(3, 140) = 2.27, p = .083). The set of least favorite 
course scales accounted for a significant and small-to-medium proportion of variance in 
cumulative GPA (R2 = .060, F(3, 140) = 2.98, p = .034). The Lack of Regulation scale 
was the only individually significant variable (b = -0.111, t = -2.58, p = .011). Having 
fewer struggles self-regulating was associated with higher cumulative GPAs. 
 In the prediction of ACT scores, the set of favorite course scales accounted for a 
significant and medium proportion of variance (R2 = .073, F(3, 128) = 3.37, p = .021). 
The Self-regulation scale made a significant contribution to the prediction of ACT scores 
Table 4.27 
Coefficients for all SPOCK regression analyses 
 b bSE β t p 
GPA      
Favorite course      
   Knowledge Building 0.137 .059 .234 2.312 .022 
   Self-regulation -0.020 .065 -.031 -0.307 .759 
   Lack of Regulation 0.013 .050 .022 0.258 .797 
Least favorite course      
   Knowledge Building -0.012 .049 -.025 -0.255 .799 
   Self-regulation 0.066 .054 .119 1.223 .224 
   Lack of Regulation -0.111 .043 -.214 -2.582 .011 
ACT scores      
Favorite course      
   Knowledge Building 0.057 .511 .012 0.111 .911 
   Self-regulation -1.357 .540 -.262 -2.513 .013 
   Lack of Regulation -0.565 .438 -.111 -1.290 .199 
Least favorite course      
   Knowledge Building -0.503 .416 -.126 -1.210 .229 
   Self-regulation 0.231 .463 .051 0.498 .619 
   Lack of Regulation 0.494 .374 .117 1.320 .189 
Course grade      
Favorite course      
   Knowledge Building -0.554 .180 -.298 -3.077 .003 
   Self-regulation 0.248 .196 .122 1.266 .208 
   Lack of Regulation 0.397 .152 .209 2.612 .010 
Least favorite course      
   Knowledge Building -0.120 .316 -.039 -0.379 .705 
   Self-regulation 0.226 .357 .065 0.634 .527 
   Lack of Regulation 0.937 .270 .293 3.464 .001 
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 (b = -1.357, t = -2.513, p = .013). Less frequent self-regulation in favorite courses was 
associated with higher ACT scores. The set of least favorite course scales did not account 
for a significant proportion of variance in ACT scores (R2 = .030, F(3, 128) = 1.30, p = 
.277). 
 In the prediction of course grades, the set of favorite course scales accounted for a 
significant and medium proportion of variance (R2 = .122, F(3, 140) = 6.49, p < .001). 
The Knowledge Building (b = -0.554, t = -3.077, p = .003) and Lack of Regulation (b = 
0.397, t = 2.612, p = .010) scales made significant contributions to the prediction of 
course grades. Greater use of knowledge building strategies and fewer struggles self-
regulating were associated with higher course grades. The set of least favorite course 
scales also accounted for a significant and medium proportion of variance in course 
grades (R2 = .088, F(3, 130) = 4.16, p = .008). The Lack of Regulation scale made a 
significant contribution to the prediction of course grades (b = 0.937, t = 3.464, p = .001). 
Fewer struggles self-regulating were associated with higher course grades. 
 MAI scales. Statistics for all scales and all analyses are shown in Table 4.28. The 
Knowledge of Cognition and Regulation of Cognition scales accounted for a significant 
proportion of variance in cumulative GPA (R2 = .068, F(2, 146) = 5.31, p = .006) that fell 
between the small and medium conventions for interpretation. The Knowledge of 
Cognition scale (b = 0.014, t = 2.321, p = .022) made a significant contribution to the 
prediction of cumulative GPA, but the Regulation of Cognition scale did not. In the 
prediction of ACT scores, the MAI scales again accounted for a significant proportion of 
variance (R2 = .053, F(2, 131) = 3.67, p = .028) that fell between the small and medium 
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Table 4.28 
Coefficients for all MAI Regression Analyses 
 b bSE β t p 
GPA      
   Knowledge of Cognition 0.014 .006 .297 2.321 .022 
   Regulation of Cognition -0.002 .005 -.049 -0.380 .704 
ACT scores      
   Knowledge of Cognition 0.086 .051 .237 1.688 .094 
   Regulation of Cognition -0.003 .044 -.008 -0.058 .954 
Favorite course grade      
   Knowledge of Cognition -0.036 .017 -.273 -2.112 .036 
   Regulation of Cognition 0.010 .015 .092 0.711 .478 
Least favorite course grade      
   Knowledge of Cognition -0.096 .032 -.389 -3.002 .003 
   Regulation of Cognition 0.040 .027 .191 1.477 .142 
 
conventions for interpretation. However, neither scale was an independently significant 
predictor. 
 In the prediction of favorite course grades, the MAI scales accounted for a 
significant and small proportion of variance (R2 = .044, F(2, 146) = 3.35, p = .038). The 
Knowledge of Cognition scale (b = -0.036, t = -2.112, p = .036) made a significant 
contribution to the prediction of favorite course grades, but the Regulation of Cognition 
scale did not. And in the prediction of least favorite course grades, the MAI scales 
accounted for a significant and medium proportion of variance (R2 = .072, F(2, 141) = 
5.46, p = .005). Again, the Knowledge of Cognition scale (b = -0.096, t = -3.002, p = 
.003) made a significant contribution to the prediction of favorite course grades, but the 
Regulation of Cognition scale did not. 
Correlations among Constructs 
 Correlations among scales from the MIPSS, MAI, and SPOCK, the MSLQ 
Metacognitive Self-regulation scale, and the Implicit Theories of Intelligence scales are 
shown in Tables 4.29 through 4.32.  
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Table 4.29 
Correlations among MIPSS scales 
 DK PK CK FS FC FA FT LS LC LA 
DK           
PK .430*          
CK .489* .525*         
FS .323* .308* .417*        
FC  .316* .189* .302* .386*       
FA .315* .338* .275* .339* .382*      
FT .122 .159* .110 .331* .227* .167*     
LS .229* .208* .193* .331* .191* .297* .027    
LC .273* .286* .232* .200* .239* .269* .112 .590*   
LA .237* .319* .213* .229* .143 .220* .222* .380* .499*  
LT .215* .191* .160* .247* .159* .265* .206* .426* .422* .402* 
Note. N = 293, * p < .01. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional 
Knowledge, FS = Favorite Studying, FC = Favorite In Class, FA = Favorite Assignment, FT = Favorite 
Taking a Test, LS = Least Favorite Studying, LC = Least Favorite In Class, LA = Least Favorite 
Assignment, LT = Least Favorite Taking a Test. 
 
 Inspection of Table 4.29 reveals the following relationships among MIPSS scales 
that are discussed further in Chapter 5: a) knowledge subscales were more highly 
correlated with each other than with regulation subscales, b) regulation subscales tended 
to be more strongly related to other regulation subscales for the same course than to 
subscales for a different course, and c) correlations among the least-favorite regulation 
subscales (rs from .380 to .590) tended to be stronger than correlations among the 
favorite regulation subscales (rs from .167 to .386). Also of note, same-activity 
correlations (between the two courses) ranged from .206 to .331, suggesting that even for 
similar academic activities, individuals exhibit considerable variability across courses. 
 The first two columns of Table 4.30 show that, as expected, the MIPSS 
knowledge scales were more strongly correlated with the MAI knowledge scale than the 
MAI regulation scale. However, MIPSS regulation scales were not consistently more 
correlated with MAI regulation scales; in fact, five MIPSS regulation scales had higher 
correlations with the MAI knowledge scale than the MAI regulation scale. The last two 
columns of Table 4.30 show that as expected, same-course correlations among the MSLQ  
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Table 4.30 
Correlations between MIPSS scales and MAI and MSLQ Metacognitive  
Self-regulation scales 








DK .490* .300* .332* .053 
PK .530* .356* .347* .252* 
CK .474* .393* .387* .190 
FS .513* .435* .485* .228* 
FC .364* .339* .526* .126 
FA .346* .273* .507* .179 
FT .267* .269* .345* .122 
LS .319* .383* .350* .578* 
LC .267* .272* .330* .488* 
LA .370* .300* .261* .408* 
LT .302* .217* .113 .261* 
Note. N = 149, * p < .01. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional 
Knowledge, FS = Favorite Studying, FC = Favorite In Class, FA = Favorite Assignment, FT = Favorite 
Taking a Test, LS = Least Favorite Studying, LC = Least Favorite In Class, LA = Least Favorite 
Assignment, LT = Least Favorite Taking a Test. 
 
Metacognitive Self-regulation scale and the MIPSS regulation scales were stronger than 
opposite-course correlations. 
 Correlations among MIPSS scales and SPOCK scales also revealed stronger 
correlations for scales pertaining to the same course. As is shown in Table 4.31, the 
favorite-course Knowledge Building scale correlated with only three of the MIPSS 
scales, but the least-favorite-course Knowledge Building scale correlated with seven of 
the MIPSS scales, including all four least-favorite-course regulation scales and one 
favorite-course scale. All eight same-course correlations between the SPOCK Self-
regulation scales and MIPSS were significant, and two of the eight opposite-course 
correlations were significant. The SPOCK Lack of Regulation scales showed little 
relationship with MIPSS scales. 
 Finally, Table 4.32 shows correlations among MIPSS scales and constructs that 
were expected to be unrelated to metacognition. These results followed expectations with  
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Table 4.31 

























DK .165 .217* .184 .275* -.263* -.094 
PK .225* .134 .213 .190 -.186 -.173 
CK .110 .244* .324* .284* -.083 -.086 
FS .202 .267* .549* .475* .053 .071 
FC .367* .129 .341* .187 -.097 .006 
FA .265* .164 .217* .321* -.048 -.048 
FT .087 .117 .285* .174 -.001 -.220* 
LS .028 .346* .214 .693* -.095 -.095 
LC .072 .498* .084 .494* -.175 -.161 
LA .153 .357* .209 .404* -.053 -.435* 
LT .133 .246* .189 .426* -.080 -.191 
Note. N = 144, * p < .01. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional 
Knowledge, FS = Favorite Studying, FC = Favorite In Class, FA = Favorite Assignment, FT = Favorite 
Taking a Test, LS = Least Favorite Studying, LC = Least Favorite In Class, LA = Least Favorite 
Assignment, LT = Least Favorite Taking a Test. 
 
only a small number of these correlations achieving statistical significance. Overall, the 
observed correlations supported the hypotheses. MIPSS knowledge scales were more 
correlated with the MAI Knowledge of Cognition scale than the MAI Regulation of 
Cognition scale, same-course scales were more correlated than opposite-course scales, 
and scales measuring classroom perceptions and theories of intelligence mostly were 
unrelated to the MIPSS scales. 
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Table 4.32 



















DK .052 .058 .072 .036 .053 -.062 
PK .114 .128 -.116 -.027 -.001 -.120 
CK .071 .176 -.008 .009 .126 -.141 
FS .111 .231* .147 -.048 .182 -.131 
FC .238* .081 .214 .005 .095 -.081 
FA .123 .046 .008 .046 .196 -.141 
FT -.005 .149 .178 .092 .104 -.126 
LS -.074 .047 -.001 .186 .121 -.085 
LC -.054 .153 .018 .116 .107 -.081 
LA -.083 .211 -.063 .309* .239* -.162 
LT .035 .051 -.029 .070 .127 -.161 
Note. N = 144, * p < .01. The Cooperative Learning and Teacher Directedness scales are part of the 
SPOCK. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, FS = 
Favorite Studying, FC = Favorite In Class, FA = Favorite Assignment, FT = Favorite Taking a Test, LS = 
Least Favorite Studying, LC = Least Favorite In Class, LA = Least Favorite Assignment, LT = Least 
Favorite Taking a Test. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 This chapter contains a discussion of the results of this dissertation. The research 
questions and subsequent analyses addressed three identified gaps in the research 
literature. The Factor Structure Question and associated bi-factor analyses addressed the 
gap in the literature related to the factor structure of self-report questionnaires that 
measure metacognition in post-secondary students. The Variability Question and 
associated repeated-measures ANOVAs addressed the gap related to within-person 
differences in metacognitive regulation: this dissertation is one of only a few empirical 
demonstrations of within-person variability in metacognitive regulation and SRL. And, 
the Association Question and associated correlation and regression analyses addressed 
the gap related to the previously found weak associations of off-line measures of 
metacognition with achievement and on-line measures of metacognition by testing the 
possibility that differences in the context specificity of measured variables weakens the 
observed relationships. In this chapter, results relating to the three research questions are 
discussed in order, followed by limitations and future directions for research, and final 
conclusions. 
Question 1: The Factor Structure Question 
 Prior research examining the factor structure of metacognition instruments has 
often failed to extract the factor structures hypothesized to correspond to the instruments. 
Though the hypothesized structure was not produced exactly as expected in all analyses 
in this dissertation, results from the bi-factor analyses conducted to test the Factor 
Structure Question suggest a bi-factor model approximates the MIPSS data from this 
dissertation reasonably well. Considering how rarely factor analyses of metacognition 
  133 
instruments, especially EFA, have returned the hypothesized structure (e.g., Hilpert et al., 
2013; McClendon, 1996; Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Sperling et al., 2002; Tock & 
Moxley, 2017), the results of the bi-factor analyses in this dissertation are notable. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, all MIPSS items loaded on a general metacognition 
factor, and groups of items loaded on group factors specific to the activity or the 
knowledge type represented in the item. Exploratory bi-factor analyses were conducted to 
test alternate models with theoretically plausible numbers of factors. As expected, the 
eight-factor solution fit well and was most interpretable for both the favorite course and 
least favorite course data. In addition to the general metacognition factor, the group 
factors mostly corresponded to the three components of metacognitive knowledge and the 
four activities represented in the metacognitive regulation items, though there was not a 
clear Assignment factor in either eight-factor solution. This bi-factor structure indicates 
responses to the MIPSS were influenced by a general metacognition component, but 
there was unique variance associated with the different activities and types of knowledge.  
For both the Knowledge + Favorite Course and the Knowledge + Least Favorite 
Course eight-factor solutions, most of the items had factor pattern coefficients above 0.40 
for the general metacognition factor, and all but one of the items had factor pattern 
coefficients above 0.30. Factor pattern coefficients for the group factors were more 
variable, and not all items had coefficients > .20 on the expected factor. Most correlations 
between MIPSS group factors were < .20 and all were < .30, indicating, that after 
accounting for the general metacognition factor, group factors were mostly unassociated 
with other group factors. 
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 The three other solutions that were considered did not show the same level of fit 
and interpretability as the eight-factor solution. The expected result of the three-factor 
solution was a general metacognition factor, a knowledge factor, and a regulation factor. 
This pattern would have shown that after accounting for the metacognition factor 
common to all items, there remained unique metacognitive knowledge and regulation 
components. Published factor analyses of the MAI (e.g., Schraw & Dennison, 1994) 
support the distinction between metacognitive knowledge and regulation in that 
instrument, and its scoring yields scores for those two factors. Given the strong 
correlations that have been reported for the two MAI factors (e.g., Hammann, 2005; 
Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Schraw et al., 1995; Sperling et al., 2004), it is plausible that 
a bi-factor model with three factors would fit the MAI or a similarly designed instrument, 
such as the MIPSS. However, the three-factor solution for the MIPSS data did not 
produce factors as expected. For both sets of items, a mix of knowledge and regulation 
items had factor pattern coefficients equal than or greater to 0.20 on each of the two 
group factors, and the items that loaded on each factor were different for the two three-
factor solutions. Therefore, after accounting for the variability shared by all items, the 
knowledge and regulation items sets are not distinct enough to comprise separate group 
factors.  
 The expected result of the six-factor solution was a general metacognition factor, 
a single knowledge factor, and one factor for each of the four activities represented in the 
MIPSS. This result would have indicated that after accounting for the metacognition 
factor common to all items, there was a unique metacognitive knowledge factor that did 
not distinguish between the three knowledge components, and the metacognitive 
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regulation items captured variability unique to the activity indicated in the item. 
However, the Knowledge + Favorite Course six-factor solution returned group factors 
that generally corresponded to declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, two of the 
activities (i.e., taking a test and completing an assignment), and a combination of 
conditional knowledge and regulation items with both positive and negative factor pattern 
coefficients. The Knowledge + Least Favorite Course six-factor solution returned group 
factors that generally corresponded to declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, 
conditional knowledge, and two different sets of regulation items. Contrary to what was 
expected for the six-factor solution, after accounting for the variance common to the 
general metacognition factor, the knowledge components had relatively distinct group 
factors and factors composed of regulation items did not align with the activities 
represented in the items. 
 The expected result of the nine-factor solution was a general metacognition factor, 
one group factor for each of the components of metacognitive knowledge, and one group 
factor for each of the five components of metacognitive regulation (i.e., controlling, 
evaluating, monitoring, planning, and metacognitive experiences). This result would have 
indicated that after accounting for the metacognition factor common to all items, there 
was unique variability associated was each of the three metacognitive knowledge 
components and the five metacognitive regulation components. This structure is the bi-
factor equivalent to what was originally hypothesized for the structure of the MAI 
(Schraw & Dennison, 1994), but exploratory factor analysis did not yield this structure 
for the MAI either. Based on the results of this dissertation and Schraw and Dennison 
(1994), it appears that the components of metacognitive regulation are unlikely to emerge 
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as distinct factors when factor analyzed. In fact, I am unaware of any studies that have 
found factors reflecting components of metacognitive regulation. This repeated failure of 
the components of metacognitive regulation to emerge as separate factors suggests at 
least two possibilities: (a) during learning, metacognitive regulation processes are 
intertwined to the point that using one almost certainly leads to using others, or (b) the 
“lines” that have been drawn between processes in theories of metacognition do not 
divide up regulatory processes in a way that reflects how learners regulate their cognition. 
The Knowledge + Favorite Course nine-factor solution returned a strong general 
metacognition factor, three factors mostly aligned with three of the activities represented 
in the regulation items, and two factors mostly aligned with two of the knowledge 
components. Three of the factors were not interpretable, and none aligned with the 
components of metacognitive regulation. Similarly, the Knowledge + Least Favorite 
Course nine-factor solution did not reflect the hypothesized structure. There was again a 
strong general metacognition factor, but few of the group factors were interpretable, and 
several items cross-loaded with factor pattern coefficients > .20 on multiple group 
factors. 
 The bi-factor structure of the MIPSS was replicated by the confirmatory factor 
analyses. Both the Knowledge + Favorite Course and Knowledge + Least Favorite 
Course models fit the data well, but there were some differences between the two models 
in terms of item loadings and factor correlations. Notably, the general metacognition 
factor was stronger in the Knowledge + Favorite Course model than the Knowledge + 
Least Favorite Course model. All but two items had loadings on the general factor > .20 
in the Knowledge + Favorite Course model, but ten items had loadings on the general 
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factor < .20 in the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course model. And, both CBFA models 
had weaker general metacognition factors than the EBFA models. The strength of the 
CBFA group factors was similar for the two models: loadings for individual items 
differed in some instances, but overall loadings on the group factors were strong, which 
was not the case for the EBFAs.  
 The largest difference between the results of the exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analyses was the strength of the correlations among the group factors. Whereas the 
EBFA eight-factor solutions returned factor correlations that were mostly weak, several 
of the factor correlations from the CBFA models were strong, with several rs > .50. It is 
possible that the differences in factor correlations is related to the differences in the 
strength of the general metacognition factor. The general factor captures variance shared 
by all the items, and factor correlations capture variance shared by groups of items. If less 
shared variance is explained by the general factor, more variance is available to be 
captured by factor correlations. However, it is unclear whether this difference is due to 
differences between the two samples or the way (co)variance is distributed to factors 
through the two analyses.  
 The strong correlations among the three metacognitive knowledge components 
led to the decision to test alternate CBFA models that had a single metacognitive 
knowledge factor. These alternate models also fit the data well and should be tested again 
in future studies to determine whether this more parsimonious model should be used in 
place of the more complex hypothesized model. Regardless of whether the hypothesized 
model or the alternate model is ultimately determined to be more appropriate for the 
MIPSS, the group factors associated with the four activities indicate that there is 
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variability associated with the activity represented in the item that is separate from one’s 
general tendency to use metacognition. Although the bi-factor models did not test for 
unique variability associated with the course, the results do suggest that individuals’ 
metacognitive regulation varies across activities. This effect of activity could introduce 
multidimensionality into the scores of instruments that include multiple activities. For 
example, the MSLQ Metacognitive Self-regulation scale contains items that reference 
studying, reading for the course, and being in class. Using a single score for an 
instrument that includes multiple activities might force a unidimensional scale onto data 
that are inherently multidimensional, and therefore obscure differences among 
individuals that are captured by the data. In such cases, separate scores for the various 
activities, like those generated from the MIPSS, would be appropriate. 
 Theoretical frameworks group the subcomponents of metacognitive knowledge, 
the processes used to regulate cognition, and experiences related to awareness of 
cognition under the same broad label—metacognition—suggesting that although the 
components are distinct, they are all part of the same construct. Previously tested factor-
analysis models have attempted to capture these relationships among metacognitive 
knowledge, metacognitive regulation, and metacognitive experiences through 
hierarchical and correlated-factors (oblique) models. These models represent the general 
metacognition construct through the relationships among components derived from the 
common variability their factors share. The bi-factor model offers an alternate way to the 
model the complex nature of metacognition. The bi-factor model represents the general 
metacognition construct as common variability at the item-level, not the factor-level, and 
the components are derived from common variability that remains after removing the 
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variability associated with the general factor. The bi-factor actually shows more clearly 
than hierarchical and correlated-factors models that metacognitive knowledge, 
metacognitive regulation, and metacognitive experiences are all part of the same 
construct.  
Additionally, the general metacognition factor and activity-specific group factors 
generated from the MIPSS data are consistent with Hong (1998) and Mujagić and Buško 
(2013) that suggest there are both trait-like and state-like aspects of metacognition. The 
general factor shows commonality across the activities, and therefore captures a more 
stable, trait-like component of metacognition. The group factors for the activities show 
that there are also differences associated with different activities; that is, there are also 
state-like facets that are less stable. 
Question 2: The Variability Question 
Metacognitive regulation takes place within a specific context that is made up of 
multiple interacting factors. Theory predicts that these factors contribute to within-person 
differences in metacognitive regulation, but to date there has been little research to test 
for within-person differences or their possible causes. The published research on within-
person differences has mostly focused on differences in regulation in different courses 
(Ben-Eliyahu & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2015; Coertjens et al., 2016; Vermetten et al., 
1999). In this dissertation, course and activity were isolated as important contextual 
factors that are likely to influence metacognitive regulation. Results from the repeated-
measures ANOVAs used to test the Variability Question support the hypothesis that 
metacognitive regulation is influenced by context. As hypothesized and in line with 
findings reported by Ben-Eliyahu and Linnenbrink-Garcia (2015), participants 
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consistently reported more regulation in their favorite course than their least favorite 
course. Most effect sizes were moderate or large, indicating undergraduate students 
exhibit appreciable differences in self-regulation across different courses. The MASRL 
model (Efklides, 2011) suggests a Motivation Hypothesis might explain this difference: 
one’s level of motivation (associated with liking the course) at the person level influences 
one’s regulation at the person x task level. Self-regulating requires additional effort, and 
it appears that in preferred courses students have the necessary motivation to put forth the 
additional effort required for self-regulation. However, the person and person x task 
levels are reciprocally influential, and it is possible that courses that require or induce 
greater self-regulation come to be viewed as favorite courses. Directionality of influence 
cannot be determined by the analyses conducted in this dissertation. 
In the analysis of MIPSS subscales, the significant interaction between course and 
activity provides some evidence that metacognitive regulation is also influenced by the 
activity in which one is engaged. The interaction effect indicates the influence of course 
differed across activities; the effect sizes for the mean differences between courses 
ranged from d = 0.22 for taking a test to d = 0.90 for completing an assignment. The 
variability in effect sizes suggests some activities elicit similar levels of metacognitive 
regulation regardless of the course for which they are completed, while other activities do 
not. Again, the Motivation Hypothesis provides an explanation. For example, tests tend to 
be motivating regardless of the course, so students are likely to put forth the extra effort 
required to self-regulate during most tests. As a result, one can expect students to report 
that their metacognitive regulation during tests is relatively similar across courses. In 
contrast, assignments tend to contribute less to one’s overall grade than tests, and 
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assignments are likely to vary widely in their perceived utility. As a result, a student 
might attach the label “busy work” to an assignment, especially if the assignment is for a 
course that is not well liked. If an assignment is not valued as a learning experience or as 
a grade, it is unlikely a student will invest the effort required to regulate while completing 
the assignment. 
Taken together, these results indicate metacognitive regulation varies across 
contexts to a meaningful degree. This finding has implications for researchers who study 
metacognitive regulation and SRL. First, context-general measures of regulation 
completely mask within-person variability in regulation that is introduced by differences 
in context. Requiring participants to indicate what they “usually” do, by mentally 
averaging their behavior across a large number of contexts might not be appropriate 
because there is evidence that regulatory behaviors are substantially influenced by 
context. This is especially true when other variables (e.g., motivation, achievement) being 
studied are context-specific. Although a measure of one’s “average” metacognitive 
regulation might be useful in some situations, it is unclear whether participants are able to 
provide a true average of regulation over all contexts or if, for example, they rely on a 
small number of recent experiences to generate responses to context-general measures.  
Second, multiple components of the context have the potential to influence 
metacognitive regulation. When designing studies, researchers should be mindful of the 
degree to which contextual features of the study align with the instruments used to 
measure metacognitive regulation. For example, when using self-report instruments to 
study the relationship between metacognitive regulation and study strategies, researchers 
should select an instrument that primarily measures regulation during studying. 
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Instruments that cover a wide range of activities or an activity other than studying will 
not measure metacognitive regulation in a way that is most relevant for that study. 
Finally, findings from this study support and extend previous research (Ben-
Eliyahu & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2015; Coertjens et al., 2016; Vermetten et al., 1999) that 
indicates metacognitive regulation is influenced by context. However, little is known 
about which specific contextual factors (e.g., prompts to regulate, student-centered 
instruction) influence regulation or what can be done by educators to encourage 
regulation. The finding that students regulate more for their favorite courses than their 
least favorite courses suggests general preference or motivation for the course plays a 
role. And, the finding that the effect of course varies across activities suggests other 
general contextual factors can influence regulation. Future research should explore other 
contextual factors that might influence regulation, such as whether a course is “live” or 
online. Additionally, research that identifies and targets fine-grained contextual factors 
(e.g., working independently vs. collaboratively) could lead to principled 
recommendations for fostering metacognitive regulation through instructional design. 
Question 3: The Association Question 
 Off-line, self-report measures of metacognition have been criticized for failing to 
correlate with achievement and other measures of metacognition. However, this criticism 
has been based mostly on research that compares self-report instruments with measures 
of metacognition and achievement with different levels of specificity, such as comparing 
a context-general questionnaire and a think-aloud protocol, which is inherently task-
specific. In this dissertation, self-report measures of metacognitive regulation and SRL 
with different levels of specificity were compared and used to predict multiple indictors 
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of academic achievement in order to determine how the context specificity of the 
variables impacted the observed relationships. 
Regression Analyses 
 Empirical evidence (e.g., Dent & Koenka, 2015; Shell & Soh, 2013) supports 
theoretical frameworks that indicate metacognition and SRL are related to learning and 
achievement (e.g., Efklides, 2011). However, the degree to which research has detected 
the relationship with achievement varies according to how metacognition or SRL and 
achievement are measured. In this dissertation, metacognition and SRL were measured 
by self-report instruments with varying levels of context specificity, and achievement was 
measured by ACT scores, cumulative GPA, and grades in two different courses. Results 
of the regression analyses partially supported the hypotheses. As hypothesized, the 
MIPSS and SPOCK scales tended to predict variance in course grades better (in terms of 
effect size, R2) than the general measures of achievement—GPA and ACT scores. Also 
consistent with the hypothesis, the course-specific MIPSS and SPOCK scales predicted 
course grades better than the context-general MAI. Contrary to the hypothesis, the MSLQ 
Metacognitive Self-regulation scale predicted variance in general measures of 
achievement better than grades and was worse than the MAI at predicting grades. The 
MAI scales predicted all achievement measures comparably, with R2 ranging from .044 
for favorite course grades to .072 for least favorite course grades. 
 Most predictions of achievement were small or medium in terms of effect size 
(R2), and the best predictions fell between medium and large. These results are consistent 
with prior research that has also found weak to moderate associations between measures 
of metacognition and achievement (e.g., Kitsantas et al., 2008; Sperling, Richmond, 
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Ramsay, & Klapp, 2012; Young & Fry, 2008). The SPOCK scales predicted about 12% 
of the variance in favorite course grades, and the MIPSS scales predicted about 15% of 
the variance in least favorite course grades. Notably, the SPOCK Self-regulation scale, 
which is conceptually the most similar to the MIPSS scales, was only a significant 
predictor in one model—the prediction of ACT scores from SPOCK scales completed in 
reference to a favorite course. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the variance accounted for by the context-general 
measure, the MAI, was fairly similar to course- and activity-specific scales. Interestingly, 
the MAI Regulation scale was never a significant predictor of achievement, but the MAI 
Knowledge scale was significant in three of the four regression models. For the only 
other measure with knowledge scales, the MIPSS, the Procedural Knowledge scale was 
the most consistently significant predictor variable. From a theoretical perspective, this 
finding suggests explicit awareness of how to manage one’s own cognition is particularly 
important to academic success at the undergraduate level. From a research perspective, 
this finding suggests that metacognitive knowledge scales might be particularly helpful in 
predicting achievement. 
Though not related to a specific hypothesis, the least favorite scales for the 
MIPSS and the MSLQ yielded larger R2 values for grades than their favorite course 
counterparts. This might be due to the skew and range restriction of favorite course 
grades: the distribution of favorite course grades was higher and less variable (i.e., 
contained mostly “As” and “Bs”) than the distribution of least favorite course grades. 
Restriction of range in the criterion variable can reduce the explanatory power of 
predictor variables and might have caused the consistently lower R2 values for the 
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favorite course analyses. Future research that uses different course achievement variables 
that have less range restriction (e.g., final exam scores) might be better able to determine 
whether there are meaningful differences in how course-specific measures of regulation 
relate to achievement. For the SPOCK scales, the R2 for favorite course grades was larger 
than the R2 for least favorite course grades. This difference appears to be due to the 
relationship between grades and the use of knowledge building strategies that was 
significant in favorite courses but not least favorite courses. For favorite courses, students 
who reported using more knowledge building strategies earned higher grades, but this 
relationship was not observed in least favorite courses. 
Correlation Analyses 
 Results of correlation analyses supported the hypotheses and followed the 
framework shown in the theoretical framework (see Figure 3.1). First, correlations among 
the MIPSS and MAI knowledge scales were strong and larger than all but one of the 
correlations between a knowledge scale and a regulation scale (i.e., r = .513 for MIPSS 
Favorite Studying and MAI Knowledge), suggesting these scales measure a component 
of metacognition that is partially distinct from metacognitive regulation. The 
convergence of these knowledge scales and the unique contributions knowledge scales 
made to the prediction of achievement suggest that metacognitive knowledge is a 
conceptually distinct component of metacognition that might provide unique insight into 
students’ SRL. For example, metacognitive knowledge might be a key component in 
identifying the difference between an availability deficiency and a production deficiency 
(Veenman, 2013b). Students who fail to regulate effectively or apply a needed strategy 
might do so because they do not know how—an availability deficiency—or because they 
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know how but choose not to do so—a production deficiency. Assessing metacognitive 
knowledge could be an efficient way to distinguish between the two. Alternately, one 
could assess regulation in a variety of contexts to determine whether regulation failures 
happen in a limited number of contexts or all contexts. The former would indicate a 
production deficiency while the latter would indicate an availability deficiency.  
Second, as hypothesized, in all but one instance, course-specific regulation scales 
(i.e., MSLQ Metacognitive Self-regulation scale and SPOCK Self-regulation scale) were 
more strongly related to MIPSS regulation scales for the same course than to scales for 
the opposite course. The same-course correlations were in the moderate-to-strong range 
according to Cohen’s guidelines. These relationships indicate participant responses 
yielded course-specific variability that was consistent across measures and support the 
broader hypothesis that context influences regulation. The SPOCK Lack of Regulation 
scale, however, showed little correlation with the MIPSS regulation scales. This is 
probably because the Lack of Regulation scale measures a different component of SRL 
than most self-regulation scales; whereas most self-regulation scales measure what an 
individual does to regulate cognition or behavior, the Lack of Regulation scale measures 
struggles in self-regulating and a reliance on others to guide regulation (Shell & Husman, 
2008).  
Third, the Implicit Theories of Intelligence scale and the SPOCK classroom 
perception scales were mostly unrelated to the MIPSS scales, indicating implicit theories 
of intelligence and classroom perceptions are distinct from metacognition. Although SRL 
theory and the theoretical framework indicate motivation should be related to regulation, 
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implicit theories of intelligence are domain- and context-general beliefs and therefore 
were not expected to be associated with context-specific measures of regulation.  
Somewhat contrary to the hypothesis, the MIPSS regulation scales’ correlations 
with the MAI regulation scale were only slightly weaker than the correlations between 
the MIPSS regulation scales and the same-course regulation scales. As hypothesized, the 
MAI regulation scale – MIPSS regulation scales correlations were generally moderate in 
strength, but the correlations between the MIPSS regulation scales and same-course 
regulation scales ranged from moderate to strong. This overlap in ranges might be due to 
the bi-factor nature of the MIPSS scales: the general metacognition factor is more likely 
to correlate with the context-general MAI and context-specific group factors are more 
likely to correlate with the context-specific SPOCK and MSLQ. Factor scores that 
remove the influence of the general factor from the group factors might be able to tease 
apart these sources of influence and clarify the relationships among the different scales. 
 Two additional findings are of interest but are not related to any specific 
hypotheses. First, correlations among the MIPSS least-favorite course regulation scales 
(rs from .380 to .590) tended to be stronger than correlations among the MIPSS favorite 
regulation scales (rs from .167 to .386). If motivation for the course and activity features 
are drivers of regulation, as was proposed in the theoretical framework, this difference in 
the strength of correlations suggests general motivation for a course is a bigger influence 
than activity features in least favorite courses, and students’ regulation (relative to other 
students) varies more across activities completed for favorite courses. Second, same-
activity correlations (between the two courses) were weak to moderate, indicating that 
students’ level of metacognitive regulation during a given activity does not uniformly 
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increase or decrease based on how well they like a course. It is possible that some 
students are more consistent in their use of metacognitive regulation than others. Students 
who rely more heavily on external motivators, such as the instructor, to inspire the 
additional effort required to self-regulate are more likely to exhibit variability in their 
regulation, but students who are self-motivated and can maintain the effort need to self-
regulate on their own are less likely to exhibit that variability across courses. A mix of 
these two types of students would result in same-activity correlations that are weak. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 There are several important limitations that must be considered when evaluating 
the results of this dissertation. They are discussed next, along with suggestions for 
addressing these limitations in future research. Additional possible avenues for future 
research are also presented. 
 First, the decision to use “favorite” and “least favorite” courses might have 
affected the results in unknown ways. The decision was based on the desire to capture 
maximal differences between courses as well as the practical constraint of students being 
enrolled in different courses. If the Motivation Hypothesis is correct, asking participants 
about their favorite and least favorite courses likely increased the differences between the 
two courses and decreased differences between individuals for a given course, which 
would increase the observed effect of course on metacognitive regulation (as tested in 
The Variability Question). However, a reduction in variability within a given course 
would also impact the factor analyses, regressions, and correlations, likely decreasing 
factor loadings and associations between individual items (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007a), 
which may explain why Vermetten and colleagues (1999) found much higher 
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correlations—most above .60 and several above .80—among students’ scores on three 
measures of regulation in four courses. It is therefore important that the factor structure 
and psychometric properties of the MIPSS be examined in a future study that does not 
specify the course based on the students’ preference for the course. Ideally, participants 
in the study would be students in a cohort-style program that prescribes the set of courses 
students take so that students in the program take the same courses in a given semester, 
similar to the sample in the study conducted by Vermetten and colleagues (1999). Then, 
all participants in the study could be asked about the same set of courses and there would 
most likely be more variability in responses because students would have a wider range 
of feelings about the course. 
 Second, it was not possible to directly test the effect of activity on metacognitive 
regulation because the MIPSS metacognitive regulation items were not the exact same 
items repeated for the different activities, and the other instruments did not have activity 
specific scales. The activity group factors in the bi-factor analysis and the significant 
interaction between course and activity in the repeated-measures ANOVA suggest that 
there is a separate effect of activity, but additional research is needed to directly test the 
effect of activity. Obtaining parallel measures of metacognitive regulation during 
different activities will be challenging. If a self-report instrument like the MIPSS is used, 
items must be the same for each activity so that any measured differences are due to 
differences in metacognition and not differences in item content. If on-line measures such 
as observations or computer logfiles are used, the selected activities must allow for 
participants to regulate in a way that can be inferred by the researcher and also be similar 
enough that comparable scoring schemes can be used.  
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 A third limitation has to do with the timing of data collection. Participants in 
Study 2 completed the survey in mid-January and were asked to reference courses taken 
during the previous (fall 2016) semester when responding to the course-specific items. It 
is preferable for participants to provide responses related to courses they are taking at the 
time of the survey, as was the case in Study 1, because the time lapse between the events 
being queried and the survey administration likely reduced the accuracy of the responses 
to course-specific items (Groves et al., 2009). A reduction in accuracy could reduce 
reliability by introducing additional error into individuals’ observed scores on the scales. 
However, future research is needed to determine the extent to which such delayed 
administration impacts the accuracy of responses and the instruments’ properties. 
 Fourth, the sample size of each of the studies limited the number of items that 
could be included in the factor analyses. The final version of the MIPSS contains 26 
knowledge items and 45 regulation items (presented twice), but only 15 knowledge items 
and 20 regulation items were included in each factor analysis. The samples in these two 
studies meet the liberal sample size recommendations of 300 cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007a) or 5 cases for every variable in the factor analysis (Gorsuch, 1983), but a greater 
case-to-variable ratio is needed to increase the stability of factors (MacCallum, Widaman, 
Zhang, & Hong, 1999). If the full MIPSS scales are to be used in the future, additional 
research with enough participants to factor analyze the full instrument is needed. 
 Fifth, the participants in this dissertation were recruited from courses in the 
college of education at a single large, public university. Participants self-identified as 
mostly White and female. As a result, the sample is not representative of the population 
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of undergraduate students at this university or in the United States. Studies of other, more 
diverse populations are needed before generalizations to the population can be made. 
 Finally, three additional avenues for future research have been encountered 
through the completion of this dissertation. First, the notion of availability and production 
deficiencies in regulation (Veenman, 2013b) suggests students differ in how consistently 
they regulate their cognition. Identifying the type of deficiency being exhibited would 
enable educators to better intervene when students fail to regulate effectively. Future 
research should test the possibility of identifying the type of deficiency a student is 
exhibiting by classifying students based on the consistency of their regulation across 
different contexts.  
Second, the MIPSS metacognitive regulation response scale (“almost never” to 
“almost always”) had an option, “I’m not sure if I do/did this,” that was scored as zero. 
This is in line with theory, as knowing one does not use a particular regulation tactic 
requires metacognitive awareness, but a lack of awareness of how one regulates (“I’m not 
sure”) indicates less metacognition than only failing to regulate. However, the question of 
whether this “I’m not sure” option reflects a point on the same latent scale as the 
frequency options is an empirical one that ought to be addressed by future research. 
Furthermore, with the delay between the courses and survey administration in Study 2, 
the “I’m not sure” option might have actually functioned as an “I can’t remember” 
option, which would not be expected to fall on the latent metacognition scale.  
Finally, bi-factor models only recently have begun to be used in applied research, 
and technical recommendations are less readily available for bi-factor analysis than for 
traditional factor analysis. One important question that has yet to be answered is how 
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reliably EBFA and CBFA will recover the same known model. Gerbing and Hamilton 
(1996) demonstrated the effectiveness of using traditional exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analysis as complements in determining factor structure, but, to my knowledge, 
this has not yet been demonstrated for the bi-factor case. With the increasing popularity 
of bi-factor models and the likelihood that researchers will use EBFA as a foundation for 
a later CBFA, as was done in this dissertation, it is important to establish the 
appropriateness of generalizing this practice from traditional factor analysis to bi-factor 
analysis. 
Conclusions 
 Context is important. The ways students self-regulate and engage metacognition 
while learning differs across the various contexts in which learning occurs. Although this 
statement is intuitively true and backed by theory, there is little empirical evidence to 
support it. The results of this dissertation provide initial evidence that the specific activity 
being completed and the course for which it is completed are important factors that 
influence the degree to which undergraduate students self-regulate their cognition. The 
influence of these factors might also influence the relationships between measures of 
metacognition and achievement that are observed in research. When these contextual 
factors are represented within a self-report measure of metacognition, those factors might 
introduce multidimensionality and a need for multiple scales so that the data may be 
better reflected by the scores. Overall, it appears that within-person differences in 
metacognition should be taken into account in measurement, research, and practice.  
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APPENDIX A 
Complete List of Instruments and Items from Study 1 
Note. Instructions shown to participants are given in italics. 
This survey is grouped into four sections. In the first section, you will rate a favorite and 
least favorite course on a variety of characteristics. In the next two sections, you will see 
a series of statements and then provide a response for that statement. The final section 
contains basic demographic questions and appears on a single page. 
Please read the directions, statements, and response options carefully. There are not 
right and wrong answers: what is important is that you answer truthfully.  
 
Please think of a specific course you consider one of your favorites. You will be asked to 
think about this course again later in the survey. Indicate the extent to which you agree 
with the following statements. 
 
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = 
agree, 5 = strongly agree 
 
1. The course is challenging. 
2. Class meetings are engaging. 
3. I am motivated to learn. 
4. The teacher supports my learning. 
5. Class activities contribute to my learning. 
6. What I am learning will help me in the future. 
7. I am interested in the topics we are learning about. 
 
Please think of a specific course you consider one of your least favorites. You will be 
asked to think about this course again later in the survey. Indicate the extent to which you 
agree with the following statements. 
 
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = 
agree, 5 = strongly agree 
 
1. The course is challenging. 
2. Class meetings are engaging. 
3. I am motivated to learn. 
4. The teacher supports my learning. 
5. Class activities contribute to my learning. 
6. What I am learning will help me in the future. 
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 Metacognitive knowledge. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
Please be sure to respond to each item. 
 
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = 
agree, 5 = strongly agree 
 
1. I understand my strengths and weaknesses when it comes to school. 
2. I know which subjects are easier for me. 
3. I purposefully structure my study area so I can focus on my studying. 
4. I know where I rank among my friends when it comes to academic ability. 
5. I know when my ideas and perspectives differ from those of my classmates. 
6. How much I learn depends on how well I focus on the material. 
7. I control how much I learn in class. 
8. I know which types of homework assignments require more work than others. 
9. I know which types of tests require more studying than others. 
10. Some of the study strategies I use are more effective than others. 
11. I could describe how I study to someone else. 
12. I don’t know how to keep myself from getting distracted while doing school work.  
13. I know how to motivate myself to learn when I need to. 
14. I try to think about issues from other people’s points of view. 
15. I know how to find extra information to clarify topics I don’t understand.  
16. I have learned a variety of different strategies that I can use while studying. 
17. I know how to create a detailed plan that will help me complete long-term 
assignments on time. 
18. I know how to keep track of my progress while doing my school work. 
19. I don’t know how to organize my thoughts and ideas while writing a paper. 
20. I have a specific process I follow when I write papers. 
21. I don’t know where to start when I have to put together a presentation. 
22. I don’t really understand what I’m supposed to do while studying. 
23. I have figured out what time of day I am able to do my best work for school. 
24. I know when during the week I am able to do my best work for school. 
25. I know where I am able to do my best work for school. 
26. I know who I should go to if I need help learning a topic. 
27. I think about how my friends influence my motivation for school. 
28. I know what influences how much a person learns during a lecture. 
29. I can identify the factors that contribute to how much a person learns during a study 
session. 
30. I don’t really know why I use the strategies that I use. I guess it’s just what I’ve 
always done. 
31. I can recognize when a strategy won’t work well for a certain assignment. 
32. I know how to change my study strategies so that I can be successful in hard classes. 
33. I take time to think about what study strategies will work best with the subject I am 
studying. 
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 Metacognitive regulation and experiences. 
This scale was presented twice. Each time the directions indicated which class was to be 
the target of responses. 
 
This section is divided into eight subsections (across four pages). In each subsection you 
will be asked to think about a situation within either the favorite or least favorite course 
you rated earlier.  
Please indicate how frequently you do each of the following activities in the given 
situation. If you are unsure whether you ever do what the statement says, choose “I’m not 
sure if I do this.” 
 
Response scale: 0 = I’m not sure if I do this, 1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 
4 = almost always 
 
While studying for the class I consider one of your [least/favorites] … 
1. I set goals for what I will accomplish during the session before I begin studying. 
2. I sit down and start studying without much of a plan. 
3. I am aware of how well I understand a passage while I am reading it. 
4. I am aware of how much I am learning while I study.  
5. I look for ways to make my studying more effective. 
6. After I complete a reading assignment, I realize I had not been paying attention to 
what I was reading. 
7. When I realize I didn’t understand what I read, I reread it. 
8. I get distracted while studying. 
9. I take steps to remove distractions from my study area.  
10. I make sure I have time to study for the class. 
11. I create a plan to space out my study sessions before a test. 
12. I use practice questions (my own or from the text books/study guides) to test my 
understanding of the material. 
13. I take time to consider whether I am using the best strategies. 
14. I can sense what topics will be more challenging to learn. 
15. I can determine what I do and do not understand. 
16. I can tell how well I understand the material. 
17. At the end of the study session I am aware of what information I will need to study 
again. 
18. I can tell whether or not I need to spend more time studying a topic. 
19. I can sense whether or not my study strategies are being effective. 
 
While in the class you consider one of your [least/favorites] … 
1. I am prepared to learn when class starts. 
2. I intentionally think about what was taught in previous lectures before the instructor 
presents new information.  
3. I am aware of what I do and do not understand during lectures. 
4. After class I add things to my notes that I didn’t get written down during the lecture. 
5. I ask myself questions to see how well I understand what is being presented during 
the lecture. 
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6. I am able to keep myself focused on the lecture. 
7. I try to connect new information to things I already know. 
8. I can tell how easy or challenging it will be for me to learn a new topic. 
9. I sense how well I understand a topic compared to the rest of the class. 
10. I am able to identify any topics I need to study on my own later. 
 
While doing an assignment for the class I consider one of my [least/favorites] … 
1. I think about the steps I’ll take to complete the assignment before I begin working. 
2. I start working without much of a plan. 
3. I find myself completing the assignment at the last minute. 
4. I make plans so I can get all my work for the class done. 
5. I can explain my thought processes to someone else when working on a problem. 
6. I catch my errors as I am working.  
7. I accurately predict what grade I am going to get on an assignment before I turn it in. 
8. I take time to step back and critically assess my own work.  
9. I get distracted while working. 
10. I am able to maintain my focus on the assignment until I am finished. 
11. I can accurately estimate how much effort an assignment will require. 
12. I can tell how challenging an assignment is going to be. 
13. I can tell when my work on an assignment meets the instructor’s expectations. 
14. I am not sure what grade I will get when I turn in an assignment. 
 
While taking a test in the class I consider one of my [least/favorites] ... 
1. I am aware of what I am thinking as I recall information during tests. 
2. I keep track of how well my test-taking strategies are working. 
3. I am able to maintain my focus on the test. 
4. I intentionally use specific strategies when taking tests. 
5. I go back and check my answers before turning in the test. 
6. Before I leave for class, I make sure I have all the materials I need for the test. 
7. I have a hard time remembering things that I know I have learned. 
8. I read the instructions carefully before starting the test. 
9. I am aware of how confident I am in my answers while taking tests. 
10. I can tell when I know an answer but can’t think of it right away. 
11. I am surprised by the grade I get on tests. 
 
Demographic Items 





e. Other: _____ 
2. My gender is 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Prefer to not answer 
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□ Middle Eastern/Arabic 
□ Other: _____ 
4. My cumulative GPA is ___. (please report one decimal value; e.g., 3.4) 




(The answer to item 9 determined whether item 10 or 11 was shown.) 
6. What was your combined SAT score (critical reading and math sections)? (Report 
your highest combined score if you took the SAT more than once.) 
7. What was your ACT composite score? (Report your highest composite score if you 
took the ACT more than once.) 
8. Are you a first-generation college student? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
9. Have you ever received training on study skills? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
10. I am participating in this study because I am a student in… 
a. EDPS 209 
b. EDPS 250 
c. EDPS 251 
d. EDPS 362 
e. EDPS 457 
11. My instructor for that course is… 
(options not shown for privacy)  
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APPENDIX B 
Complete List of Instruments and Items from Study 2 
Note. Instructions shown to participants are given in italics. MIPSS items that were used 
in scale scores are bolded. Reverse scored items are indicated by “(reversed)”. Reverse 
scoring instructions and scale headings (underlined) were not shown to participants. 
 
Courses and Ratings 
Please name a specific course you consider one of your favorites that you took 
during the previous semester (Fall 2016). You will be asked about this course 
throughout the survey. If you know the course code (e.g., MATH 100), please use it as 
your response here. 
 
Please name a specific course you consider one of your least favorites that you took 
during the previous semester (Fall 2016). You will be asked about this course 
throughout the survey. If you know the course code (e.g., MATH 100), please use it as 
your response here. 
 
With regard to [favorite class], indicate the extent to which you agree with the following 
statements. 
 
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = 
agree, 5 = strongly agree 
 
1. The course was challenging. 
2. Class meetings were engaging. 
3. I was motivated to learn. 
4. The teacher supported my learning. 
5. Class activities contributed to my learning. 
6. What I learned will help me in the future. 
7. I am interested in the topics we learned about. 
 
With regard to [least favorite class], indicate the extent to which you agree with the 
following statements. 
 
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = 
agree, 5 = strongly agree 
 
1. The course was challenging. 
2. Class meetings were engaging. 
3. I was motivated to learn. 
4. The teacher supported my learning. 
5. Class activities contributed to my learning. 
6. What I learned will help me in the future. 
7. I am interested in the topics we learned about. 
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 Metacognitive knowledge. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
Please be sure to respond to each item. 
 
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = 
agree, 5 = strongly agree 
 
Declarative knowledge 
1. I understand my strengths and weaknesses when it comes to school. 
2. I know which subjects are easier for me.  
3. I know when my ideas and perspectives differ from those of my classmates. 
4. How much I learn depends on how well I focus on the material. 
5. I control how much I learn in class. 
6. I know which types of assignments require more work than others. 
7. I know which types of tests require more studying than others. 
8. I could describe how I study to someone else. 
9. Some of the study strategies I use are more effective than others. 
 
Procedural knowledge 
10. I don’t know how to keep myself from getting distracted while doing school 
work. (reversed) 
11. I know how to motivate myself to learn when I need to. 
12. I have learned a variety of different strategies that I can use while studying. 
13. I know how to create a detailed plan that will help me complete long-term 
assignments on time. 
14. I know how to keep track of my progress while doing my school work. 
15. I don’t know how to organize my thoughts and ideas while writing a paper. (reversed) 
16. I don’t know where to start when I have to put together a presentation. 
(reversed) 
17. I don’t really understand what I’m supposed to do while studying. (reversed) 
 
Conditional knowledge 
18. I have figured out what time of day I am able to do my best work for school. 
19. I know when during the week I am able to do my best work for school. 
20. I know where I am able to do my best work for school. 
21. I know who I should go to if I need help learning a topic. 
22. I know what influences how much a person learns during a lecture. 
23. I can identify the factors that contribute to how much a person learns during a 
study session. 
24. I can recognize when a strategy won’t work well for a certain assignment. 
25. I know how to change my study strategies so that I can be successful in hard 
classes. 
26. I take time to think about what study strategies will work best with the subject I 
am studying. 
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 Metacognitive regulation and experiences. 
This scale was presented twice. Each time the directions indicated which class was to be 
the target of responses. 
 
This subsection is divided across four pages. On each page you will be asked to think 
about situations related to either the favorite or least favorite course you rated earlier.  
Please indicate how frequently you did each of the following activities in the given 
situation. If you are unsure whether you ever did what the statement says, choose “I’m 
not sure if I did this.” 
 
Response scale: 0 = I’m not sure if I did this, 1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 
4 = almost always 
 
Studying 
When it came to studying for [least/favorite class] … 
1. I set goals for what I wanted to accomplish during the session before I began 
studying. 
2. I was aware of how well I understood a passage while reading it. 
3. I was aware of how much I was learning while studying.  
4. I looked for ways to make my studying more effective. 
5. I got distracted while studying. (reversed) 
6. I took steps to remove distractions from my study area.  
7. I made sure I had time to study for the class. 
8. I created a plan to space out my study sessions before a test. 
9. I used practice questions (my own or from the text books/study guides) to test my 
understanding of the material. 
10. I took time to consider whether I was using the best strategies. 
11. I could sense what topics would be more challenging to learn.   
12. I could determine what I did and did not understand. 
13. I could tell how well I understood the material. 
14. At the end of the study session I was aware of what information I needed to study 
again. 
15. I could tell whether or not I needed to spend more time studying a topic. 
 
In Class 
While in [least/favorite class] (while attending class) … 
1. I could tell how easy or challenging it was going to be for me to learn a new 
topic. 
2. I was prepared to learn when class starts. 
3. I intentionally thought about what was taught in previous lectures before the 
instructor presented new information.  
4. I was aware of what I did and did not understand during lectures. 
5. I could sense how well I understood a topic compared to the rest of the class. 
6. I added things that I didn’t get written down during the lecture to my notes after class. 
7. I asked myself questions to see how well I understood what is being presented during 
the lecture. 
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8. I was able to keep myself focused on the lecture. 
9. I tried to connect new information to things I already know. 
10. I was able to identify any topics I needed to study on my own later. 
 
Assignment 
While doing assignments for [least/favorite class] … 
1. I thought about the steps I’d take to complete the assignment before I began working. 
2. I made plans so I could get all my work for the class done. 
3. I could explain my thought processes to someone else when working on a 
problem. 
4. I caught my errors as I was working.  
5. I accurately predicted what grade I was going to get on an assignment before 
turning it in. 
6. I took time to step back and critically assess my own work.  
7. I got distracted while working. (reversed) 
8. I was able to maintain my focus on the assignment until I was finished. 
9. I could accurately estimate how much effort an assignment would require. 
10. I could tell how challenging an assignment was going to be.  




When it came to taking tests in [least/favorite class] … 
1. I was aware of how confident I was in my answers. 
2. I was aware of what I was thinking as I recalled information. 
3. I kept track of how well my test-taking strategies were working. 
4. I was able to maintain my focus on the test. 
5. I went back and checked my answers before turning in the test. 
6. I made sure I had all the materials I needed for the test before I left for class. 
7. I had a hard time remembering things that I knew I had learned. (reversed) 
8. I read the instructions carefully before starting the test. 
9. I could tell when I knew an answer but couldn’t think of it right away. 
 
Survey Branch A 
 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 
Please indicate how true each of the following statements are about you.  
 
Response scale: 0=not at all true, 100=completely true, all middle values were unlabeled 
 
1. I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my goals.  
2. I consider several alternatives to a problem before I answer.  
3. I try to use strategies that have worked in the past.  
4. I pace myself while learning in order to have enough time.  
5. I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses.  
6. I think about what I really need to learn before I begin a task.  
7. I know how well I did once I finish a test.  
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8. I set specific goals before I begin a task.  
9. I slow down when I encounter important information.  
10. I know what kind of information is most important to learn.  
11. I ask myself if I have considered all options when solving a problem.  
12. I am good at organizing information.  
13. I consciously focus my attention on important information.  
14. I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use.  
15. I learn best when I know something about the topic.  
16. I know what the teacher expects me to learn.  
17. I am good at remembering information.  
18. I use different learning strategies depending on the situation.  
19. I ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after I finish a task.  
20. I have control over how well I learn.  
21. I periodically review to help me understand important relationships.  
22. I ask myself questions about the material before I begin.  
23. I think of several ways to solve a problem and choose the best one.  
24. I summarize what I’ve learned after I finish.  
25. I ask others for help when I don’t understand something.  
26. I can motivate myself to learn when I need to.  
27. I am aware of what strategies I use when I study.  
28. I find myself analyzing the usefulness of strategies while I study.  
29. I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses.  
30. I focus on the meaning and significance of new information.  
31. I create my own examples to make information more meaningful.  
32. I am a good judge of how well I understand something.  
33. I find myself using helpful learning strategies automatically.  
34. I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension.  
35. I know when each strategy I use will be most effective.  
36. I ask myself how well I accomplish my goals once I’m finished.  
37. I draw pictures or diagrams to help me understand while learning.  
38. I ask myself if I have considered all options after I solve a problem.  
39. I try to translate new information into my own words.  
40. I change strategies when I fail to understand.  
41. I use the organizational structure of the text to help me learn.  
42. I read instructions carefully before I begin a task.  
43. I ask myself if what I’m reading is related to what I already know.  
44. I reevaluate my assumptions when I get confused.  
45. I organize my time to best accomplish my goals.  
46. I learn more when I am interested in the topic.  
47. I try to break studying down into smaller steps.  
48. I focus on overall meaning rather than specifics.  
49. I ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am learning something 
new.  
50. I ask myself if I learned as much as I could have once I finish a task.  
51. I stop and go back over new information that is not clear.  
52. I stop and reread when I get confused.  
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Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire – Metacognitive Self-Regulation 
scale 
This scale was presented twice. Each time the directions indicated which class was to be 
the target of responses. E.g., “For the following items, please answer with regard to 
[least/favorite class].” 
 
Scale: 1 = not at all true of me, 7 = very true of me, 2-6 were unlabeled 
 
1. During class time I often miss important points because I’m thinking of other things. 
(reversed) 
2. When reading for this course, I make up questions to help focus my reading. 
3. When I become confused about something I’m reading for this class, I go back and 
try to figure it out. 
4. If course materials are difficult to understand, I change the way I read the material. 
5. Before I study new course material thoroughly, I often skim it to see how it is 
organized. 
6. I ask myself questions to make sure I understand the material I have been studying in 
this class. 
7. I try to change the way I study in order to fit the course requirements and instructor’s 
teaching style. 
8. I often find that I have been reading for class but don’t know what it was about. 
(reversed) 
9. I try to think through a topic and decide what I am supposed to learn from it rather 
than just reading it over when studying. 
10. When studying for this course I try to determine which concepts I don’t understand 
well. 
11. When I study for this class, I set goals for myself in order to direct my activities in 
each study period. 
12. If I get confused taking notes in class, I make sure I sort it out afterwards. 
 
Survey Branch B 
 
Student Perceptions of Classroom Knowledge Building Scale 
This scale was presented twice. Each time the directions indicated which class was to be 




General Self-Regulation – 4, 7, 9, 11, 20  
Knowledge Building – 2, 8, 12, 14, 19  
Lack of Regulation – 5, 10, 15, 21,  
Cooperative Learning – 1, 6, 16, 18 
Teacher Directed Classroom – 3, 13, 17 
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For items on this page, use the following scale: 
5 - Almost always -- > Usually or always occurred: on a rare occasion, it may not have 
occurred.  
4 - Often ----------- > Occurred frequently: occurred about ¾ of the time. 
3 - Sometimes ----- > Occurred about half of the time. 
2 - Seldom --------- > Did not occur often: occurred about ¼ of the time. 
1 - Almost never ---- > Occurred on a very rare occasion or not at all. 
 
1. In this class, my classmates and I actively worked together to complete assignments.  
2. As I studied the topics in this class, I tried to think about how they related to the 
topics I was studying in other classes. 
3. In this class, the instructor told us what the important information was.  
4. In this class, I set goals for myself which I tried to accomplish.  
5. In this class, I couldn’t figure out how I should study the material.  
6. In this class, my classmates and I actively worked together to help each other 
understand the material. 
7. In this class, I tried to determine the best approach for studying each assignment.  
8. In this class, I focused on those topics that were personally meaningful to me.  
9. In this class, I tried to monitor my progress when I studied. 
10. In this class, when I got stuck or confused about my schoolwork, I needed someone 
else to figure out what I needed to do.  
11. In this class, I made plans for how I would study. 
12. In this class, I tried to examine what I was learning in depth.  
13. In this class, the instructor focused on getting us to learn the right answers to 
questions.  
14. As I studied a topic in this class, I tried to consider how the topic related to other 
things I know about. 
15. In this class, I relied on someone else to tell me what to do.  
16. When I did my work in this class, I got helpful comments about my work from other 
students. 
17. In this class, the instructor gave us specific instructions on what we were to do.  
18. In this class, my classmates and I actively shared ideas.  
19. In this class, I tried to fully explore the new information I was learning.  
20. In this class, I thought about different approaches or strategies I could use for 
studying the assignments. 
21. In this class, I had difficulty determining how I should be studying the material. 
 
Implicit Theories of Intelligence scale 
For each statement below, indicate how much you agree or disagree with it. 
 
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = mostly disagree, 4 = mostly 
agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree 
Scale items 
 Incremental – 2, 4, 5, 8 
 Entity – 1, 3, 6, 7 
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1. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can’t really do much to change it. 
2. No matter who you are, you can significantly change your intelligence level. 
3. To be honest, you can’t really change how intelligent you are. 
4. You can change even your basic intelligence level considerably. 
5. No matter how much intelligence you have, you can always change it quite a bit. 
6. Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very much. 
7. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence. 
8. You can always substantially change how intelligent you are. 
 
Digital Distraction Items 
These items were presented twice. Each item indicated which class was to be the target of 
responses. 
 
1. Which of the following digital devices did you ever use during [least/favorite class] 
for non-class purposes? (Select all that apply.) 
□ Smart (cell) phone 
□ Laptop 
□ Smart watch 
□ iPad/tablet 
□ iPod/mp3 player 
□ Other: _____ 
 
2. In [least/favorite class], I used my digital devices for non-class purposes: 
a. A lot (13+ times per class) 
b. Often (10-12 times per class 
c. Sometimes (7-9 times per class) 
d. Seldom (4-6 times per class) 
e. Rarely (1-3 times per class) 
f. Never (0 times per class 
 
3. In [least/favorite class] when I used my digital devices for non-class purposes, I 
missed instruction: 
a. A lot (13+ times per class) 
b. Often (10-12 times per class) 
c. Sometimes (7-9 times per class) 
d. Seldom (4-6 times per class) 
e. Rarely (1-3 times per class) 
f. Never (0 times per class) 
 
4. In [least/favorite class], what percentage of the time do you spend using your digital 
devices for non-class purposes? (Please enter digits and no percentage sign.) 
 
5. Which of the following most accurately describes the technology policy for 
[least/favorite course]? 
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a. This course has a policy against using mobile technology for non-class 
purposes, but this policy does not deter me because the instructor does 
not enforce the policy. 
b. This course has a policy against using mobile technology for non-class 
purposes, but this policy does not deter me even though the instructor 
enforces the policy. 
c. This course has a policy against using mobile technology for non-class 
purposes and this policy does deter me because the instructor enforces the 
policy. 





12. How old are you? 
 
13. What is your major? If you have not declared a major, please type "undeclared". 
 





e. Other: _____ 
 
15. My gender is 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Prefer to not answer 
 





□ Middle Eastern/Arabic 
□ Other: _____ 
 
17. What was your final grade in [favorite class]? 
 
18. What was your final grade in [lease favorite class]? 
 
19. My cumulative GPA is ___. (Please report two decimal values, if known; e.g., 3.47) 
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(The answer to item 20 determined whether item 21 or 22 was shown.) 
21. What was your combined SAT score (critical reading and math sections)? (Report 
your highest combined score if you took the SAT more than once.) 
 
22. What was your ACT composite score? (Report your highest composite score if you 
took the ACT more than once.) 
 
23. I am participating in this study because I am a student in… 
a. EDPS 209 
b. EDPS 250 
c. EDPS 251 
d. EDPS 320 
e. EDPS 362 
f. EDPS 457 
g. EDPS 459 
 
Engagement Check Items 
(Appearing within the MIPSS, taking tests for [least favorite class] [item 107-116]) 
I did not care if I passed. 
 
(Appearing within either the MSLQ [item 172] or the SPOCK [item 154]) 
For quality purposes, please select [2 (MSLQ) or seldom (SPOCK)] for this item. 
 
Face-to-face questions 
1. For how much of the survey did you read the items and response options carefully? 
a. The whole survey 
b. Most of it (about 75%) 
c. About half of it 
d. A small part of it (about 25%) 
e. None of it 
 
2. For how much of the survey did you put effort into answering as honestly as you 
could? 
a. The whole survey 
b. Most of it (about 75%) 
c. About half of it 
d. A small part of it (about 25%) 
e. None of it 
 
